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ABSTRACT
»
The aim of the thesis is to examine changes in the recent labour market experience of 
women relative to men. It uses micro economic data from the mid-1970s to the mid- 
1990s. The thesis has seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction. In the 
second chapter trends in the gender pay gap across the full wage distribution are 
examined, and the impact of rising wage inequality on the earnings differential is 
assessed for full time workers. Chapter 3 examines changes in the relative earnings of 
part-time female workers relative to full-time men and women. It finds that part-time 
workers, in contrast to those working full time, have failed to increase their earnings 
relative to men over recent decades. Chapter 4 examines the impact of children on 
female wages in seven countries. The wage penalty to having children is found to 
vary substantially across countries, and is greatest in the UK. The fifth chapter looks at 
earnings differentials across education groups. It finds that demand shifts for more 
educated workers have outweighed recent increases in supply, and lead to increases in 
their relative wages. This shift in demand towards more educated workers has been 
particularly marked for women. In Chapter 6 changes in the gender pay gap across 
cohorts are examined. It suggests that while the pay gap widens considerably between 
the ages of 20 and 35, for more recent birth cohorts the pay gap has grown more 
slowly with age. It finds that the largest improvements in relative earnings over recent 
decade have been among more educated women of child bearing age. Finally, Chapter 
7 concludes.
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tCHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines changes in female employment and earnings vis-a-vis men since 
the 1970s. There is a large literature on the gender pay gap in the UK and elsewhere. 
However, much of the previous analysis of the gender pay gap has focused on average 
female earnings. What distinguishes this thesis is that trends in female earnings and 
employment across the wage distribution, across qualification groups and for full and 
part-time workers are examined separately. The thesis is largely empirical, and draws 
on a wide range of micro economic data sources.
The rise in female labour force participation over recent decades has been one 
of the most striking changes to occur in Western industrialised countries labour 
markets. In the United Kingdom the labour force participation rate of women aged 15- 
64 rose from 46 percent in 1960 to 65 percent by 1991. Equally striking trends are 
observed in other countries: the United States saw an increase in the analogously 
defined female labour force participation rate from 43 to 68 percent between 1960 and 
1991; in France, comparable figures were 47 and 57 percent; in Germany the rise was 
from 49 percent to 59 percent.1 At the same time, the gender pay gap has been falling 
in most countries, although significant cross-country differences remain. For example 
in 1994-8, in the UK the full-time ratio of female to male weekly earnings gender was 
is 75 percent, and in US 76 percent, compared to a ratio of 84 percent in Sweden, 87 
percent in Australia and 90 percent in Belgium (Blau and Kahn 2000). There have 
been a number of studies that have analysed cross-country differences in the gender 
pay gap (see, for instance, Blau and Kahn, 1992, 1995, 1996, and 1998; Callan, 
Adams, Dex, Gustafsson, Schupp, and Smith, 1996). These have tended to place 
particular emphasis on the importance of differences in wage structures to the pay gap.
In Britain, three other major labour market trends define the period from the 
late 1970s to the mid-1990s. First, the period saw a dramatic and well-documented rise 
in wage inequality for men (see, for instance, Machin 1996a, Schmitt 1995). One of
1. The source for these numbers is various issues of the OECD Economic 
Outlook.
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tthe main explanations for increasing wage inequality has been that the demand for 
skilled labour has increased, and this has been reflected in increasing wage premiums 
for those with higher educational qualifications and more work experience. The second 
major trend has been the shift in labour demand away for the manufacturing towards 
service sector employment. Thus while the 28 percent of all jobs were in 
manufacturing, and 60 in services in 1978, by 2000 the share of manufacturing in 
employment had fallen to 19 percent while services employment share had grown to 
76 percent.2 These shifts in labour demand have tended to favour women, who make 
up fewer than 30 percent of the manufacturing workforce but account for over one half 
of all service sector workers. The third trend is the rise in the number of employees 
who work part time. Between 1984 and 1999 the number of part time jobs in the 
economy grew by 37 percent, from 4.97 to 6.82 million jobs.3 Consequently, the share 
of employees working part time grew from 25 to 33 percent. While the majority of 
part-time workers are still women (80 percent in 1999), men are increasingly likely to 
work part time. The incidence of part-time employment doubled for men (from 4.3 
percent to 9.1 percent of male jobs) while for women it remained constant at around 45 
percent of all female employees between 1984 and 1999.4
The second chapter of this thesis brings together two of these labour market 
trends and examines the implications of rising wage inequality in the UK for the 
female/male wage differential in Britain for full-time workers. Data from the General 
Household Survey (GHS) shows that from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s a 
significant closing of the average gender wage gap is found, with most of this 
improvement occurring in the late 1980s. However, this chapter argues that, as this 
time period saw very large rises in wage inequality in Britain, to properly consider 
women's relative wage position one should also look at the impact of rising wage 
inequality on the gender wage differential. This is important because, if one group of 
workers is less skilled than another then, as wage inequality increases the relative wage 
of the less skilled group will decline ceterus paribus. It is important therefore, in a
2 Source: Labour Force Survey data available from wwww.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/tsdataset.asp.
3 Source: Labour Force Survey.
4 Source: Social Trend 2000, available from wwww.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/xsdataset.asp.
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period of rising wage inequality, to separate out the effects of changes in gender 
specific factors affecting the gender pay gap from those that affect the pay gap via the 
wage structure. Blau and Kahn (1992) have done this for the US. They find that there 
rising wage inequality since the late 1970s has hampered the narrowing of the male / 
female wage gap. They suggest that while female employees have made significant 
improvements in their labour market skills, and in spite of a decline in 
‘discrimination’, the trend of rising wage inequality has hampered women’s progress 
to equality. Chapter Two of this thesis uses Blau and Kahn’s methodology to assess 
the impact of rising wage inequality on the gender wage gap in the UK. The chapter 
also documents other reasons for a change in the full-time gender pay gap, such as the 
improved educational profile of women vis a vis men and changes in the industrial and 
occupational structure of male and female employment.
Chapter 2 looks only at the experience of full-time workers. Forty five percent 
of female employees, however, work part-time and these workers are the focus of 
Chapter 3. The separation of workers into full time versus part time categories may 
clearly be problematic, particularly as among part-time workers the number of hours 
worked may be very heterogenous. However, while this limitation is recognised, the 
division seems justified because evidence suggests that part timers are treated 
differently to full-time workers, in terms of recruitment and in the ways in which those 
working shorter hours are rewarded and promoted.
Previous work on part-time female earnings in the UK has been done by 
Ermisch and Wright (1993), who used data from the 1980 Women and Employment 
Survey to examine differences in returns to full-time and part-time female employment 
characteristics. Elsewhere a number of other studies have looked at similar issues 
using American data (Blank (1988), Long and Jones (1979)) and Canadian data 
(Simpson (1986)). No work has, however, been done on changes in part-timers’ 
relative earnings over time in the UK. Data from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) 
shows that in 1993, average hourly earnings of part-time women were equal to only 81 
percent of the full-time female average. This full-time / part-time earnings gap has, 
however, emerged only recently: in the 1970s, there was little difference in female 
average earnings by employment status. Chapter 3 uses a range of data sets to
13
examine the emergence of the full-time / part-time pay gap and to examine differences 
in returns to full-time and part-time female employees’ characteristics, and changes in 
these differences in returns, from the mid 1970s until the early 1990s. The chapter then 
assesses how much of the deterioration in the relative earnings position of part timers 
can be attributed to changes in characteristics and how much is due to an increase in 
the penalty for working part time.
Chapter 4 of the thesis moves on to examine the impact of children on 
women’s wages in seven industrialised countries. Much of the literature on the gender 
pay gap, cited earlier, takes as given that much of the differential between women and 
men is due to the fact that women bear children and have primary responsibility in 
most instances for caring or arranging care for them. It is thought that more 
progressive family policies in Nordic countries, for example, are important in 
explaining the relatively small gender pay gaps observed there. Studies within 
countries provide evidence of a persistent family gap in pay between women with 
children and women without children (see, for instance, Joshi, Paci, and Waldfogel, 
1999, and Waldfogel, 1997a and 1997b on the U.S.). However, evidence comparing 
the family gap across countries has been lacking. Thus, we do not know whether 
countries have similar family gaps, or whether countries that have a larger family gap 
have a larger gender gap in pay. We also do not know much about the relationship 
between the employment effects of children and the wage effects of children. In 
countries where children have a large negative effect on women’s employment, do 
they also have a large negative effect on women’s wages, or is the opposite true? Put 
another way, do women in some countries accommodate their family responsibilities 
by reducing their employment while women in other countries instead remain in 
employment but at lower wages? The objective of Chapter 4 is to examine cross­
country differences in the pay penalty to having children, and to examine the 
relationship that this bears to the gender pay gap.
Chapter 5 of the thesis looks at the returns to education for men and women. 
Increasing returns to education have been an important component of the rise in male 
wage inequality (Machin 1996b and Schmitt 1995) in the 1980s. In this chapter 
changes in the wage returns to education from the 1970s to the late 1990s are
14
examined separately for men and women. Since the 1970s, the female labour force has 
become much better qualified, and this has implications both for trends in female 
employment and earnings. By examining changes in the supply of educated workers, 
and changes in the wage premiums received by more educated workers, we can infer 
something about what has happened to the demand for labour generally, and in 
particular the relative demand for educated female workers. It has been suggested that 
increased demand for skilled workers has resulted from skill biased technological 
change (SBTC) (see Bound and Johnson 1992 or Johnson 1997). It could be the case 
that such a demand shift has tended to favour women. This too is tested here using 
data on computer usage, and this is assessed as a possible factor behind the narrowing 
of the gender pay gap.
Chapter 6 of the thesis examines the impact of improvements in the earnings of 
women on employment. Using data from 1974 and 1998 it looks at the evolution of 
the gender pay gap over the lifecycle for different year of birth cohorts. It attempts to 
assess the extent to which changes in the gender pay gap can be attributed to changes 
over time, differences across cohorts and differences by ages. It then goes on to assess 
the impact of demographic factors, shifts in relative female labour supply and demand, 
and inequality on the gender wage gap.
Together these five analytical chapters provide an account of some the major 
changes in patterns of female employment in the UK over the last thirty years or so. 
They also provide some evidence on how the labour market experience of British 
women differed from that of women in other industrialised countries in the 1990s. 
Major trends in employment and earnings are reviewed, and particular attention is paid 
to the employment experience of women at different points of the wage distribution, 
across qualification groups and for full and part-time workers. Together these chapters 
aim to improve our understanding of female employment, earnings and inequality.
15
CHAPTER TWO
t
CHANGES IN FULL-TIME WOMEN’S WAGES IN BRITAIN 
2.1. Introduction
This chapter examines recent trends in the gender pay gap in Britain. Analysis 
of data from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) reveals that, while women have 
improved their relative wage position over the last twenty-five years, these gains have 
been concentrated into two sub-periods. The first very well known increase coincides 
with the introduction of the Equal Pay Act in 1975. The second, rather less well known, 
period of improvement occurred from about 1988 onwards.
The empirical analysis considers information from several of the large-scale 
British micro-data sources. Each provides complementary evidence on various issues of 
interest and we feel that one can obtain a much more coherent picture by drawing on 
several data sets, each of which has limitations that make generalisation from a single 
source rather difficult.
As the period studied saw very large rises in wage inequality in Britain it also 
seems necessary and important to look at the potential impact of this on the gender wage 
differential. Decompositions based on the full wage distribution are therefore 
considered, and we find that the observed rise in wage inequality limited the closing of 
the gender wage gap. Had the structure of wages remained at the level of the mid-1970s 
the gender wage differential would have closed more by the 1990s than it did in practice. 
Thus it seems that looking at the evolution of the entire wage distribution is vital for 
examining changes in women's relative wage position. The estimates also suggest that, 
even with the observed closing of the gender wage gap, by the 1990s women were still 
paid substantially less than men in otherwise comparable jobs and that the rise in wage 
inequality has put a partial brake on women's earnings improvements.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next Section 
descriptive material on what has happened to the gender wage gap since the 1970s is
16
reported. In order to obtain a clear picture of the patterns that we are interested in, we 
report material from several data sources, and focus on several different measures that 
describe the relative wage fortunes of women as compared to men in Britain. In Section
2.3 a simple, full distribution accounting analysis of the rise in the female/male wage 
differential between the late 1970s and 1990s is carried out. Section 2.4 then considers 
a number of decomposition methods and other econometric issues to examine the 
robustness of the results of the previous sections. Section 2.5 then concludes.
2.2 Data Description and Descriptive Material 
Data Sources
1). General Household Survey (GHS)
(Sample size: 3,500 to 6,500 men and 2,000 to 3,000 women working full-time each 
year.)
Data from the GHS is available from 1977 to 1998/9. As data was collected on a 
biannual basis from 1996/97, no data is available for 1997/8. The main limitation of the 
GHS data is that earnings are reported as weekly earning including over time payments, 
while hour of work are reported as weekly hours excluding overtime. Data on over time 
hours are collected only between 1974 and 1982. As over time hours are an important 
component of total hours of work for men, this only allows us to compare men and 
women’s weekly earnings.
2). Family Expenditure Survey (FES)
(Sample size: 3,000 to 5,000 men and 2,500 to 3,500 women working full-time each 
year.)
Utilising hourly wage information from the FES can rectify the main drawback 
of the GHS. The FES contains much more limited in information on industry and 
occupation (including definition changes through time) and on education where there is 
only information on years of schooling (only from 1978 onwards) as compared to the 
educational qualifications data in GHS.
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3). British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
(Sample size: approximately 2,000 men and 1,200 women working full-time annually.)
The BHPS longitudinal data begins in 1990/1, and has very rich data on the 
characteristics of individuals and on their labour market earnings. The BHPS is 
particularly attractive as it has data on actual work experience, unionization and 
establishment size. Its major drawback is that it is available only from 1990 and that 
sample sizes are relatively small.
Sample Definition
The observed rise in female labour force participation raises questions about 
sample composition, and in particular changes in sample composition, that may cause 
potential problems with the analysis. For most of the paper, this issue is side stepped by 
considering wage differences between men and women in full-time jobs (> 30 hours per 
week). The samples used include all employees aged 16-60 who work over 30 hours per 
week. Those reporting very low or very high earnings (under £50 or over £2000 per 
week in January 1999 prices) are excluded. Potential sample selection biases that may 
be associated with this set of sample restrictions are considered in Section 2.4 of the 
paper.
Trends in Women's Employment in Britain
Figure 2.1 plots the proportion of full time workers of working age that were 
female using data from the General Household Survey (GHS) between 1974 and 1998. It 
is evident that women have steadily increased their share of full-time employment, 
making up only around 26 percent of all full time employees in 1974 compared to 35 
percent by 1998. However, when employment shares are disaggregated by age, marked 
differences in both the levels and changes in employment shares are observed. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2.2. Looking first at those aged 17-24, full-time female employment 
shares rates have increased only marginally over the period, and in 1998 women made 
up just over 40 percent of all full time employees in this age group. More striking
18
increases in employment are seen in the other age groups, although rates of full time 
employment remain lower than for younger workers. The biggest increases in full time 
employment shares are seen among those aged 25 to 34, where women accounted for 
just over one-fifth of full-time workers in this age group in 1974 compared to just under 
40 percent in 1998. For women aged 35 and over full time employment shares rose 
rapidly too, so that in 1998 in each of these age groups women accounted for around 
one-third of full-time employees.
Trends in the Composition of Women's Employment
The educational composition of the full-time labour force has changed 
dramatically over recent decades. Table 2.1 reports some summary statistics from the 
GHS on the distribution of full-time employees by educational attainment for men and 
women in four age groups for three sub-periods, 1976-1978,1986-88 and 1996-1998. It 
is clear that in 1976-1978 full-time female employees were much less well qualified 
than their male counterparts, although the difference is smaller for younger workers. By 
1986-1988 this difference had closed considerably, and women under 35 won average 
better qualified than their male counteparts. By 1996-1998, women who worked full 
time had improved had markedly improved their position relative to men, with the 
proportion holding degrees being larger and the fraction with no qualifications smaller 
than for men. Indeed, for those under 35, a large gap in the educational attainment of full 
time working men and women had emerged by 1996-1998, with women being 
significantly better qualified than their male counterparts. For older women, the 
educational gap had practically disappeared.
The composition of employment by industry and occupation has also undergone 
change since the 1970s, with more full-time female employees working in the service 
sector and in higher grade non-manual occupations. It is noteworthy that women remain 
significantly over-represented in the non-manual category of employment and 
underrepresented amongst skilled manual workers. Furthermore, despite union decline 
(Disney et al., 1995) women are much less likely to be union members and more likely 
to work in smaller firms (see Green, Machin and Manning, 1995, for evidence on wage
penalties received by women in smaller workplaces).
Changes in Male and Female Earnings
Figure 2.3 plots indexed real weekly earnings for the 10th, 50th and 90th 
percentile man and woman from GHS and FES over time. While the dispersion of 
earnings growth for the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles is similar for men and women, 
earnings growth is higher for women at all percentiles. Figure 2.4 shows kernel density 
estimates of the male and female wage distribution in 1978,1988 and 1998 for weekly 
earnings from GHS and for hourly earnings from FES. It is clear that, in both periods 
and for both measures, the earnings distribution is more concentrated for women than 
for men. However, for both men and women there is a considerable widening of the 
distribution over the period. This is confirmed by the various inequality measures 
reported in Table 2.2, which shows the extent of the widening of male and female wage 
distributions between 1978 and 1998. It is also clear that wage inequality is lower 
among women than across men.
Aggregate Trends in the Mean Gender Earnings Ratio
Figure 2.5 shows the mean weekly and hourly gender earnings ratios from 1968 
to 1999 using the FES and 1974 to 1998 using the GHS. All show very similar trends, 
although the level of the gender earnings ratio is higher when hourly wages are used. 
The gender earnings ratio rose rapidly prior to and following the introduction of the 
Equal Pay and Equal Opportunities Acts in December 1975. FES data indicates that 
between 1973 and 1977 the full-time gender earnings ratio rose from 60 to 70 percent 
for hourly earnings, and from 53 to 62 percent for weekly earnings. The GHS gives 
similar results, with the weekly wage gender earnings ratio rising 6 percentage points, to 
63 percent, between 1974 and 1977. By 1978 the effect of the new legislation on the 
gender earnings ratio appears to be exhausted, and there was little further change until 
the late 1980s. Since the late 1980s there has been a progressive increase in the gender 
earnings ratio. By 1999 the FES gender earnings ratio had risen to 79 percent for hourly 
earnings, and to 73 percent for weekly earnings. For GHS weekly wages this ratio rose
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tto 73 percent in 1998.
Changes in the Gender Earnings Ratio Across the Male and Female Wage 
Distributions
The use of averages may well conceal differences in the experience of workers 
within the male and female distributions. This is especially true given the dramatic 
widening of the wage distribution in Britain since the late 1970s depicted in Figure 2.3.1 
It is therefore useful to examine changes in the median wage gap, and earnings at 
different percentiles of the wage distribution, to see how the experience of workers has 
varied across the wage distribution.
Figure 2.6 graphs the ratio of median female to male wages from FES and GHS 
data. The trend and level of the female / male median wage ratio is almost identical to 
that for mean values for weekly wages. For hourly wages, however, the median ratio is 
around 4 percentage points higher than the mean ratio. Figure 2.7 shows the gender 
wage ratio for the 10th to 90th percentile (calculated as the ratio of the earnings of the i* 
percentile woman to the ith percentile man) in 1968, 1978, 1988 and 1998. There is 
surprisingly little variation in the gender earnings ratio across all percentiles prior in the 
1968, 1978 and 1988 data, with improvements in the gender earnings ratio been seen 
across all percentiles over each of these decades. By 1998, however, the pattern has 
changed somewhat, with the gender earnings ratio being substantially higher, 
particularly in the hourly FES data, at the lower end of the wage distribution. In 1998, 
therefore, women in the bottom fifth of the wage distribution earned around 85 percent 
of the wage of men in the same position of the distribution. Those in the top of the 
distribution however did significantly worse than comparable men, earning 70 percent 
or less of the equivalent male wage.
Where are Women Located in the Male Wage Distribution?
1. For more details on the nature of the UK rise in wage inequality see Gregg and 
Machin (1994) or Gosling, Machin and Meghir (1994), among others.
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Blau and Khan (1992) suggest that mean comparisons of male and female 
earnings may not be a very useful indicator of changes in the relative labour market 
position of women in a period of rapidly rising wage inequality. For example, if returns 
to 'skill' rise, then women, because they have on average fewer labour market skills than 
men, will see a fall in their relative earnings. As such rising wage inequality 
disproportionately penalises women and may act to mask improvements in women's 
relative earnings position. Given rapidly increasing wage inequality in some countries 
(especially the UK and US), one may learn more about changes in the labour market 
status of women by considering the position of women in the male wage distribution. 
One method of examining this is to look at the distribution of female workers by male 
earnings deciles. A second method is to examine the percentile ranking of women in the 
male wage distribution.
Figure 2.8 illustrates the ranking of women in the male earnings distribution in 
1977, 1983 and 1991 for GHS weekly earnings and FES hourly earnings data. The x- 
axis plots male earnings deciles and the y-axis plots the proportion of women in each of 
these deciles in each period. The line at 0.1 indicates the proportion of women we would 
expect to find in each decile if women had the same earnings distribution as men. The 
GHS weekly wage data indicates that in 1978 almost 50 percent of full-time female 
employees had weekly earnings in the bottom male earnings decile, while only 1 percent 
of women had earnings in the top decile. Between 1978 and 1988 the position of women 
in the male distribution had changed little. However, by 1998 there had been a 
significant improvement in the position of women in the male distribution, with the 
proportion of women in the bottom of the male earnings decile falling to 29 percent, 
although only around 3 percent made it into the top male earnings decile. FES weekly 
wage data gives similar results, and also illustrate that some significant improvement in 
the position of women in the male wage distribution occurred between 1968 and 1978. 
When hourly earnings data is used there is less clustering of women at the bottom of the 
male distribution in all periods, with the proportion of women in the bottom decile 
falling to just over one-third in 1978 and 16 percent in 1998. However, use of hourly 
earnings data does not significantly improve the position of women at the top, with only
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2 by 1998.
A second method of examining the position of women in the male wage 
distribution is to assign women a percentile ranking according to the position of their 
earnings in the male wage distribution. The median percentile ranking of women in the 
male wage distribution can then be computed. Any change in the median percentile 
ranking indicates a change in the relative labour market status of women as a result of 
gender specific changes.
Figure 2.9 graphs changes in the median percentile ranking of women in the 
male distribution over time. Unlike trends in the mean or median gender earnings ratio, 
the median percentile ranking of women in the male wage distribution appears to have 
steadily improved throughout the 1980s, although the biggest changes are still in the late 
1980s / early 1990s. Using GHS weekly wage data, we find that in 1978 the median full­
time working women earned an amount equivalent only to the 19th percentile man. By 
1988 there had been some improvement in her relative position, with her percentile 
ranking rising to that of the 29th percentile man. By 1998, however, she had improved 
her ranking in the male earnings distribution markedly, to that of the 38th percentile 
man. This increase represents a major improvement in the relative position of women in 
the labour market, as a result of gender specific factors. FES data produces a similar 
median percentile ranking for women when the weekly wage is used: 13 in 1968 rising 
to 19 in 1978,31 in 1988 and 39 in 1998. Using hourly earnings, the median percentile 
ranking was 18 in 1968 and rising to 44 by 1998.
According to GHS weekly wage data, had women's median percentile ranking 
remained unchanged at its 1978 level by 1998 the female/male median wage ratio would 
have fallen from 63.3 to 54.0 percent as a result of increased male wage inequality. In 
fact the median wage ratio rose to 72.3 percent. This indicates that had it not been for 
rising wage inequality the median gender wage ratio would have risen further, and that 
use of aggregate data therefore understates the extent by which women have improved 
their relative labour market status as a result of gender specific factors.
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2.3. Econometric Analysis of Changes in the Gender Wage Gap
The descriptive material of the previous Section makes it evident that the relative 
wage position of women vis-a-vis men shifted markedly since the late 1970s (at least for 
this sample of full-time men and women). It also makes it clear that analyses based on 
comparing and contrasting trends in the mean gender gap may be potentially misleading 
so that econometric analysis should consider the entire wage distribution. In this 
Section what has shaped the observed trends in the gender wage differential in Britain is 
more formally consider.
Modelling Procedure
Here regression analysis of microeconomic data for three cross-sections (1978, 
1988 and 1998) is used to analyse the change in the gender gap for full-time employees. 
Simple decompositions, which break down the average gender gap into components due 
to changing prices or quantities, using a simple earnings function is used. The analysis 
then goes on to use a full distribution accounting method to implement a decomposition 
method initially introduced by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), but translated over to 
the gender earnings gap context by Blau and Kahn (1992). This method makes an 
explicit link between the general rise in wage inequality and the change in the gender 
gap. In this framework, the change in the gender wage gap is decomposed into, first the 
change in the gap due to women catching up with men in measured labour market skills, 
second the change in the gap due to changes in returns to skills, third the change due to a 
rise in inequality for both men and women, which cannot be explained by changes in 
observed characteristics, and finally the change in the gender gap which has resulted 
from reduced discrimination.
Using this framework the gender wage gap can partly be explained by 
differences in male and female labour market skills, and partly by differences in returns 
to skills by gender. The explanatory variables of interest, which are available from the 
General Household Survey, are age, education, region, industry and occupational 
classification. Employer size is also available to us in 1991, and union status is available 
in 1983. Unfortunately, the General Household Survey does not include any variables
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which allows us to compute labour market experience. For this reason we therefore 
supplement this information with data from the British Household Panel Survey for 
1990 and 1998.
Simple Regression Models
Table 2.3 reports various wage regressions from our three data sources (Table 
A2.1 reports means for the data used in the empirical analysis). In Panel (a) we present 
a set of simple human capital earnings functions (weekly and hourly) including a 
quadratic in age and education variables for 1978,1988 and 1998. Panel (b) includes 
controls for region, industry and occupation for GHS and BHPS, whilst Panel (c) 
includes the fullest set of controls, also including a set of workplace size dummies, 
unionization and (for BHPS) a quadratic in work experience.
The simple human capital models tell a very similar story across data sources, 
for both hourly and weekly earnings. The estimated coefficients on the age and 
education variables are very similar for the wage equations from different data sources 
within each sex-year group. Probably the clearest pattern concerns the intertemporal 
behaviour of returns to education and age, both of which have risen significantly over 
the 1978 to 1998 time period for both men and women. This is clearly part of the 
observed rise in wage inequality that has occurred (see also Schmitt, 1995; or Gosling, 
Machin and Meghir, 1994).
Fuller Regression Models
It may be the case that we are missing a number of important explanatory 
variables in our wage equations. Panel (b) of Table 2.3 reports models that also include 
controls for region, industry and occupation, whilst Panel (c) reports our fullest 
specification that supplements the Panel (b) models with controls for previous work 
experience, employer size, and the existence of a trade union at work, all of which are of 
potential importance to the process of wage determination (and may well have different 
means and different wage effects for men and women). All these variables are available 
(in addition to those variables already included in the regressions) from the BHPS.
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In the Panel (b) models the reported R2's suggest that about 40-50 percent of the 
variation in log(wages) can be accounted for by these variables. There are some 
interesting effects, especially if one considers intertemporal variations in the estimated 
coefficients. Over and above the rising returns to age and education (which remain 
robust to the addition of the extra controls), there is some evidence (especially for 
women) that the wage premium for professionals and managers has risen, and that the 
wage penalty for unskilled manuals has become larger (in absolute terms). In the Panel 
(c) models the establishment size, unionization and work experience variables exert a 
significant impact on wages.
Oaxaca Decompositions
The gender gap can be decomposed into two components: that part of the gender 
gap which can be explained by differences in measured characteristics, and that part 
which can be explained by differences in male and female returns to measured 
characteristics. The theory behind the decomposition is outlined below, and the results 
are reported in Table 2.4.
If the log wage is determined by :
log wm = bm Xm for men
and log wf = bfXf for women
then log wm - log wf = (bm - bf) Xf + (Xm - Xf) bm
The results of this decomposition are shown in Table 2.4 and illustrate that, in 
1978, for the simple human capital models of Table 2.4 (a), only about 11 percent (FES 
Weekly) to 18 percent (GHS) of the gender gap can be explained by quantity differences 
in male and female characteristics. The bulk of the gender gap is explained by 
differences in returns to male and female characteristics. As expected, when industry, 
occupation and regional dummies are added, the proportion of the gap explained by 
differences in characteristics rises, but still only to 27 percent (GHS).
According to the GHS weekly wage data the log wage gap had narrowed from 
.451 in 1978 to .305 by 1998. That part of the gender gap explained by differences in 
measured characteristics fell from .083 (or 18 percent) to .025 (8 percent) under the
26
human capital specification. When industry, occupation and regional dummies are 
added, that part of the gap explained by differences in characteristics falls by a greater 
amount, from .121 (27 percent) to .026 (8 percent). However, it remains the case that in 
1998 the majority of the gender gap (over 90 percent) results from differences in returns 
to skills by gender. In the fullest BHPS regression models a larger proportion of the 
variation in wages is explained by characteristics, with differences in experience, 
unionisation and employer size increasing the proportion of the wage gap explained by 
characteristics to 48 percent in 1998.
Decomposing Intertemporal Changes in the Gender Gap
Following Blau and Khan (1992), the Juhn, Murphy & Pierce (1993) 
decomposition is used to analyse the change in the gender gap over time. The 
decomposition uses the male wage equation to estimate the position of women in the 
wage structure. This assumes that the regression coefficients are the same for men and 
women, and requires discrimination to be reflected in the residual only2. It further 
assumes that there is no sex correlated measurement error. The theory behind the 
decomposition is outlined below.
Suppose for a male worker i in year t wages are given by:
Yjt — Xit Bt + St Sit
where Xjt is a vector of explanatory variables, Bt is a vector of coefficients, st if the male 
residual standard deviation and Sit is the standardized residual. In year t the male female 
wage gap is then given by:
2 . Note that in the Oaxaca decompositions:
Ym -Yf = (bm - bf) Xf + (Xm - Xf) bm
In the Juhn, Murphy, Pierce decompositions:
Ym — bmXm + um
Yf = bfXf + Uf
and Ym - Yf — (Xm - Xf)bm + (um ~ Uf)
Therefore: um -U f = (bm - bf) Xf
and therefore the measures of discrimination resulting from the Oaxaca and Juhn, 
Murphy, Pierce decompositions are identical.
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Dt = Ymt - Yft = dXt Bt+ st dSt 
where Ymt is average log male earnings, Yft is average log female earnings, dXt is the 
average male/female difference in explanatory variables and dSt is the average 
difference in male/female standardized residuals from the male wage equation.
Using this model structure the change in the gender pay gap between period 0 and 
period 1 can be decomposed into:
Dt - Do = (dXrdXo) Bt + dXoCBj-Bo) + (dSr dS0) Si + dS0 (sr s0)
The first term on the RHS may be interpreted as the contribution of changes in 
differences in female-male labour market skills to the change in the gender earnings gap. 
The second term measures the contribution of changes in returns to measured labour 
market skills to the change in the gap. Term three reflects changes in female-male 
residual differences, resulting from an improvement (or worsening) in the relative labour 
market position of women, after controlling for changes in female-male differences in 
measured characteristics and for changes in returns to characteristics. Term four, on the 
other hand, measures the change in female-male residual inequality, which has resulted 
from a general rise in inequality not reflected in the change in returns to measured 
characteristics. Terms one and three together reflect changes in the gender gap which 
have resulted from gender specific changes. Terms two and four taken together reflect 
the change in the gender gap which has resulted from changes in observed and 
unobserved price effects, or in other words from a change in the wage structure.
Descriptive Statistics on Male and Female Wage Structures
Table 2.5 reports some simple descriptive statistics derived from the GHS and 
BHPS male wage equations in 1978, 1988 and 1998. The male residual standard 
deviation rises by 28 percent between 1978 and 1998, reflecting an increase in wage 
inequality which cannot be explained by changes in measured characteristics, or by 
changes in returns to those characteristics. The female residual standard deviations and 
mean residuals, computed from the male wage equation, are also reported in Table 2.5. 
The residual standard deviation also rises for women between 1978 and 1998. The 
mean female residual fell over the period, indicating a reduction in the unexplained
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component of the gender gap. This may reflect a reduction in discrimination, or a fall in 
productivity related unmeasured female-male differences.
The inverse log of the mean female residual gives us a measure of the gender gap 
after controlling for differences in male and female measured characteristics. The raw 
GHS data gives us a gender earnings gap of 63.7 percent in 1978, rising to 73.7 percent 
in 1998 (and to 75.1 percent in the 1998 BHPS). When controls are added for 
differences in measured human capital the gender earnings gap closes to 69.1 percent in 
1978 and 75.6 percent in 1998. Adding further controls for occupation, industry and 
region reduces the gap even further to 71.9 percent in 1978 and 75.7 percent in 1998. In 
the full BHPS specification the weekly wage gap (after controls) is as high as 86.3 
percent in 1998.
Full Accounting Decompositions
In Table 2.6 the change in the gender gap is decomposed into that change due to 
changes in the difference between measured male and female characteristics, that due to 
changes in returns to observed characteristics, and that due to a change in the difference 
between the mean male and female residual. This third component is further 
decomposed into the change in the female residual due to changes in gender specific 
factors, and that part due to the overall change in residual male earnings inequality.
Between 1978 and 1998 the gender log wage gap fell by -.146. Results from the 
human capital specification in Table 2.6(a) indicate that had gender specific factors 
acted alone there would have been a much greater decline in the gender wage gap (- 
.340), as changes in the wage structure served to increase the gender wage gap (by .194). 
So, had inequality remained at its 1977 level the male/female wage differential would 
have fallen by more.
Of the gender specific factors, quantity changes in the differences in observed 
X's reduced the gender log wage gap by -.075. About four-fifths of this reflects changes 
in age structure, whilst the remainder reflects changes in the structure of education. The 
change in the 'gap* term (or that part of the gap attributed to differences in male and 
female residuals) on the other hand accounted for -.199 (or about 150 percent) of the
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change in the gender gap. This reflects a big reduction either in discrimination or in 
unobserved differences which are positively related to productivity. As already noted, 
the wage structure effects all worked against the narrowing of the wage gap. Changes in 
returns to observables widened the gender gap by .018. Changes in returns to 
unobservables however had a much greater impact on the gender gap, with the general 
rise in unexplained inequality raising the gender gap by .176.
Adding controls for occupation, industry and region reduce both the negative 
change in the gender gap attributed to changes in gender specific factors (-.249) and that 
attributed to changes in the wage structure (. 106). Now quantity differences in observed 
X's reduce the gap by -.053, with changes in mean age differences still having the 
dominant impact on reducing the gap, but with changes in regional differences, 
occupation and industry all having a small impact on reducing the gap. Changes in the 
difference in the mean male and female residuals have a smaller effect on reducing the 
gender wage gap (-.196) when these additional controls are added. On the wage 
structure side, the observed price effect is now smaller and negative (-.039), as a result 
of changes in returns to occupation and industry helping reduce the gap. The unobserved 
price effect is also smaller than before (.146), as the change in the standard deviation of 
the mean male residual is smaller with these additional controls.
The same decomposition was also carried out for the two sub periods 1978 to 
1988, and 1988 to 1998. The results are reported in Table 2.6(b). Practically all the 
closing of the gender gap took place in the second time period. In the first sub period, 
gender specific factors helped to narrow the pay gap (by -.120 in the human capital 
specification and -.091 in the full specification) while changes in wage structure negated 
this change (by .082 in the first specification and .052 in the second), leading to a small 
net reduction in the gap. The second sub period saw larger reductions in the pay gap due 
to gender specific factors (-. 192 in the first specification and -. 154 in the second) while 
changes in wage structure, while still important, had a smaller impact on increasing the 
pay gap than between 1978 and 1988.
The same decomposition is carried out in Tables 2.6 c and d using data from the 
BHPS betweenl 990-98. The change in the gender pay gap using weekly wages is
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smaller than the change in the wage gap over 1988 to 1998. The pattern of change is 
however similar when decompositions using the same sets of controls are used. Adding 
in controls for experience however suggest that changes in levels of and returns to work 
experience relative to men have had an adverse impact on the wage gap. Table 2.6(d) 
illustrates the results from this decomposition when hourly wages are used. The fall in 
the pay gap is larger using the hourly wage measure, reflecting the increase in number of 
hours worked by women. The contribution of changes in relative characteristics, and 
returns to those characteristics, to the change in the log wage gap are however similar.
Overall these results illustrate that the sharp rise in male wage inequality that 
occurred from the late 1970s onwards retarded some of the improvement in women's 
relative wages. Like some of the US work (e.g. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993) that 
stresses that increasing returns to observables like age and education and unobservables 
like ability underpin the rise in US wage inequality. The results here suggest that the 
same things have been going on in the UK male wage distribution and that they have set 
back women's quest for equal wages. Some related UK work (Gosling, Machin and 
Meghir, 1994) also notes these trends in the UK, but prefers to interpret them as 
reflecting cohort or generational effects. If it is reasonable to suggest that these cohort 
effects may have long-lasting effects on relative wages our work seems to suggest that 
any such permanent shifts in the extent of male wage inequality may well further hinder 
women's progress towards equal labour market rewards.
2.4. Robustness of Results and Extensions
In this section the robustness of the results obtained are evaluated. The sensitivity of the 
results to the choice of, first the wage inequality used to carry out the decomposition, 
second the price measure used and, third the impact of selection into employment on 
wage equation estimates, are all assessed.
Other Inequality Decompositions
Wage inequality measures are sensitive to choice of wage inequality used.
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Variances and standard deviations, for example, give equal weighting to all 
observations. It is of interest however to see how using alternative measures of wage 
inequality, which give a different weighting to different points of the wage distribution, 
impact on our results. Table 2.7 presents the results from the Juhn Murphy Pierce 
decomposition, were the male residual standard deviation, Sjt, is replaced by the 90-10 
log wage difference as the measure of wage inequality. The results obtained are very 
similar to those reported in Table 2.6, suggesting that the conclusions drawn are robust 
to the choice of inequality measure.
Index Number Issues
The results reported so far have been based on decompositions were the “prices” of 
skills are assumed to be given by the coefficients from the male wage equation. Any 
differences in returns to skills between men and women are then commonly interpreted 
as “discrimination”. It would be equally valid to assume that the price of skill is given 
by the coefficients in the female wage equation, and that any divergence in male and 
female coefficients can alternatively be interpreted as resulting from a system of 
“patriarchy”. It is, of course, likely that the true price of skill lies somewhere between 
the male and female coefficients. Oaxaca decompositions are sensitive to the choice of 
skill price. This is discussed in detail in Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) who suggest a range 
of decompositions based on different price measurements. Table 2.8 reports further 
decompositions based on the different measures of skill prices suggested by Oaxaca and 
Ransom. For each of the three time periods, four decompositions are performed using an 
equation of the form:
log wm - log wf = (bm - b) Xm + (b - bf) Xf + (Xm - Xf) b 
Skill prices are represented by ‘b’, and in Table 2.8 four different methods of estimating 
b are used. These are explained in further detail below. The first term in the above 
equation, and in the first column of Table 2.8, is intended to measure the share to the 
male female wage gap resulting from “patriarchy”. Term two is the share of the wage 
gap resulting from “discrimination”, while the third term measures wage differences 
resulting from differences in observed characteristics.
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The first line of Table 2.8 uses, for each period, the coefficients from the female 
wage equation to estimate b (ie. b=bf). In this scenario, the second term (ie the part of 
the wage gap due to “discrimination”) is by definition equal to zero. Wage differences 
are in this case due to differences in characteristics and “patriarchy”. The second line 
uses the male coefficients as the estimates of b (ie b=bm), and in this case term 1 equals 
zero. In this case, wage differences are attributable to differences in characteristics and 
“discrimination”. The third and fourth lines represent intermediate cases, with b lying 
between bm and bf. The third decomposition is Cotton’s decomposition, where b is a 
weighted average of the male and female coefficients, and the proportions of workers 
that are male determine the weights. In this case b=pmbm+(l-bm)bf, where pm is the 
proportion of male full time employees. Finally, the pooled decomposition estimates b 
from the coefficients obtained from regressing log wages of all full time workers on 
characteristics. Of most interest is how the choice of coefficients changes the estimated 
share of the wage gap explained by differences in characteristics. Our previous models 
all used b=bm. Comparing these decompositions with those using other measures of skill 
price we find similar results, with the pooled regression attributing the largest proportion 
of the wage gap to differences in characteristics and the female wage equation the 
smallest.
Table 2.8(b) assesses how the change in log wage gap varies according to the 
type of decomposition used. While there is some variation across the four methods, the 
differences are relatively small, and the conclusions of the previous analysis therefore 
appear robust to variations in the chosen measure of skill price.
Selection Issues
So far no attempt has been made to account for the non-random selection of workers 
into full-time employment. In this section results are reported, in Table 2.9, for GHS 
wage equations with and without controls for the non-random selection of men and 
women into full-time work using the basic human capital specification. The selection 
model used is Heckman’s selection correction, where selection into full-time 
employment is identified by other household income. The Mills ratio is statistically
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insignificant in all years and the coefficients remain stable in response to these 
additional controls for selection. The results in the previous analysis do not therefore 
appear to be affected by sample selection issues.
2.5. Concluding Remarks
Since the late 1970s women have improved their relative wage position 
compared to men in the UK labour market. For example, among the full-timers that we 
study in this paper, the weekly wage gap rose from around 64 percent in 1978 up to 74 
percent by 1998. After estimating a range of regression models controlling for detailed 
characteristics we find a weekly wage ratio of about 86 percent in 1998.
Hence, women still seem to be paid substantially less for doing similar jobs and 
for similar sets of observable characteristics. The main interest of this paper was to 
document the observed changes, and to ask how this was affected by the sharp rise in 
wage inequality that occurred in the UK since the end of the 1970s. The results show 
that much of women's relative wage improvement took place in the late 1980s and 
1990s, but that rising wage inequality (part of which reflects increased returns to 
observed and unobserved skill) over this period had a detrimental impact on the 
reduction of the male/female wage differential. Had inequality remained at its 1978 
level, the model suggests that the gender wage gap would have closed twice as fast (the 
overall fall in the log wage gap was .146 log points, but had inequality remained at its 
1978 level the models predicts that the gap would have fallen by .330 log points).
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Table .2.1: Composition of Employment and Gender Earnings Ratios by Education and Age
1976-78 1986-88 1996-98
Gender Gender Gender
Men Women Earnings Men Women Earnings Men Women Earnings
Ratio Ratio Ratio
All aged 17-59
Degree 0.07 0.04 .718 0.14 0.11 .740 0.18 0 20 .729
Alevels / 0.11 0.13 .733 0.20 0.21 .757 0.27 0.25 .734
Highers
5+ “0 ”s 0.10 0.09 .607 0.14 0.14 .690 0.14 0.13 .718
1-4 “0 ”s 0.26 0.28 .615 0.27 0.34 .684 0.25 0.29 .722
& below
No quals 0.46 0.46 .633 0.25 0.20 .657 0.16 0.13 .693
Aged 17-24
Degree 0.04 0.02 .947 0.06 0.06 .903 0.10 0.15 .953
Alevels/ 0.14 0.13 .887 0.19 0.19 .862 0.27 0.29 .778
Highers
5+ “0 ”s 0.17 0.15 .799 0.21 0.21 .849 0.21 0.20 .845
1-4 “0 ”s 0.36 0.43 .739 0.42 0.48 .814 0.32 0.30 .867
& below
No quals 0.29 0.26 .742 0.12 0.07 .746 0.10 0.05 .773
Aged 25-34
Degree 0.11 0.08 .780 0.17 0.18 .829 0.21 0.26 .809
Alevels/ 0.15 0.19 .743 0.24 0.24 .824 0.29 0.27 .798
Highers
5+ “0 ”s 0.12 0.08 .731 0.16 0.15 .792 0.14 0.15 .743
1-4 “0 ”s 0.27 0.29 .652 0.28 0.33 .746 0.29 0.27 .771
& below
No quals 0.35 0.36 .636 0.15 0.10 .691 0.07 0.04 .722
Aged 35-44
Degree 0.08 0.03 .755 0.17 0.12 .764 0.21 0.22 .750
Alevels/ 0.11 0.12 .725 0.22 0.22 .764 0.30 0.24 .750
Highers
5+ “0 ”s 0.09 0.06 .527 0.14 0.10 .672 0.13 0.11 .721
1-4 “0 ”s 0.26 0.22 .593 0.22 0.29 .670 0.22 0.29 .721
& below
No quals 0.47 0.57 .587 0.25 0.27 .612 0.14 0.15 .664
Aged 45-59
Degree 0.05 0.02 .736 0.13 0.08 .721 0.16 0.13 .708
Alevels/ 0.07 0.10 .704 0.15 0.18 .731 0.23 0.21 .744
Highers
5+ “0 ”s 0.06 0.05 .565 0.10 0.09 .648 0.11 0.09 .723
1-4 “0 ”s 0.22 0.15 .683 0.23 0.25 .647 0.22 0.32 .644
& below
No quals 0.60 0.68 .639 0.38 0.40 .653 0.27 0.25 .778
Notes: Data source is the GHS. The gender earnings ratios based on weekly wages.
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Table 2.2; Inequality Measures of Male and Female Earnings
GHS Weekly Earnings
Men Women
1978 1988 1998 1978 1988 1998
9010 Log(Wage) 
Differential .9151 1.1566 1.3162 .9123 1.1203 1.2740
90-50 Log(Wage) 
Differential .4479 .5844 .6541 .4744 .6067 .6379
50-10 Log(Wage) 
Differential .4672 .5722 .6621 .4378 .5137 .6361
Reative Mean Deviation .1477 .1845 .2110 .1430 .1793 .2075
Coefficient o f Variation .4496 .5179 .6022 .3908 .4864 .5861
SC of Logs .3918 .4775 .5439 .3631 .4532 .5265
Giii Coefficient .2144 .2615 .2988 .2038 .2505 .2908
FES Weekly Earnings
Men Women
1978 1988 1998 1978 1988 1998
90- 0 Log(Wage) .9510 1.1900 1.3463 .9559 1.1727 1.2306Differential
.4770 .6022 .6932 .4981 .6163 .6256
.4741 .5878 .6531 .4578 .5563 .6050
Rehtive Mean Deviation .1510 .1958 .2190 .1494 .1841 .1975
Coefficient o f Variation .4437 .6082 .7129 .4040 .4877 .5995
SD of Logs .3932 5061 .5481 3886 .4712 .5035
Gin Coefficient .2171 .2801 .3110 .2127 .2564 .2782
FES Hourly Earnings
Men Women
1978 1988 1998 1978 1988 1998
90-10 Log(Wage) Differential .9555 1.2329 1.3709 .9173 1.1712 1.2126
90-50 Log(Wage) Differential .4946 .6658 .7473 .5070 .6384 .6355
50-10 Log(Wage) Differential .4609 .5670 .6236 .4103 .5328 .5772
Relative Mean Deviation .1567 .2052 .2270 .1471 .1854 .1936
Coefficient of Variation .4696 .6243 .6913 .4092 .4924 .5701
SD of Logs .4027 .5157 .5587 .3981 .4831 .4975
Gin Coefficient .2244 .2895 .3158 .2114 .2590 .2726
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tTable 2.3 (a): Regression Results: Human Capital Specification
1978
GHS FES
Wage Measure Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly Hourly Hourly
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Age .097 .047 .094 .040 .083 .047(003) (.004) (.003) (005) (.003) (005)
Age2/ 100 -.114 -.054 -.111 -.047 -.098 -.057(.003) (.005) (.004) (.006) (.004) (.006)
Years of 
education - -
.016
(-001)
.028
(.002)
.022
(.002)
.028
(.002)
Degree .465(.018)
.686
(.033)
As .250 .371(.015) (.033)
5+ Os .206(.015)
.226
(.025)
Under 5 Os .096
(.010)
.108
(.015)
Constant 3.502 4.019 3.604 4.068 -.019 .306
(0.047) (0.059) (.056) (.080) (.058) (.081)
Sample size 5850 2450 4062 1843 4063 1848
R2 .366 .317 .256 .131 .223 .144
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tTable 2.3 (a) continued
1988
GHS FES
Wage Measure Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly Hourly Hourly
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Age .098 .073 .104 .067 .091 .067
(.004) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.006)
Age2/100 -.110 -.085 -.117 -.079 -.101 -.078
(.005) (.007) (.006) (.008) (.006) (.008)
Years o f - - .052 .065 .059 .064
education (.003) (.004) (.003) (.004)
Degree .556 .694
(.020) (.030)
As .372 .528
(.019) (.025)
5 + Os .236 .313
(.021) (.029)
Under 5 Os .134 .222
(.017) (.023)
Constant 3.565 3.688 3.120 3.335 -.538 -.329
(.070) (.087) (.084) (.105) (.086) (.108)
Sample size 3840 2252 3357 1804 3357 1806
R2 .383 .342 .285 .227 .275 .223
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Table 2.3 (a) continued
t
1998
Wage Measure 
Age
Age2/ 100
Years o f  
education
Degree
As
5+ Os 
Under 5 0 s  
Constant
Sample size 
R2
GHS FES
Weekly Weekly Weekly Weekly Hourly Hourly
Male Female Male Female Male Female
.105 .094 .117 .089 .107 .091
(.006) (.008) (.006) (.007) (.006) (.007)
-.117 -.112 -.130 -.105 -.118 -.107
(.008) (.011) (.008) (.010) (.008) (.010)
.057 .068 .065 .066
(.003) (.004) (.003) (.004)
.672 .786 - -
(.033) (.044)
.355 .480 - -
(.030) (.044)
.130 .298 - -
(.036) (.051)
.186 .224
(-031) (041)
3.405 3.389 2.793 2.999 -.870 -.696
(117) (.142) (.110) (.132) (.112) (.130)
2424 1471 2649 1599 2650 1600
.300 .317 .297 .253 .292 .263
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Table 2.3 (a): (Continued)
t
Wage Measure
1990
BHPS
Weekly Weekly Hourly Hourly
Male Female Male Female
Age .109 .082 .100 .089
(.006) (.009) (.006) (.009)
Age2/100 -.124 -.100 -.111 -.109
(.008) (.012) (.009) (013)
Degree .555 .695 .673 .707
(.038) (.052) (.039) (-053)
As .370 .421 .445 .447
(.032) (.050) (.033) (.053)
5+ Os .262 .248 .323 .288
(.034) (.052) (.035) (.051)
Under 5 Os .155 .174 .185 .201
(.031) (.043) (.030) (.043)
Constant 4.719 5.050 -.418 -.227
(.111) (.146) (.112) (.152)
Sample size 1723 1106 1723 1106
R2 .394 .390 .404 .316
1998
BHPS
Wage Measure Weekly Weekly Hourly Hourly
Male Female Male Female
Age .106 .087 .108 .094
Age2/ 100
(.007) (.008) (.007) (.008)
-.119 -.105 -.121 -.111
(.007) (011) (.009) (011)
Degree .638 .682 .729 .716
(.045) (.055) (.046) (.052)
As .391 .374 .430 .399
(.038) (055) (.039) (.052)
5+ OS .322 .292 .367 .329
(.043) (063) (.044) (.060)
Under 5 Os .236 .214 .242 .226
(.038) (.052) (.038) (.049)
Constant 4.708 4.948 -.615 -.344
(.124) (.154) (.123) (.152)
Sample size 1700 1120 1699 1120
R2 .351 .289 .374 .308
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Table 2.3 (b>: Regression Results ; Full Specification
Wage Measure 
Age
Age2/ 100
Degree
As
5+ Os 
Under 5 Os 
Regional Dummies 
Energy, mining and minerals 
Engineering and vehicles 
Other Manufacturing 
Construction 
Services
Transport and communications
Prof/Manager
Non-manual (other)
Personal Services
Skilled manual
Semi skilled manual
Constant
Sample Size 
R2
1978 1988
GHS GHS
Weekly
Men Women Men
.089 .041 .091
(.002) (.003) (.004)
-.105 -.052 -.103
(.003) (.005) (.005)
.305 .608 .371
(.021) (034) (.022)
.155 .339 .251
(.015) (.021) (.019)
.146 .192 .134
(.014) (.024) (.021)
.064 .082 .094
(.010) (.016) (.016)
Yes Yes Yes
.160 .366 .209
(.038) (.134) (.054)
.132 .389 .091
(.037) (-133) (.052)
.105 .294 .119
(.038) (.133) (.053)
.096 .231 .117
(.038) (.144) (.054)
.031 .275 .043
(.037) (.132) (.052)
.118 .410 .141
(.038) (.135) (.052)
.359 .297 .402
(.026) (.047) (.031)
.159 .115 .233
(.024) (.037) (.031)
.057 -.062 -.049
(.074) (.043) (.067)
.151 .074 .172
(.022) (.043) (.029)
.074 .073 .115
(.023) (.039) (-031)
3.426 3.680 3.402
(.054) (.142) (.084
5850 2450 3840
.443 .399 .470
1998
GHS
Women Men Wome
.067 .095
n
.078
(.005) (.006) (.008)
-.078 -.108 -.092
(.006) (.008) (.010)
.532 .403 .553
(.032) (.036) (.046)
.433 .212 .333
(.026) (.030) (.045)
.216 .087 .184
(.029) (.034) (.048)
.150 .129 .134
(.023) (.029) (.041)
Yes Yes Yes
.233 .210 .217
(.067) (.077) (.154)
.171 .233 .179
(.064) (.065) (.133)
.156 .203 .135
(.063) (.066) (.131)
.121 .141 .101
(.073) (.066) (.144)
.163 .168 .184
(.060) (.068) (.138)
.324 .087 .058
(.068) (.064) (.126)
.493 .441 .635
(.071) (.044) (.111)
.332 .198 .379
(.068) (.044) (.107)
.005 .046 .051
(.075) (.100) (.116)
.253 .018 .165
(.072) (.041) (.119)
.220 -.049 .170
(.070) (.043) (.111)
3.303 3.327 3.316
(.111) (.135) (.182)
2252 2424 1471
.457 .415 .442
Notes: 1. As for Table 2.3 (a).
2. Omitted occupation group is unskilled manuals and the omitted industry group is agriculture.
tTable 2.3(b) continued_________________________________________
1990 1998
BHPS BHPS
Wage measure Weekly Hourly Weekly Hourly
Men Wome Men Wome Men Wome Men Wome
n n n n
Age .089 .069 .080 .076 .093 .076 .095 .082
(.006) (•007) (.006) (.009) (.006) (.008) (.006) (.008)
Age2/ 100 -.102 -.085 -.088 -.095 -.107 -.092 -.108 -.098
(.008) (.011) (.008) (.012) (.008) (.010) (.008) (.010)
Degree .334 .444 .376 .428 .391 .432 .407 .425
(.039) (.056) (.040) (.059) (.043) (.057) (.044) (.056)
As .198 .253 .225 .255 .231 .212 .236 .209
(.031) (.054) (.031) (.058) (.034) (.053) (.033) (-051)
5+ Os .132 .099 .163 .115 .181 .124 .197 .133
(.031) (.052) (.032) (.054) (.037) (.060) (.037) (.058)
Under 5 Os .074 .035 .089 .041 .142 .075 .137 .066
(.028) (.043) (.028) (.045) (.034) (.051) (.033) (.049)
Energy, mining .134 .005 .219 .034 .145 .251 .246 .270
and minerals (.041) (.076) (.040) (.074) (.042) (.070) (.040) (-067)
Engineering and -.008 -.084 .075 -.074 .069 .162 .155 .170
vehicles (.035) (.068) (036) (.069) (.037) (.064) (.038) (.061)
Other -.036 -.229 .021 -.214 -.015 .024 .060 .063
Manufacturing (.037) (.071) (.038) (.072) (.039) (.066) (.040) (.063)
Construction -.063 -.283 -.020 -.292 -.016 -.130 .034 -.093
(.050) (197) (038) (.198) (.044) (.116) (.045) (.121)
Services -.169 -.385 -.130 -.365 -.223 -.150 -.163 -.162
(.040) (.069) (.041) (.073) (.040) (.055) (.040) (053)
Transport and .010 -.163 .097 -.116 -.043 .079 .045 .098
communications (.035) (.061) (.037) (.063) (.035) (.049) (.036) (.046)
Prof/Manager .538 .595 .568 .596 .547 .481 .596 .504
(.054) (.109) (.054) (.116) (.061) (.100) (.058) (-093)
Non-manual .299 .389 .361 .423 .344 .217 .416 .254
(.050) (.104) (.050) (.105) (.059) (.097) (.056) (.090)
Personal Services .059 .018 .056 .042 -.016 -.027 .041 .018
(.112) (.110) (.104) (.113) (.087) (.102) (.083) (.096)
Skilled manual .241 .265 .224 .250 .220 .158 .187 .054
(.047) (.113) (.047) (.115) (.059) (.110) (.055) (.097)
Unskilled Manual .122 .207 .127 .205 .140 .014 .129 -.014
(.050) (.112) (.050) (.113) (.062) (.103) (.058) (.096)
Constant 5.090 5.439 -.058 .120 4.959 5.197 -.405 -.066
(.117) (.173) (.113) (.181) (.131) (.172) (.124) (-168)
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Size 1723 1106 1723 1106 1700 1120 1700 1120
R2 .506 .481 .534 .478 .479 .460 .527 .489
Notes: 1. As for Table 2.3 (a).
2. Omitted occupation group is unskilled manuals and the omitted industry group is
agriculture.
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Table 2.3 (c): Regression Results : Full Specification
Wage Measure
1990
BHPS
Weekly Weekly Hourly Hourly
1998
BHPS
Weekly Weekly Hourly Hourly
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Age .091 .064 .087 .072 .091 .061 .092 .063
Age2/ 100
(.008) (.008) (.007) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009)
-.001 -.077 -.098 -.087 -.001 -.075 -.104 -.076
(.000) (011) (.010) (.012) (.000) (011) (011) (011)
Degree .329 .400 .369 .380 .381 .411 .387 .396
(.039) (055) (.040) (.059) (043) (053) (043) (.051)
As .187 .213 .213 .216 .216 .196 .212 .186
(.031) (.050) (.031) (054) (034) (.048) (.033) (.046)
5+ Os .132 .081 .160 .096 .178 .111 .184 .112
(.031) (.049) (.032) (051) (037) (054) (.038) (.051)
Under 5 Os .077 .035 .091 .042 .140 .061 .128 .045
(.028) (.040) (.027) (.042) (.033) (.046) (.033) (043)
Energy, mining and .108 -.006 .192 .027 .120 .184 .217 .200
minerals (.040) (.069) (.040) (.068) (.040) (.065) (.039) (.063)
Engineering and vehicles -.023 -.077 .067 -.063 .040 .130 .130 .147
(.036) (.064) (.036) (.065) (.036) (.056) (036) (054)
Other Manufacturing -.042 -.205 .024 -.188 -.034 -.013 .042 .029
(037) (065) (.038) (067) (.038) (.058) (.039) (055)
Construction -.048 -.186 .005 -.186 -.006 -.076 .055 -.036
(.050) (.162) (.049) (.161) (042) (.124) (042) (.119)
Services -.127 -.306 -.074 -.286 -.200 -.130 -.121 -.142
(.041) (.064) (.042) (.067) (039) (.049) (.039) (.046)
Transport and .001 -.130 .090 -.081 -.038 .063 .054 .077
communications (.035) (.055) (.036) (.058) (033) (.042) (034) (.040)
Prof/Manager .497 .535 .535 .530 .531 .437 .578 .459
(.054) (.098) (.054) (.100) (.060) ( H I ) (.055) (108)
Non-manual .244 .305 .305 .330 .308 .177 .373 .212
(.050) (093) (.050) (.094) (.059) (109) (054) (.106)
Personal Services .008 .055 .008 .079 -.047 -.002 .005 .039
(.108) (.098) (.100) (.099) (.085) (.114) (.079) ( H I )
Skilled manual .189 .186 .171 .159 .212 .132 .176 .068
(.048) (103) (.047) (.103) (.058) (.117) (.053) (.113)
Unskilled Manual .062 .132 .067 .118 .114 -.055 .098 -.091
(.051) (.099) (.050) (.100) (061) (.113) (.056) (.109)
Size: 1-2 Employees -.393 -.413 -.425 -.478 -.361 -.331 -.419 -.322
(.088) (.098) (085) (115) (.093) (105) (.099) (.109)
Size: 3-24 Employees -.151 -.159 -.152 -.157 -.173 -.113 -.205 -.102
(.032) (.038) (.032) (039) (041) (036) (039) (.036)
Size: 25-99 Employees -.024 -.056 -.043 -.049 -.122 -.020 -.160 -.007
(.028) (037) (.028) (037) (039) (034) (.038) (.033)
Size: 100-999 Employees -.023 -.023 -.031 -.026 -.026 .041 -.033 .050
(.027) (035) (.026) (035) (037) (033) (.036) (.033)
Trade Union at Workplace .014 .101 .041 .106 -.024 .050 .006 .071
(021) (025) (.021) (.026) (021) (.024) (.021) (.025)
Years FT work experience -.002 .006 -.006 .005 .000 .012 -.000 .015
(.003) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Years FT work .003 -.016 .013 .014 .000 -.022 -.002 -.029
experience2/100 (.008) (.010) (.008) (011) (.009) (.009) (.008) (.009)
Years PT work experience -.037 -.035 -.024 -.033 -.006 -.039 -.041 -.038
(.027) (.008) (.028) (.008) (.020) (.006) (021) (.006)
Years PT work .109 .002 -.028 .143 -.287 .169 .040 .173
experience2/! 00 (.332) (.000) (342) (.046) (.194) (.029) (.192) (.028)
Constant 5.187 5.571 -.049 .252 5.129 5.487 -.193 .289
(.132) (.162) (.128) (.169) (172) (.191) (.162) (.191)
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Size 1723 1106 1723 1106 1700 1120 1700 1120
Adjusted R2 .531 .543 .561 .541 .505 .532 .562 .561
Notes: 1. As for Table 2.3 (b).
2. The omitted establishment size variable is 1-2 Employees.
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Table 2.4: Decomposing the Gender Gap
GHS Weekly Wages
1978 1988 1998
Human Human Human Human Human Human
Capital Capital
SIC,SOC
Region
Capital Capital
SIC,SOC
Region
Capital Capital
SIC,SOC
Region
Log wm - .451 .451 .413 .413 .305 .305
Log wf
(bm - bf) Xf .369 .330 .327 .308 .280 .279
(Xm-X f)b m .083 .121 .086 .106 .025 .026
FES Weekly Wages
1978 1988 1998
Human Capital Human Capital Human Capital
log wm - .485 .437 .343
log wf
(bra - bf) Xf .431 .376 .321
(Xm - Xf) bm .053 .061 .022
FES Hourly Wages
1978 1988 1998
Human Capital Human Capital Human Capital
Log wm - .361 .312 .237
Log Wf
(bm - bf) Xf .3121 .256 .217
(Xm - Xf) bn, .049 .056 .020
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%Table 2.4 (continued): Decomposing the Gender Gap
BHPS Weekly Wages
1990 1998
Human Human Human Human Human Human
Capital Capital Capital Capital Capital Capital
SIC,SOC SIC,SOC SIC,SOC SIC,SOC
Region Region, Region Region,
experience, experience,
TU & Size TU & Size
Log wm - .328 .328 .328 .259 .259 .259
logw f
(bm - bf) Xf .271 .293 .236 .248 .258 .132
(Xm - Xf) bm .057 .035 .092 .011 .001 .126
BHPS Hourly Wages
1990 1998
Human Human Human Human Human Human
Capital Capital Capital Capital Capital Capital
SIC,SOC SIC,SOC SIC,SOC SIC,SOC
Region Region, Region Region,
experience, experience,
TU & Size TU & Size
log wm - .224 .224 .224 .153 .153 .153
logWf
(bm ‘ bf) Xf .167 .223 .155 .141 .190 .089
(Xm- X f)b m .057 .002 .069 .012 -.037 .064
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!Table 2.5 : Descriptive Statistics: Standard Deviations and
Residuals from the Male Wage Distribution (GHS and BHPS)
Weekly wages
No Human Human Human Capital, SIC,
Explanatory Capital Only Capital, SIC, SOC, Region, Trade
Variables SOC, Region Union, Employer Size
Male Residual Standard Deviation
1978 GHS .391 .311 .292 -
1988 GHS .474 .372 .345 -
1990 BHPS .494 .386 .348 .339
1998 GHS .549 .460 .420 -
1998 BHPS .500 .404 .364 .357
Female Residual Standard Deviation
1978 GHS .364 .326 .314 -
1988 GHS .453 .386 .357 -
1990 BHPS .472 .409 .364 .337
1998 GHS .528 .450 .413 -
1998 BHPS .456 .387 .349 .390
Mean Female Residual
1978 GHS -.451 -.369 -.330 -
1988 GHS -.413 -.327 -.308 -
1990 BHPS -.318 -.282 -.297 -.238
1998 GHS -.305 -.280 -.279 -
1998 BHPS -.286 -.246 -.251 -.147
Gender Earnings Ratios after Controls
1978 GHS 63.7 69.1 71.9 -
1988 GHS 66.2 72.1 73.5 -
1990 BHPS 72.8 75.4 74.3 78.8
1998 GHS 73.7 75.6 75.7 -
1998 BHPS 75.1 78.2 77.8 86.3
Hourly Wages
No Human Human Human Capital, SIC,
Explanatory Capital Only Capital, SIC, SOC, Region, Trade
Variables SOC, Region Union, Employer 
Size
Male Residual Standard Deviation
1990 BHPS .515 .399 .353 .341
1998 BHPS .525 .414 .364 .353
Female Residual Standard Deviation
1990 BHPS .485 .413 .367 .350
1998 BHPS .472 .391 .348 .344
Mean Female Residual
1990 BHPS -.212 -.175 -.222 -.154
1998 BHPS -.185 -.142 -.184 -.097
Gender Earnings Ratios after Controls
1990 BHPS 80.9 83.9 80.1 85.7
1998 BHPS 83.1 86.8 83.2 90.8
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»Table 2.6(a): Decomposition of the Change in the Gender Gap, 1978-1998 (GHS)
No Controls Human Capital Human Capital,
SIC, SOC, Region
Change in Differential -.1462 -.1462 -.1462
Observed X's -.0747 -.0523
age -.0602 -.0098
education -.0145 -.0002
region .0065
SOC - .0005
SIC
Observed Prices .0175 -.0393
Age .0178 .0115
Education -.0003 -.0014
region .0027
SOC -.0501
SIC .0005
Gap -.3296 -.2652 -.1964
Unobserved Prices .1833 .1761 .1455
Sum Gender Specific -.3296 -.3399 -.2487
Sum Wage Structure .1833 .1936 .1062
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tTable 2.6(b): Decomposition of the Change in the Gender Gap 1978-1988 and 1988-1998 (GHS)
1978-88 1988-98
No Human Human No Human Human
Control Capital Capital, Control Capital Capital,
s SIC, s SIC,SOC
SOC Region
Region
Change in -.0381 -.0381 -.0381 -.1082 -.1082 -.1082
Differential
Observed X's -.0059 -.0074 -.0669 -.0587
age -.0099 -.0096 -.0499 -.0423
education .0040 .0030 -.0171 -.0100
Region -.0011 .0011
s o c .0030 -.0074
SIC -.0016 -.0008
Observed Prices .0090 -.0083 .0066 -.0210
age .0103 .0076 .0071 .0034
Education -.0013 -.0020 -.0005 -.0023
region .0026 .0008
SOC -.0127 -.0272
SIC -.0012 .0036
Gap -.1343 -.1138 -.0831 -.1739 -.1246 -.0952
Unobserved Prices .0962 .0726 .0607 .0657 .0768 .0668
Sum Gender -.1343 -.1197 -.0905 -.1739 -.1915 -.1539
Specific
Sum Wage .0962 .0816 .0524 .0657 .0834 .0458
Structure
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tTable 2.6(c): Decomposition o f the Change in the Gender Gap 1990-1998 (BHPS1
Weekly Wages
Human Human Capital, SIC,
No Controls Human Capital, SOC, Region,TU atCapital SIC,SOC Work, Employer Size,
Region Work Experience
Change in Differential -.0694 -.0694 -.0694 -.0694
Observed X's -.0396 -.0402 -.0123
Age -.0340 -.0274 -.0267
Education -.0056 -.0031 -.0029
Region -.0032 -.0021
SOC -.0087 -.0095
SIC -.0012 .0010
TU .0024
Size -.0055
Work Experience .0308
Observed Prices -.0066 .0061 .0463
Age -.0000 -.0004 -.0028
Education -.0066 -.0052 -.0048
Region -.0032 .0007
SOC -.0149 -.0078
SIC .0256 .0197
TU -.0005
Size .0012
Work Experience .0572
Gap -.0733 -.0360 -.0488 -.1163
Unobserved Prices .0039 .0129 .0136 .0129
Sum Gender Specific -.0733 -.0756 -.0890 -.1286
Sum Wage Structure .0039 .0063 .0197 .0592
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tTable 2.6(d): Decomposition of the Change in the Gender Gap 1990-1998 (BHPS)
Hourly Wages
No Human Human Human Capital,
Controls Capital Capital, SIC, SOC
SIC,SOC Region,
Region TU at Work
Employer Size and
Work Experience
Change in Differential -.0710 -.0710 -.0710 -.0710
Observed X's -.0435 -.0398 -.0229
Age -.0355 -.0285 -.0288
Education -.0079 -.0041 -.0038
Region .0012 -.0027
SOC -.0056 -.0066
SIC .0000 .0009
TU -.0006
Size -.0060
Work Experience .0247
Observed Prices -.0023 .0015 .0182
Age .0027 .0025 .0020
Education -.0050 -.0040 -.0033
Region .0027 .0005
SOC -.0253 -.0170
SIC .0000 .0204
TU -.0005
Size .0204
Work Experience .0130
Gap -.0751 -.0319 -.0397 -.0714
Unobserved Prices .0041 .0066 .0070 .0051
Sum Gender Specific -.0751 -.1029 -.0795 -.0943
Sum Wage Structure .0041 .0043 .0085 .0233
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»Table 2.7: Decomposing Using the 90-10 Log Differecence of the Residual from the Male Wage
Distribution, GHS Weekly Wages
No Dummy 
Variables Human Capital
Human Capital, 
SIC,
SOC,Region
1978-98
Change in Differential -.1462 -.1462 -.1462
Observed X's -.0747 -.0559
Observed Prices .0175 -.0410
Gap -.3479 -.2685 -.1889
Unobserved Prices .2016 .1794 .1395
1978-88
Change in Differential -.0381 -.0381 -.0493
Observed X's -.0059 -.0017
Observed Prices -.0090 -.0061
Gap -.1553 -.1261 -.1311
Unobserved Prices .1172 .0848 .0897
1988-98
Change in Differential -.1082 -.1082 -.1082
Observed X's -.0670 -.0608
Observed Prices .0066 -.0198
Gap -.1695 -.1161 -.0077
Unobserved Prices .0613 .0683 .0495
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[Table 2.8(a): Further Oaxaca Decompositions
1978 Log Wage Gap = .451
Term 1: Term 2: Term 3:
(bm - b)Xm (b - bf)Xf (Xm- X f)b
Female Wage Equation 
(b = bf)
.375 0 .077
Male Wage Equation 
(b = bm)
0 .330 .121
Cotton
(b Pmbm 0 “Pnobf)
.111 .233 .108
Pooled 
(b = ba)
.070 .167 .215
1988 Log Wage Gap = .413
Term 1: 
(bm - b)Xm
Term 2: 
(b - bf)Xf
Term 3: 
(Xm- X f)b
Female Wage Equation 
(b = bf)
.352 0 .062
Male Wage Equation 
(b = bm)
0 .327 .086
Cotton
(b = pmbm + (l-pm)bf)
.130 .194 .089
Pooled 
(b = ba)
.085 .145 .183
1998 Log Wage Gap = .305
Term 1: 
(bm - b)Xm
Term 2: 
(b -  bf)Xf
Term 3: 
(Xm- X f)b
Female Wage Equation 
(b = bf)
.311 0 -.006
Male Wage Equation 
(b = bm)
0 .288 .017
Cotton
(b  — Pmbm ( l “Pmlbf)
.118 .179 .008
Pooled 
(b = ba)
.086 .142 .077
jNote: All decompositions use GHS weekly wage data, regressions include age, age squared, education, region, SICs
and SOCs.
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Table 2.8(b); Change in Log Wage Gap: Oaxaca Decompositions
1978-1998 Change in Log Wage Gap = -.146
Term 1: 
Change 
(bm-b)X m
Term 2: 
Change 
(b - bf)Xf
Term 3: 
Change 
(Xm- X f)b
Female Wage Equation 
(b = bf) -.064 0 -.083
Male Wage Equation 
(b = bm)
0 -.042 -.104
Cotton
(b ~ Pmbm 0  ■Pm'|bf)
.007 -.054 -.100
Pooled 
(b = ba)
.016 -.025 -.138
1978-1988 Change in Log Wage Gap = -.038
Term 1: 
Change 
(bm-b)X m
Term 2: 
Change 
(b - bf)Xf
Term 3: 
Change 
(Xm-X f)b
Female Wage Equation 
(b = bf)
-.023 0 -.015
Male Wage Equation 
(b = bm)
0 -.003 -.035
Cotton
(b = Pmbm + (1 "Pmlbf)
.019 -.039 -.019
Pooled 
(b = ba)
.015 -.022 -.032
1988-1998 Change in Log Wage Gap = -.088
Term 1: 
Change 
(bm-b)X m
Term 2: 
Change 
(b - bf)Xf
Term 3: 
Change 
(Xm- X f)b
Female Wage Equation 
(b = bf)
-.041 0 -.068
Male Wage Equation 
(b = bm)
0 -.039 -.069
Cotton
(b — Pmbm (1 “Pmlbf)
-.012 -.015 -.081
Pooled 
(b = ba)
.001 -.003 -.106
Note: Decompositions use GHS weekly wage data, regressions include age, age squared, education, region, SIC & SOC.
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tTable 2.9: Basic GHS Weekly Wage Equations With Selection Corrections
1978 Men 1988 Men 1998, Men
.097 .095 .098 .096 .105 .099
Age (.003) (.003) (.004) (.007) (.006) (.029)
-.114 -.111 -.110 -.108 -.117 -.110
Age /100 (.003) (.004) (.005) (.009) (.008) (.037)
Degree .465 .4665 .556 .575 .672 .660
(.018) (.019) (.020) (.039) (.033) (.096)
As .250 .249 .372 .384 .355 .347
(.015) (.016) (.019) (.032) (.030) (.084)
5+ Os .206 .205 .236 .264 .130 .160
(.015) (.017) (.021) (.032) (.036) (.079)
Under 5 .096 .088 .134 .1553 .186 .176
Os (.010) (013) (.017) (.027) (.031) (.071)
Constant 3.502 3.604 3.565 3.576 3.405 3.543
(0.047) (0.078) (.070) (.159) (.117) (.721)
-.145 .043 -.079
Mills
Ratio
(.078) (.078) (.313)
1978 Women 1988 Women 1998 Women
.047 .057 .073 .071 .094 .101
Age (.004) (.026) (.005) (.013) (.008) (.015)
-.054 -.065 -.085 -.083 -.112 -.119
Age2/ 100 (.005) (.031) (.007) (.018) (.011) (.019)
Degree .686 .635 .694 .809 .786 .941
(.033) (.140) (.030) (.192) (.044) (.244)
As .371 .330 .528 .619 .480 .568
(.033) (.111) (.025) (.150) (.044) (.172)
5+ Os .226 .209 .313 .406 .298 .399
(.025) (.062) (.029) (.129) (.051) (.154)
Under 5 .108 .084 .222 .298 .224 .295
Os (.015) (.069) (.023) (.113) (.041) (.122)
Constant 4.019 3.987 3.688 3.524 3.389 2.961
(0.059) (0.138) (.087) (.329) (.142) (.597)
-.117 .168 .185
Mills
G atin
(.300) (.293) (.306)
Notes:
1. The dependent variable is log(week!y wages) from GHS.
2. The Mill's ratio is from a probit model o f full-time employment, which includes all right-hand side
variables in the wage equation, plus other household income(/1000).
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Figure 2.1: Female Share of Full time Employment (GHS)
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Figure 2.2: Female Share of Full-time Employment by Age Group
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Figure 2.3: Indexed Real Weekly Earnings for the 10th, 50th and 90th Percentile 
Full-time Men and Women (1979=100)
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Figure 2.3 (continued)
FES Weekly Wage
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Figure 2.3 (continued)
FES Hourly Wage
t
° 10th Percentile <> 50th Percentile
+ 90th Percentile
1.8  -
1.6  -
1.4 -
1.2  -
68 74 80 86 92 98
fesyr
Full-tim e M en
° 10th Percentile <> 50th Percentile
+ 90th Percentile
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
80 86 92 9868 74
fesyr
Full-tim e W o m en
Figure 2.4: Kernel Density Estimates of the Male and Female Wage Distribution
GHS Weekly Wages
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*Figure 2.4 (continued)
FES Hourly W ages
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tFigure 2.5: Changes in the Gender Earnings Ratio
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»Figure 2.6: Ratio of the Median Female to Male Wages 
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Figure 2.6 (continued)
FES Hourly Wages
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tFigure 2.7: Gender Wage Ratio for the 5th to 95th percentile
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Figure 2.7 (continued)
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Figure 2.8: Ranking of Women in the Male Earnings Distribution
GHS Weekly Wages
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Figure 2.8 (continued)
FES Hourly Earnings
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Figure 2.9: Median Percentile Ranking of Women in the Male Wage Distribution
GHS Weekly Earnings
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Table A2.1: Mean Values for Explanatory Variables ____
BHPSFES
Men Wome Men Wome
1978 n 1978 1988 nl988
36.77 33.87 36.59 33.53
15.32 15.40 16.66 16.86
Degree 
■As' +
5+ ‘O’s 
<5 'O’s 
Mining 
Eng
Other ma.
Construct
Service
Transport
Prof/Man
Other
non-manu
Personal
Services
Ski Manu
SS Manu
Number employees 
1-2 
3-24 
25-99 
100-999 
TU at wk 
FT exp 
PT exp
GHS
Men Wome Men Wome Men Wome
1998 nl998 1978 n 1978 1988 n 1988
37.63 35.98 37.3 34.9 36.8 34.0
16.26 17.52
.072 .037 .126 .082
.113 .137 .197 .186
.102 .079 .125 .119
.278 .300 .288 .372
.114 .048 .095 .035
.225 .126 .173 .084
.121 .159 .121 .119
.112 .015 .092 .014
.308 .609 .424 .692
.102 .039 .087 .049
.186 .072 .296 .137
.190 .588 .202 .614
.003 .078 .010 .067
.419 .065 .327 .058
.151 .168 .123 .109
Men Wome Men Wome Men Wome
1998 n 1998 1990 nl990 1998 n 1998
39.1 37.9 35.9 35.1 36.0 34.8
.198 .205 .123 .126 .162 .176
.314 .257 .230 .207 .307 .295
.109 .103 .158 .120 .158 .144
.239 .318 .306 .415 .267 .315
.026 .010 .092 .043 .078 .035
.144 .050 .170 .078 .148 .060
.136 .109 .130 .090 .115 .079
.118 .020 .060 .009 .062 .007
.476 .759 .307 .602 .332 .604
.082 .044 .142 .142 .154 .163
.352 .242 .195 .163 .215 .199
.213 .541 .318 .628 .324 .602
.011 .051 .016 .066 .020 .061
.291 .059 .324 .051 .284 .047
.093 .090 .115 .076 .116 .075
.026 .029 .025 .022
.239 .293 .266 .293
.260 .266 .245 .264
.351 .314 .359 .306
.575 .565 .469 .539
17.6 12.0 15.5 10.8
.140 2.19 .218 2.51
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CHAPTER THREE 
EXPLAINING CHANGES IN THE RELATIVE EARNINGS OF PART-TIME
FEMALE EMPLOYEES
3.1. Introduction
It is well known that the number of people in part-time work has increased rapidly in recent 
years. This increase has largely been driven by two factors, a rise in the numbers of women 
(particularly mothers) working and by the growth in the service sector. Less well known 
perhaps is that as the number of part-time jobs has grown, the quality of part time work has 
declined. This has been reflected in a substantial fall in the relative earnings of part -time 
workers. Thus, while the growth in part-time work should have provided an ideal 
opportunity for women with children to combine work and family life, working part time 
has come at a price. In 1999, while full-time working women earned a wage equal to almost 
80 per of male average hourly earnings, for part timers earning were considerably lower at 
around 60 percent of average male wage. In contrast, in 1968 there was little earnings 
difference between full and part-time women (both earned around 60 percent of the average 
male wage). This chapter sets out some of the reasons for this change, examining the 
evolution of the part-time pay gap and employment since the 1970s.
This chapter uses a range of data sets to look at the emergence of the full-time / part- 
time pay gap, examining differences in characteristics and returns to characteristics, for full­
time and part-time female employees between the mid-1970s and the late 1990s. It then 
goes on to assess how much of the deterioration in the relative earnings position of part 
timers can be attributed to changes in characteristics and how much is due to an increase in 
any part-time pay penalty. The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 looks at 
attitudes towards part-time work and at some descriptive data on preferences over working 
hours. In Section 3 a brief review of the data sets used for the rest of the chapter is given, 
and then Section 4 goes on to examine changes in female employment rates and the 
composition of the part-time female work force relative to other workers over the period. 
The fifth section looks at changes in part-time women’s earnings relative to full-time 
workingwomen and examines how the experience of part-time workers has varied across
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the wage distribution. Section 6 details the econometric techniques used to estimate the 
wage equations for full-time and part-time workingwomen. Results are reported in Sections 
7 and 8. In Section 9 reasons for differences in returns to characteristics are discussed while 
in Section 10 results uses the results to decompose the earnings gap into that part due to 
differences in characteristics and that part due to differences in returns to characteristics. 
The final empirical section looks at how differences in occupation affect the part-time / full­
time wage gap. Section 12 then concludes.
3.2 Attitudes towards Part Time Work and Working Hours
Part-time jobs are seen as bad jobs, offering low pay and little job security to a poorly skilled 
section of the labour force. As a result, while part-time work has become a more important 
component of employment (part-time jobs accounted for fewer than one in twenty jobs in 
1951 compared with one in five in 19911) it has increasingly come to be regarded as a 
problem. It has, for example, been suggested that part-time employment is a form of 
disguised underemployment, that part timers are taking full timers’ jobs, and that part-time 
earnings do little to alleviate poverty or reduce inequality (as these jobs go to women who 
live in households where there is already another earner). Part-time work has been 
particularly berated in the face of a secular decline in full-time permanent male jobs. As John 
Prescott has said:
“if I want to create employment, should I target full-time men who are on the dole 
and may never get a job, or should I encourage low paid part-time employment for 
mostly middle class women”
(Guardian 24/6/94)
Other writers, such as Patricia Hewitt (1993), have argued that part-time work is one of the 
many new forms of flexible working patterns which we can expect to observe increasingly 
in the future. Part-time work, by allowing women to combine work and family life is likely 
to be part of a growing labour market trend as women’s employment rates increase. In 
addition women’s part-time earnings have been shown to be increasingly important for
1 Source: Census of Population, Great Britain 1951 and 1991.
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keeping families out of poverty (Harkness, Machin and Waldfogel 1996). For most part- 
time workers the decision to work part time is a voluntary one. In 2000, data from the 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey shows that 15 percent of part time workers were students, 9 
percent worked part time because they could not find a full time job, while 74 percent did 
not want a full time job. Men were more likely to be involuntarily working part time, with 
20 percent of part time men unable to find a full time job (another 39 percent were students) 
compared with 7 percent of part time women. A higher proportion of part-time women 
would have preferred to work more hours, and this proportion has increased over time: in 
2000, 17 percent of part-time women would have liked more hours compared with 11 
percent in 1980, suggesting rising underemployment amongst female part timers.
Average earnings for female part timers are significantly lower than for those 
working full time. One reason for this may be that “good” jobs are only available to those 
willing to work full time, leading to a concentration of part-time workers in low skill, low 
paid jobs. The British Household Panel Survey (1998-99) and Women and Employment 
Survey (1980) show a substantial number of women working full time who would prefer to 
work fewer hours, and this proportion has been rising (in 1998-99,44 percent of full-time 
women said they would have liked to work fewer hours compared with 35 percent in 1980). 
Significantly, there are higher proportions of professional full timers wanting to work fewer 
hours than other workers (in 1998-99, 53 percent of professional full timers would have 
preferred fewer hours). This lends some support to the hypothesis that part-time women are 
crowded into low skill occupations because part-time employment is not available in more 
highly skilled jobs.
Another explanation offered for low pay amongst part-time employees is that non- 
pecuniary benefits compensate part-time workers for their low relative earnings. According 
to the International Social Attitudes Survey (Jowell, Brook and Dowds 1993) levels of job 
satisfaction are higher among part-time than full-time workers. Thus, while few part timers 
think their job is well paid, they are more likely to report that their job has flexible working 
hours and good management relations and fewer describe their job as boring or stressful. 
Differences in expectations may however go some way to explaining these disparities.
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3.3 Data and Sample Definition
This rest of this paper uses data from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), General 
Household Survey (GHS), British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and Women and 
Employment Survey (WES) to investigate the changing labour market position of women 
working part time between the mid 1970s and early 1990s. Each of these data sets provides 
complementary information on earnings and employment characteristics at different points 
in time. Our first data set, the FES, contains wage data from the 1960s to date but has little 
information on personal characteristics. The GHS, on the other hand, provides detailed 
information on personal and employment characteristics from 1974 onwards, and reports 
weekly earnings, including overtime. There is however no measurement of overtime hours 
after 1983, which means that computing wage rates for men is difficult. For women this is 
less of an issue, as they tend to work fewer overtime hours. Data from the Quarterly Labour 
Force Survey (2000) shows that women work 1.5 paid overtime hours on average, 
compared to 3 hours per week for men. The WES and BHPS are the most detailed data sets 
available. Both include detailed information on personal and employment characteristics 
including total previous full-time and part-time work experience. The WES is however only 
available in 1980 and has the additional limitation of only providing in depth information 
for women of working age. The BHPS is available from 1990-91 onwards and contains 
retrospective information on previous work experience.
Throughout the paper full-time and part-time employment is defined on the basis of 
hours usually worked, with those who normally work more than 30 hours per week, 
excluding overtime, being classed as full time and those working 30 hours or less as part 
time. The one exception is teachers, who are considered to be employed full time if they 
work over 26 hours per week. In some other studies self-reported definitions of full-time 
and part-time employment are used. In the data sets used here, results obtained using this 
definition are very similar to those obtained from an hours-based classification. Throughout 
wages are defined as the usual hourly average wages (including over-time were data is 
available) and are deflated to January 2000 prices.
2 Only husbands of women interviewed are sampled and the information provided for these 
men is much less detailed than that for women.
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3.4. Trends in Full and Part-time Employment
Increased part-time employment accounted almost entirely for the rise in the number of 
women working between 1950 and the early 1970's (Rice 1993). Since the mid-1970s the 
growth rate of part-time female employment has slowed and the proportion of women in 
full-time employment began to increase. Figure 3.1 plots full-time and part-time 
employment rates for all women aged 17 to 59, excluding students, between 1968 and 1998 
using FES data. In 1968,18 percent were in part-time employment while 34 percent worked 
full time. Between 1968 and 1974, the proportion of women in part time employment grew 
steadily reaching around 24 percent in 1974. Since then, there has been little change in part- 
time employment, with the rate of part time employment standing at 28 percent in 1999. 
Full time employment rates showed only a small increase, reaching 35 percent in 1999. 
While these changes are relatively small, they disguise bigger swings in employment rates 
across age groups. Figure 3.2 plots full- and part-time employment rates by age in 1968-70, 
1977-79, 1987-89 and 1997-99.
Looking first at full-time employment rates a U-shaped pattern is observed, with 
full-time employment rates dropping rapidly between the ages o f20-24 and 30-34, rising 
again between the ages o f35-39 and 45-49, before declining once more as women approach 
retirement. Over time, however, the dip in full-time employment around childbearing age 
has become smaller, with the largest changes in full-time employment observed among 
women in their 20s and 30s, while for younger and older women (i.e. those aged 20-24 and 
55-59) full-time employment rates have actually shown a slight fall. The largest increases in 
full-time employment have however been observed for those aged 25-29 and 30-34, with 
full-time employment increased from 26 to 49 percent for those age 25 to 29, and from 20 
to 34 percent for those age 30-34, between 1968 and 1998. For women aged 35-49 
employment rates increased by around 10 percentage points over the same period.
The incidence of part time work is quite different, with part-time employment rates 
increasing sharply between the ages of 20-24 and 35-39, thereafter levelling out. For each 
age group, the incidence of part time work has increased. However, while for full-timers 
part time work has increased steadily over time, for part timers the biggest change was
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between 1968-70 and 1977-79. Over this period part time employment rates increased by 
around 10 percentage points, but since then there has been little or no change in the 
incidence of part time work.
There are also marked differences in patterns of employment by education, and this 
is illustrated in Figure 3.3. This plots full- and part-time employment rates by highest 
educational qualification using GHS data. Looking first at full-time employment rates, it is 
clear that while full-time employment rates among those with degrees are around 80 percent 
in all periods, for those with no qualifications full time employment rates have fallen from 
over 50 percent in 1974 to below 40 percent in 1998. The increase in full time employment 
observed has been entirely due to changes in educational composition, rather than a result 
of increasing full-time employment rate within education groups. Looking at part time 
employment, the reverse is observed. Rates of part-time employment are twice as high 
among women with no qualifications as compared to those with degrees (fewer than 10 
percent of women with degrees worked part time in 1998 compared to 23 percent of those 
with no qualifications).
While at any one point in time over the last twenty years less than one-third of 
women have been working part time, a great many more women have worked part time at 
some point in their life. Data from the Women and Employment Survey (1980) and British 
Household Panel Survey (1998-99) shows that in both periods of those aged 21-59 over 50 
percent had at some point worked part time.
Changes in the Composition of Employment
These differences in changes in employment rates by age have lead to shifts in the 
age composition of female employment. Table 3.1 reports data on the age composition of 
part-time and full-time female employees in 1978, 1988 and 1998 from the GHS. In each 
period the age composition of part timers differed significantly from that of full-time 
workingwomen, with a much higher proportion of part-time workingwomen being over the 
age of 35. Full time work has tended to be concentrated on the relatively young, although 
rapid growth in full-time employment among those aged 25-34 meant that the age profile of 
full-time workingwomen in 1998 had become significantly older.
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Table 3.1 also reports summary statistics from the GHS on the distribution of 
employees by educational attainment, work experience and the proportions married and 
with children. Looking first at education, it is clear that full time workers in all periods are 
better qualified. In 1998, 22 percent of full time working women held a degree compared 
with 9 percent of those working part time, while 21 percent held no qualifications compared 
to 12 percent of full-timers. In 1978, similar educational differences existed, with 4 percent 
of full timers holding a degree compared to 2 percent of part timers and 44 percent of full 
timers having no qualifications compared to 62 percent of part timers. Some of this 
difference in the educational composition of full and part time workers is related to age 
differences, with older part time workers less likely to hold formal qualifications than 
younger full-timers. However, over and above this, part time workers are less well qualified 
than those who work full time are.
Differences in demographic characteristics of full and part time workers are also 
marked, with over two-thirds of full-time workers having no dependent children compared 
to just over one third of part timers, while only 3 percent of full time working women have 
more than 2 children. These proportions have changed very little between 1978 and 1998 
because, although the employment rates of mothers have increased, this increase has been 
offset by the overall decline in fertility.
3.5. Comparing Part-time Women, Full-time Women and Full-time Men’s Earnings 
Aggregate Trends in Average Earnings Ratios
In the mid 1970s women working part time had average earnings almost equal to 
those working full time, although both earned considerably less than men. In recent decades 
however, as full-time working women have considerably improved their earnings position 
relative to men, part-time women have seen a sharp drop in their relative earnings position 
vis-a-vis full-time women and little change relative to men. Figure 3.4 plots the ratio of 
full-time and part-time female earnings to full-time male earnings, and part-time female to 
full-time female earnings between 1968 and 1998. Between 1968 and 1973 both full and 
part-time women earned an average wage equal to around 59 percent of the full-time male 
wage. Before and shortly after the introduction of the 1975 Equal Pay and Sex
Discrimination Acts pay rose rapidly, for both full and part time workers, so that by 1978 
part time women earned around 66 percent, and full time working women earned around 69 
percent, of the average male wage. Since 1978, however, the fortunes of full and part time 
workers have diverged, with the relative earnings of full timers levelling out in the 
early1980s before steadily increasing again in the late 1980s and 1990s. By 1999, full time 
workers earned 80 percent of the average male wage. For part time workers, however, the 
gain in earnings achieved around the time of the Equal Pay Acts was reversed in the late 
1970s, and part time workers have seen no real improvement in their earnings subsequently. 
By 1999, part time workers earned only 59 percent of the average male wage. The relative 
decline in the fortune of part time women relative to those working full time is charted in 
the second panel of Figure 3.4. This indicates that part-time women’s earnings have 
declined from a position of parity with full time working women, to just 75 percent of the 
full-time average female wage.
Part-time men are not considered here as, although since the 1980s the proportion of 
men working part time has increased, they still represent a small portion of the part-time 
work force and have very different characteristics to part time women. In 1999, fewer than 
3 percent of men aged 21-60 worked part time and men accounted for 12 percent of part- 
time employees.3 It is instructive to note however that there is a significant pay gap 
between part-time women and part-time men. In the 1970s and early 1980s there was little 
difference in part-time and full-time male earnings rates and as a result the part-time female 
/ part-time male pay gap was similar to the part-time female / full-time male gap. The latter 
half of the 1980s and early 1990s however saw a sharp decline in part-time men’s relative 
pay, leading to a rise in the part-time female / part-time male earnings ratio which stood at 
around 75 percent in the early 1990s.
Changes in Earnings across the Wage Distribution
It is possible that changes in average earnings may disguise large variations in the 
experience of workers at different points of the earnings distribution. It is therefore useful to 
look at real earnings growth for men and women at different points of the distribution.
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Figure 3.5 plots indexed real hourly earnings for full-time and part-time women at the 1 Oth, 
50th and 90th percentile between 1968 and 1999.1979 is used as the base year because the 
distribution of earnings between these percentiles narrowed between 1968 and 1979 and 
widened thereafter.
From 1968 to 1979 earnings grew at a similar rate across percentiles. After 1979, 
however, for full-time women earnings of the 90th percentile woman grew notably faster 
than those of the 50th percentile woman and the earnings growth of the 50th percentile was 
significantly greater in turn than those of the 10th percentile. This pattern is observed 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Earnings growth of part-time workingwomen was slower, 
particularly at the 10th and 50th percentiles. Thus, while earnings grew rapidly for the 90th 
centile part time woman, earnings at the 10th and 50th grew less rapidly with these women 
experiencing slower earnings growth than the 10th centile full time woman.
A difference in earnings growth rates by percentile reflects a widening of the income 
distribution. More formal measures of earnings inequality are given in Table 3.2, which 
reports six alternative measures of wage inequality in 1968,1978, 1988 and 1998 for full- 
and part-time women. The reported measures differ in that they attach different weights to 
individuals at different points of the wage distribution. For example, the coefficient of 
variation defined as the variance of the wage divided by the mean, gives high weighting to 
those at the top of the earnings distribution. The standard deviation of logs attaches more 
equal weighting to those on very low and very high incomes as, by using logs, the weight 
attached to those at the top of the distribution is reduced and that attached to those at the 
bottom increased. The third measure, the gini coefficient, compares the proportion of 
cumulative total earnings held by individuals at each point of the earnings distribution with 
the proportion that would be held were earnings equally distributed. Finally, the 90-10,90- 
50 and 50-10 log wage differentials allow relative wages at different points of the wage 
distribution to be compared.
All measures of wage inequality, except the 50-10 log wage differential, suggest a 
higher degree of wage inequality among part time workers in all periods. The 50-10 log 
wage differential for part time workers was however considerably lower than for full-
3 Family Expenditure Survey.
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timers. This suggests that the high levels of wage inequality observed for part time workers 
result from a bimodal wage distribution, with the majority of part timers concentrated in 
low wage occupations and a small minority employed in high paid professional 
occupations. For full-timers, all measures suggest a decline in wage inequality between 
1968 and 1978, and an increase thereafter. The pattern of changing wage inequality for full 
time women is therefore similar to that observed elsewhere for full-time workingmen (see 
for example Machin 1996). For part timers, however, wage inequality has not shown such a 
consistent trend. The standard deviation of logs, gini coefficient, 90-10 and 90-50 log wage 
differentials all indicate a fall in wage inequality between 1968 and 1978, and an increase 
thereafter. However, the coefficient of variation shows a fall in wage inequality again 
between 1988 and 1998 and this may reflect a decline in the number of very highly paid 
part time workers over this period. This is discussed in more detail in the following section. 
The 50-10 log-wage differential also shows a different trend, with wage inequality rising 
between 1968 and 1978, falling again in 1988 and then increasing in 1998. The 50-10 log 
wage differential however suggest a relatively low level of inequality at this point of the 
wage distribution, with much more substantial wage differences being observed between 
the 50th and the 90th centiles.
Changes in the Wage Gap across the Wage Distribution
Differences in rates of earnings growth across the wage distribution may mean that the 
gender earnings ratio has improved more at some points of the wage distribution than at 
others. For example, the top 10 percent of female earners may have gained a great deal 
relative to the top 10 percent of men while the bottom 10 percent may have seen only a 
marginal gain. To see how rising wage inequality has affected women at different points of 
the wage distribution, changes in the wage gap at different percentiles of the male and 
female wage distribution are examined. Figure 3.6 shows the gender earnings ratio at each 
percentile (calculated as, for example, the ratio of the earnings of the 10th percentile full­
time woman to the 10 percentile full-time man etc.) for full-time and part-time women 
relative to full-time men, and for part-time women relative to full-time women, in 1968, 
1978,1988 and 1998.
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Looking first at comparisons of full-time female to male earnings in the top panel 
we see that the gender earnings ratio increased across all percentiles between 1968 and 
1998. However, while in 1968 the ratio was flat across the distribution, by 1998 there was a 
steady fall in the gender earnings ratio at the higher end of the earnings distribution. The 
biggest improvement in the gender earnings ratio therefore occurred at the bottom end of 
the wage distribution. The earnings of women working part time also improved vis a vis 
men across the distribution between 1968 and 1998.This is illustrated in the middle panel. 
Changes in the gender earnings ratio where however much smaller at all percentiles than 
occurred for full time working women. Moreover, these improvements were concentrated at 
the lower end of the wage distribution. Finally, comparing part-time and full-time female 
employees earnings in the third panel reveals that while the earnings of these two groups 
were similar in 1968 for all except those in the top 20 percent of the distribution (who 
earned considerably more per hour than the highest paid full timers). Each decade saw a 
continuing decline in the relative earnings of part timers across all percentiles. It is also 
notable that in 1998 the size of the pay gap between full-time and part-time workers was 
larger at the top end of the wage distribution.
Women in the Male Wage Distribution
So far we have used earnings comparisons to assess changes in the labour market 
status of part-time workingwomen over the last twenty years. Blau and Khan (1992) 
however suggest that such earnings comparisons may not be the best indicator of changes in 
the relative labour market position of groups of workers in periods of rapidly rising wage 
inequality. This is because if, for example, returns to 'skill' rise then, part-time women, 
because they have on average fewer labour market skills than other groups of workers, will 
see a fall in their relative earnings. Thus, while rising wage inequality disproportionately 
penalises part-time women, the resulting fall in relative average earnings has not resulted 
from gender or part time specific factors (such as a rise in the skills gap, or an increase in 
discrimination). As a result earnings comparisons may understate any improvement in part- 
time women's relative labour market position as a result of gender specific or part time 
specific changes if wage inequality is increasing rapidly.
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Given rapidly increasing wage inequality, changes in the position of part-time 
women in the full-time male and female wage distributions may give a better indication of 
changes in their relative labour market status. One way to do this is to look at the 
distribution of female workers by full-time male or full-time female earnings deciles. A 
second method is to examine the percentile ranking of women in the male wage 
distribution.
Figures 3.7 (a) -  3.7 (c) show the distribution of female workers by various earnings 
deciles in 1968,1978,1988 and 1998 using FES hourly earnings data for those aged 21 to 
60. Figure 3.7 (a) illustrates the position of part-time working women in the full-time male 
earnings distribution, 3.7 (b) shows that of full-time working women in the full-time male 
distribution and 3.7 (c) shows the position of part-time working women in the full-time 
female wage distribution. The x-axis plots the corresponding earnings deciles and the y-axis 
plots the proportion of women in each of these deciles in each period. The line at 0.1 
indicates the proportion of women we would expect to find in each decile if, for example, 
part-time women had the same earnings distribution as full-time men. Figures (a) and (b) 
show that women working part time in all periods were more likely than those working full 
time to fall within the lowest male earnings deciles. Moreover, while women working full 
time have seen a significant improvement in their earnings position in the last two decades 
(particularly in the lower deciles) the change for women working part time has been much 
less dramatic. Indeed, for part-time workingwomen there has been relatively little 
improvement in their relative earnings position over the last two decades. Part-time women 
remain considerably over-represented in the bottom male earnings deciles, and although the 
proportion falling within the very lowest decile did fall significantly between 1968and 
1998, this was mainly as a result of an increased proportion falling within the second decile. 
Part timers remain massively over-represented in the bottom half of the male earnings 
distribution: in 1998 81 percent of part timers earned less than the male median compared 
with 89 percent in 1968. Finally, it is noteworthy too that as many part-time working 
women made it into the top male earnings decile as full timers: around 5 percent in 1968 
and 4 percent in 1998. For full timers the FES hourly earnings data indicates that in 1968 61 
percent of full-time female employees had earnings in the bottom male earnings decile and
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that 90 percent earned less than the male medians. Just 2 percent of women had made it into 
the top male earnings decile. Each decade has seen a considerable improvement in women’s 
position in the male wage distribution and by 1998 the proportion of women in the bottom 
male earnings decile had fallen to 13 percent and the proportion earning less than the male 
median had fallen to 65 percent. There remains however significant under-representation of 
women in the very top earnings deciles: in 1998 only 2 percent of full-time workingwomen 
made it into the top male earnings decile.
Comparing the position of part-time and full-time women in Figure 3.7 (c) shows 
that between 1968 and 1998 part-time women moved from being fairly evenly spread 
throughout the full-time female wage distribution to being heavily concentrated in the 
bottom third of the distribution. By 1998 the proportion of part-time women in the lowest 
decile had increased to 25 percent, while a further quarter were in the second decile. At the 
same time the percentage in the top decile fell too, to 8 percent in 1998. Together these 
shifts indicate a substantial deterioration in the relative labour market position of part-time 
vis-a-vis full-time women.
Another way of looking at the changing position of part-time women while 
accounting for changes in the wage structure is to assign women a percentile ranking 
according to the position of their earnings in the full-time male and full-time female wage 
distribution. Changes in the position of the percentile ranking of, for example, the median 
woman in the male wage distribution can then be computed over time. Panel (a) of Figure 
3.8 graphs the mean percentile ranking of full-time and part-time workingwomen in the 
male wage distribution between 1968 and 1998. For full-time workingwomen the median 
percentile ranking in the male wage distribution rose from the 17th percentile in 1968 to the 
41 st percentile in 1999. Part timers again fared much less well, with their median percentile 
ranking increasing from the 17th percentile to the 25th percentile between 1968 and 1998. 
Use of the percentile ranking therefore suggests an improvement in the relative labour 
market position of part-timers, which is not observed in the changes in relative earnings. It 
is noteworthy too that the gap between the percentile ranking of full-time and part-time 
women was quite large in the mid-970s, suggesting that the part-time / full-time earnings 
gap was low because at this time the wage distribution was relatively compressed. In panel
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(b) we can see how the mean earnings percentile ranking of part-time women has fared vis- 
a-vis full-time women. It is apparent that there has been a sharp decline in the median 
percentile ranking of part-time women in the full-time female earnings distribution over the 
last twenty years. Thus, while in 1968 the mean part-time woman earned an amount 
equivalent to the 45 percentile full-time woman; this percentile ranking dropped 
substantially over the next ten years so that by 1998 the median part timer earned amount 
equivalent to the 32nd percentile woman.
It is possible to extend our analysis to examine how women at different points of the 
wage distribution have fared using similar methodology. From this, it is clear that, for both 
full-time and part-time workingwomen across the earnings distribution; changes in 
percentile rankings suggest a substantially greater improvement in women’s relative labour 
market status than changes in the earnings ratio. Looking however at the ranking of part- 
time women in the full-time female wage distribution we see that part timers once again 
appear to have persistently fallen behind full timers over the last two decades at all points of 
the earnings distribution.
3.6. Wages, Labour Supply and Hours of Work 
Wage Determination
A typical wage equation estimates an individual’s hourly earnings as a function of 
human capital and job characteristics. The wage offer received is normally assumed to be 
independent of hours of work. Table 3.3 reports results from regressions of the log of wages 
on a part time dummy variable and personal characteristics using data from the 1980 WES 
and 1990 and 1998 BHPS.4 No attempt is made to control for selection into either 
employment or part time work at this point. These results show that, while in 1980 there 
was no significant wage penalty to part time work, the wage penalty associated with part 
time work had increased to approximately 17 percent in 1990 and 21 percent in 1998. It is 
notable too that in the 1990s including controls for part time work and previous years work 
experience eliminates the pay penalty to having children found in earlier studies (see Joshi,
4 Controls include a quadratic in age, four education dummy variables, quadratics in previous full and 
part time work experience, regional dummies and three dummy variables for the number o f children in the
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Paci and Waldfogel 1999). It is notable too that years of previous part time work experience 
actually leads to significantly lower current wages in both 1990 and 1998.
Moffitt (1984) and Lundberg (1985), using US data, have both found wages to be 
endogenous to the number of hours of worked (wages were found to increase with hours of 
work). Similarly a number of studies of part-time earnings find significant differences in 
returns to full and part time work (Ermisch and Wright 1993, Simpson 1986, Long and 
Jones 1979, Blank 1990a and 1990b). An F ‘test’ for equality of the parameters in the full- 
and part-time wage equations rejects the hypothesis of equality in all periods using GHS 
data for 1978,1988 and 1998,1980 WES data and BHPS data for 1990 and 1998. Separate 
full time and part time wage equations are therefore developed in the following sections, 
and in addition methods of controlling for selection into full and part time employment are 
discussed.
If we allow wage offers to differ by full-time and part-time employment status 
female wage offer equations are estimated by the functions: -
(1) log Wf = df Xf + ef for full-time women
(2) log Wp = ap Xp + ep for part-time women
Where Wfj>p are estimated wage offers, Xfi)P are vectors of employment characteristics, and 
<Xf>p are estimated returns to characteristics for full-time and part-time employees 
respectively. As we observe only accepted wage offers, and as we do not know whether our 
pool of observed full-time and part-time workers are randomly selected, we must also 
control for the selection of individuals into different states labour market states. The use of 
a Tobit model to estimate female labour supply functions has been rejected by a number of 
studies including that of Mroz (1987) who concluded that women’s hours of work and 
labour force participation decisions were distinct. It is therefore preferable to use a two- 
stage model, such as that of Heckman (1979), as such models allow variables to take on 
different parameters in the wage and participation decision equations. Ermisch and Wright 
(1993) use an ordered probit model to estimate the parameters determining selection into 
non-employment, part-time employment or full-time employment, and then use the
household.
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parameter estimates to control for selectivity bias in the wage equations. This assumes 
proportionality of the parameters determining selection into employment and those 
determining the choice of hours worked. This assumption is relaxed in Blank (1988) and 
Nakamura and Nakamura (1983). These studies use separate equations to model the 
participation and part-time / full-time work decision, but both considerably increase the 
complexity of the model to be estimated. Ermisch and Wright (1993) tested Nakamura and 
Nakamura’s model against that outlined above and found that the results obtained from 
both were similar. The ordered probit model further assumes that preferences are ranked, 
with the probability of choosing some outcome ‘j ’ determined by a latent variable ‘y’, 
which is itself a function of a set of characteristics ‘z’. It is not clear, however, that the 
choice between non-employment, part time work and full-time work is an ordered one. For 
example, if full-time employment is an individuals preferred employment status, this need 
not imply that part time employment is preferred over non-employment. For this reason a 
multinomial logit model, which does not assume any ranking of employment states, is used 
instead to correct for selection into full and part-time employment when wage equations are 
estimated. The methodology used here is similar to that of Ogawa and Ermisch (1996) and 
Lee (1982, 1983).
Suppose utility Y from a choice of employment j is given by some set of 
characteristics V such that:
Yj = Voij+ej
If a choice ‘k’ is made it implies that Yk>max Yj for all j not equal to k. Assuming the j 
error terms are independently and identically distributed and follow a Weibull distribution, 
then
e j =max Yk-Uj
follows a multivariate logistic distribution Fj (e), and a woman is observed in work status k 
iff £j < Voij. The probability of observing outcome Zj=j can be written as the multinomial 
logit model with:
(4)
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Prob[Zj = j] =
exp(«jV,)
1 + Z exp (a> ()
*=1
Here Z is the selection variable which takes the values 0,1, ..., J for J+l outcomes, ‘i’ 
indexes individuals, ‘j ’ indexes outcomes and selection is made on Z j= j. ‘V’ is a vector of 
characteristics that are thought to influence Z, the decision to work full-time, part-time or 
not at all. The possible outcomes j are:
j = 0 non employment
= 1 part time work
= 2 full time employment
Selecting on Zj=j, Lee (1983) shows that implied regression equation for the conditional 
expectation of wages is now given by:
(4)
E[log wk I ek < vak] = xpk + E[ek \ ek < Vpk]
The selection problem arises because ^  j£ <y^  may not be zero. Lee proposes a
transformation of 8k to Ek*=J(ek)=^>1[Fk(e)], where O is a cumulative density function with 
standard normal distribution. Now if €k<V(Xk then £k*<Jk(V<Xk). Hence E[ek | £k<Vak] = E[ek | 
£k*<Jk(Vak)] where 8k* has a standard normal distribution. From the properties of 
conditional expectations and the truncated normal distribution, we can now write:
E[es | es < vak] = - p k<jk<j>[Jk(ypk)]/Fk{Vpk) = - p ka kXk
Where pk is the correlation coefficient between ek and z k, and ak2 is the variance of es and 
Xj=0[J(Vpk)/F k (Vpk)], where 0  is the standard normal density function. Consistent 
estimates of p j and 0j can now be obtained by OLS regression of log Wj on X and Xj, with:
E[log wk I s k < vak]= xpk -  p ka kXk = Xpk + 0kXk
The standard errors obtained must however be corrected. Details of the procedure for 
correcting standard errors can be found in Greene (1992, pp618-622). Note that if 0k is not 
significantly different from zero then there is no evidence of selection bias and we could
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simply obtain estimates of the wage equations from (1) and (2). It should be noted that the 
selection procedure adopted here is based on the Heckman (1980) selection correction. 
While this is a commonly adopted approach several authors including Manski (1989) have 
criticized it for lack of robustness. For this reason, results are presented for the full and part- 
time wage equations both with and without controls for selection in Section X.
3.7. Results from the Multinomial Logit Model of Full- and Part-time Employment
Employment decisions are expected to be a function of potential earnings, demographic 
characteristics and other household income. Table 3.4(a) reports the marginal effects from 
the multinomial logit (computed as dPj/dv) using 1978, 1988 and 1998 GHS data. The 
mean values from the multinomial logit model are reported in Appendix Al. This model 
includes as controls all variables in the wage equation (i.e. a quadratic in age, dummy 
variables for educational qualifications, the number of children in the household and 
region), plus dummy variables for being married/cohabiting, for the presence of children 
under 5 in the household, and the log of other weekly household income. Table 3.4(b) 
reports results using the same control variables using 1980, 1990 and 1998 data from the 
WES and BHPS. These data sets have the advantage of also including information of 
previous full and part time work experience. Past experience would be expected to 
influence current employment decisions, first because past work experience influences 
current wages, and therefore increases the benefit of working. Second, there is likely to be 
persistence in employment behaviour, which may, for example, reflect preferences for work 
or improved employment networks. Quadratics in full and part time work experience, and 
the interaction of full and part time work experience, are also therefore included as controls 
in Table 3.4(c). In all cases non-employment is the omitted category, and the marginal 
effects are therefore interpreted as the change in the probability resulting from a change in 
‘v’ of being in part- or full-time employment vis a vis being non-employed.
Looking first at Table 3.4(a), in 1978 we observe a positive and significant 
coefficient on age for part-time workers and a negative and significant coefficient on age 
for full timers. This suggests that as women age they were more likely to work part time, 
while the probability of full-time work falling with age. By 1998 the coefficient on age was
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insignificant or part timers, while for model suggests that the probability of full-time work 
now increased at a decreasing rate, with age. This may be a result of not only increasing 
employment among women in their 30s, but also a result of declining employment rates 
among women under 20. The coefficients on the education dummies tell us that, while in 
1978 education had no impact on the probability of part time work, by 1998 the probability 
of working part time (vis a vis non employment) was significantly lower among the most 
educated. In 1998, women with a degree were 12 percent less likely to work part time than 
those with no qualifications. On the other hand, women with higher qualification levels 
have always been more likely to work full-time, and the magnitude of the coefficients has 
been increasing. Thus while in 1978 having a degree increased a woman’s probability of 
working full time by 11 percent, by 1998 this had increased to 40 percent. This reflects an 
increasing polarisation in the employment of low and high skill women, which has been 
documented in Rake (2000).
The impact of children on the probability of being full or part time employed has 
been changing, reflecting the increased employment of mothers, particularly among those 
with young children, that has occurred since the 1970s (see Desai et al 1999). In 1978, 
having a child under 5 in the household reduced the probability of part time employment by 
8 percent but by 1998 the impact was no longer statistically significant. The number of 
children in the household also had a significant impact on employment, with the probability 
of part time work increasing and of full time work decreasing with the number of children 
in all periods. Marriage and other household income increased the probability of part time 
work in all periods, while other household income reduced the probability of full time 
work. Marriage, on the other hand, had no impact of full time work in 1978 and 1988, but 
by 1998 those who were married or cohabiting were significantly more likely to work full­
time.
Together these changes reflect increased female labour force participation, with women 
today being more likely to continue working after marriage and to take less time out of the 
labour market after childbirth (McRae and Daniel 1991). The increased magnitude of the 
negative coefficients on the children dummies reflect the fact that childbirth, rather than 
marriage, is now the most important factor determining female labour force participation
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decisions.
Table 3.4(b) reports marginal effects from the multinomial logit model, using the 
same set of explanatory variables, and data from the 1980 WES and 1990 and 1998 BHPS. 
The results obtained are similar to those in Table 3.4(a). In Table 3.4(c) controls for 
previous full and part-time work experience are added. Including these variables increases 
the explanatory power of the models, with pseudo R2 increasing from . 150 to .318 in 1980 
and from .127 to .195 in 1998. In 1980, part time work experience tended to increase the 
probability of both part- and full-time work, while full time work experience increased the 
probability of working full time only. By 1998, the impact of previous work experience on 
current employment choices had changed slightly, with previous part time work experience 
increasing the probability of part time work, and reducing the probability of full time work. 
Full-time work experience, on the other hand, increased the probability of working full time 
but reduced the probability of part time work. This change may reflect the increasingly 
dichotomous nature of full and part time employment, with part time work experience 
doing little to enhance full-time employment opportunities. On the other hand those with 
full time work experience do not appear to regard part time employment as an alternative to 
full-time work, with these women being more likely to switch out of the labour force than 
into part-time work. This is likely to reflect the increasing concentration of part time work 
in low wage work. The inclusion of previous work experience tends to increase the size of 
the coefficients on the dummy variables for number of children in the household and age of 
youngest child.
3.8. Wage Equations with and Without Sample Selection
Table 3.5 reports results from full-time and part-time wage equations both with and without 
sample selection. In Table 3.5(a) results are reported using GHS data, for 1978,1988 and 
1998 where controls included are a quadratic in age and dummy variables for education, 
number of children in the household, and region. The selection term, lambda is calculated 
from the multinomial logit model and estimates the probability of full-time, part-time or 
non-employment. In Table 3.5(b) results are reported for wage equations with the same set 
of explanatory variables, using WES and BHPS data for 1980, 1990 and 1998. In Table
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3.5(c) additional controls for full and part-time work experience are added.
Looking first at Table 3.5(a) without controls for selection, we find that for full 
timers returns to age and education have been increasing over time, which is consistent with 
other findings (see, for example, Gosling, Machin and Meghir 1994) which show that 
increased returns to age and education have been an important component of the general 
increase in wage inequality since the late 1970s. There is also a pay penalty to having 
children, of around 10 percent for one or two children in 1998 and as high as 29 percent 
among those with three or more children. This again is consistent with other work on the 
family pay gap (see Waldfogel 1998a). It is perhaps notable that the pay penalty to having 
children has not changed significantly over time. The returns to characteristics differ quite 
considerably between full- and part-time workers for age and demographic characteristics, 
with returns to age being considerably lower and the wage penalty associated with having 
children considerably smaller than for full-time workers. The explanatory power of the 
model is considerably greater for full-time workers; with between 30 and 40 percent of 
wages being explained in the full-time wage models compared to around 20 percent in the 
part time models. Controlling for selection, we find that selection into full-time work is 
significant and positive in 1978, but by 1998 the coefficient is negative and insignificant. 
In 1988 and 1998 therefore the hypothesis of sample selection bias is rejected, telling us 
that unobserved characteristics (e.g. motivation) which affect a woman’s full-time wage 
(through ef) do not also affect the probability that she will be observed to be working full 
time. Full-time workingwomen are therefore found to be randomly selected in 1988 and 
1998 and ordinary least squares estimation should therefore give unbiased and consistent 
parameter estimates of the full-time wage equation. Selection into part time work on the 
other hand tended to reduce wages in 1978, but by 1998 the coefficient on lambda was large 
and positive. The positive coefficient on lambda in 1998 tells us that unobserved 
characteristics, such as motivation, which raised a woman’s part-time wage also increased 
the probability that she would be observed working part time. This implies that non-random 
selection of workers into part time jobs tended to reduce wages in 1978 but increase them in 
1998. Coefficients on the other variables are not changed greatly as a result of correcting for 
selection into employment. Table 3.5(b) reports results for full- and part-time wage
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equations using data from the 1980 WES and 1990 and 1998 BHPS. The estimated 
coefficients are very similar to those found using GHS data, except for the 1998 the 
coefficients on the number of children in the household. In the BHPS data having one or 
two children has an insignificant impact on wages, although having three or more children 
in the household reduces wages by 15 percent.
In Table 3.5(c) additional controls are then included for previous full and part time 
work experience. The coefficients on full-time work experience in both the full time and 
part time wage equations show that previous full time work experience increases wages, 
although the impact of previous work experience on wages is greater for those working full­
time. Ermisch and Wright (1993) also find that using 1980 WES data returns to work 
experience were greater for full timers than part timers. On the other hand part time work 
experience has no impact on wages for part timers, and actually has a significant negative 
impact on the wages of full time workers. Adding controls for work experience tends to 
reduce the coefficients on age, as would be expected. In the full-time wage models, the size 
of the coefficients on the number of children in the household fall with the addition of 
controls for previous work experience with the number of children in the household having 
no significant impact on wages in 1998. This suggests that, for full time working women in 
1998, the observed child penalty in the Tables 3.5(a) and 3.5(b) resulted from lower levels 
of labour market experience among mothers. In 1980 and 1990, however, a wage penalty to 
motherhood existed over and above any loss in work experience. Looking at the coefficients 
on the selection terms in Table 3.5(c), the model suggests that once previous work 
experience is controlled for, negative selection into part time work is observed in all 
periods. This implies that in all periods part time workers are not randomly selected into 
part time work; instead unobserved characteristics that tend to increase the probability of a 
woman working part time also tend to reduce her part time wage. Table 3.5(c) does not 
therefore provide any evidence of non-random selection into full-time work in any period.
Overall, the wage equations estimated here suggest that the ways in which full and 
part time workers are rewarded are quite different. For part time women returns to 
education and age or work experience tend to be much lower than for those working part 
time. However, while full time workingwomen have tended to have a large pay penalty to
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having children, for part time workers the penalty to having children is much smaller. Much 
of this difference in the wage penalty to having children appears to result from years of lost 
work experience, and this is particularly true for the later time periods. Finally, there is 
some evidence of non-random selection into full and part time employment.
3.9. Why might Returns to Characteristics Differ?
If the labour market were perfectly competitive then workers with the same 
marginal productivity would have to be paid the same wage in equilibrium. There are, 
however, several explanations as to why part timers might be paid less than full timers with 
the same characteristics might. One argument is that fixed costs of employment, such as 
training and recruitment costs, may lead to lower wages when fewer hours are worked (see 
Rosen 1976). Alternatively the labour supply function of full-time and part-time workers 
may be distinct if, for example, part timers are more concerned about their work fitting in 
with other household responsibilities or if there are fixed costs associated with labour 
supply, such as travel to work expenses. A third related reason for lower wage offers to part 
timers may be compensating wage differentials, with convenience of hours, lower levels of 
stress etc. making up for lower remuneration.
An alternative explanation of full-time / part-time or gender differences in returns to 
characteristics may be that the wage equation is misspecified, for example, as a result of the 
omission of variables which differ systematically across full-time / part-time employees or 
across genders. One such omitted variable was suggested by Becker (1985), who argued 
that women typically have less ‘energy’ for work than men because of their responsibility 
for household tasks. This argument could also be applied to full-time and part-time 
employees if it was thought that differences in household responsibilities between these two 
groups affected effort. Becker’s effort hypothesis has been tested by Bielby and Bielby 
(1988) in the US and Baxter (1992) in Australia. No conclusive evidence in support of the 
hypothesis was found in either study. There may also be other areas in where there are 
unobserved differences between full-time and part-time employees, such as in motivation 
for work. Therefore a selection term derived from the multinomial logit model is included 
in the wage equations.
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Finally, returns to characteristics could differ because of discrimination which may 
arise if the presence of market imperfections. Imperfect information, for example, may lead 
employers to discriminate against women or part timers, and this may adversely affect their 
employment, promotion opportunities and wages. Alternatively, if all employers derive 
utility from discrimination, discrimination may persist (see Arrow (1972), Becker (1957) 
and Neumark (1988) for models of discrimination) in the absence of perfect information. It 
is probable that a mixture of discrimination, differences in returns to unobserved 
characteristics, variations in fixed costs of employment and compensating wage 
differentials explain differences in returns to observed characteristics.
3.10. Simple Decompositions
Using Oaxaca’s (1973) methodology, the part time pay gap can be decomposed into 
two components: that part of the gender gap which can be explained by differences in 
measured characteristics, and that part which can be explained by differences in male and 
female returns to measured characteristics. The decomposition is outlined below, and the 
results are reported in Table 3.6.
From equation (4), evaluated at the mean the log wage is given by:
(5)
logwf = p f  'Xf +0f  Xf + t j {
(6)
log wp = /y X p +6p +7]r
and therefore:
(7)
log w f - log Wp =  p f  (Xp - x f) + ( P p - P f ) x  p + ef  ( Ap - Af) + (0P - 6f ) ap 
The first term in equation (7) tells us how much of the log(wage) gap results from
differences in observed characteristics, the second term tells us how much of the log(wage)
gap can be accounted for by differences in returns to these characteristics, and the third term
reflects differences in unobserved characteristics, and fourth term differences in returns to
these unobserved characteristics. The second term is often interpreted as that part of the
wage gap resulting from “discrimination”. For reasons discussed above it may not,
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however, be a entirely accurate measure of discrimination as it includes that part of the gap 
arising from differences in fixed costs of employment and compensating wage differentials.
Results from the Decomposition
Results from the part-time / full-time earnings decomposition for women are 
reported in Table 3.6. Looking first at the results from the GHS data, it is observed that 
between 1978 and 1998 the log wage gap widened from -.068 to -.264 log point. Moreover, 
in 1978 the entire wage gap was accounted for by differences in returns to characteristics. 
1998 had reversed this position. In 1998 differences in employment characteristics 
accounted for -.109 of the wage gap, with -.084 of the wage gap accounted for by 
differences in education -.037 by motherhood. Looking at returns to observed 
characteristics, differences in returns to age and in the constant are the largest components 
of this part of the wage gap. In 1998, returns to education were lower and the wage penalty 
to having children greater for part time workers (in 1978 the reverse was true). Looking at 
the change in the log wage gap, the increasing differential between full and part time pay 
between 1978 and 1998, o f-. 196 log points, was mostly accounted for by an increase in the 
skills gap between full and part time workers (-.123 of the change in the differential 
resulted from a change in the difference in characteristics). Of this the change in the 
difference in the age and educational profile of part time workers vis-a-vis full timers was 
most important. Changes in prices also mattered, with part timers in 1998 facing lower 
rewards to education and age than those working full-time and this has also contributed to 
the emerging pay gap.
Data from the Women and Employment Survey (1980) and BHPS (1990 and 1998) 
give a similar picture when the same sets of controls are used. Using this data the log wage 
gap between full and part time workers increases from -.104 to -.260 log points between 
1980 and 1998. Controlling for age, education, number of children and region, that part of 
the wage gap accounted for using differences in characteristics rises from -.016 to -.069 
between 1980 and 1998. One of the most important factors behind the full time /part time 
wage gap is the way in which returns to age differ. This is not a surprising result if, for full 
timers, age is a proxy for years of full-time work experience while for part timers this is not
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the case. Adding in controls for full and part time experience might therefore be expected to 
increase the portion of the wage gap that is explained. The results reported here show that 
controlling for work experience increases the portion of the explained wage gap from -.069 
log points in 1998 to -.131, with differences in years of work experience accounting for - 
.081 of this. Looking at the change in the log wage gap, once controls for experience are 
added, it appears to be changes in the way full- and part-time workers are rewarded which 
are most significant to the change in the part time pay gap. In particular, falling rewards to 
age for part timers have tended to increase the part time pay penalty.
Differences in characteristics accounted for a large part of the earnings gap in all 
periods once controls for work experience are included. However, while between 1980 and 
1998 the size of the log wage gap resulting from differences in characteristics rose from - 
.105 to -.131 log points, worsening returns to employment characteristics relative of part 
timers relative to full time workers accounted for the majority of the increase in the wage 
gap (in 1980 differences in returns closed the wage gap by .001 log points, while by 1998 
they accounted for a -.130 log point increase in the wage gap). Changes in the relative 
returns to characteristics for part timers therefore accounted for -.131 log point of the -. 156 
increase in the log wage gap.
3.11. Employment and Earnings by Occupation 
Changes in Employment by Occupation
So far the analysis of the part time pay penalty has focussed on individual characteristics. 
However, part of the reason for the wage differential between full and part time workers is 
that they do different jobs. Table 3.7 reports the occupational distribution of full- and part- 
time jobs, and the proportion of female employees who work part-time, in 1980,1990 and 
1998. Looking first at the occupational distribution of full and part time workers we see that 
in all periods women working part time where much less likely to be in professional or 
managerial occupations, and much more likely to work in unskilled manual jobs or personal 
services. In 1998 20 percent of full-time workingwomen were employed in professional and 
managerial occupations, 6 percent were in personal services, and 2 percent in unskilled 
manual jobs. For part time workers however only 5 percent worked in professional /
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managerial occupations, 17 percent were employed in personal services and 11 percent 
were unskilled manual workers. This is reflected in the proportion of part time workers by 
occupation. The variations in the proportion of women working part time are stark: in 1998 
fewer than one fifth of professional and managerial jobs held by women were part time, 
while 68 percent of personal service workers and 83 percent of those in unskilled manual 
occupations worked part time. Table 3.8 reports earnings ratios for part-time women 
relative to those who work full-time by occupation. It is notable that in 1980 there is no 
evidence of part-time jobs being lower paid within occupational groups except in personal 
services. By 1990 however, a pay gap had emerged, particularly among those in manual and 
non-manual (other) occupations. By 1998 the relative earnings ratio of part time to full time 
staff had declined to just 65 percent in skilled manual occupations, and to between 75 and 
85 percent in semi-skilled and unskilled occupations, personal services and non-manual 
(other) occupations. Only those in professional / managerial occupations who worked part- 
time fared relatively well with an earnings ratio of 94 percent. So differences in 
occupational structure therefore appear to explain only a limited part of the full and part 
time pay gap. In Table 3.9 wage equations are estimated including controls for industry and 
occupation. It is of interest to ask to what extent do differences in characteristic contribute 
towards the part-time pay gap. Table 3.10 reports the results from decomposing the Oaxaca 
decomposition into its component parts. Jones (1983) has argued that such further 
decompositions are problematic because the contribution of any set of characteristic to the 
pay gap is dependent on how variables are measured. This is because the value of the 
intercept term shifts in response to changes in the unit of measurement, and any 
decomposition of the gender pay gap which attempts to breakdown the “explained” and 
“unexplained” components further is therefore dependent on the choice of measurement 
unit. The contribution of these components to the pay gap therefore depends “arbitrary 
decisions about how to impose a metric on the variables implicated in the process of 
discrimination”. Leslie, Clark and Drinkwater (2000) suggest that the problem identified by 
Jones is essentially one of normalization, which results because there is no universally 
accepted standard for measure ment of wage equations. However, the degree to which the 
choice of variable is arbitrary varies considerably. Nielsen (2001) suggests that for
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continuous variables the problem of measurement is less acute as “institutional settings 
dictate how we should measure the variables” (p3). However, a particular problem arises 
with indicator variables, as the contribution of indicator variables to the decomposition is 
not robust to changes in the reference group. However, the summation and evaluation of 
sets of indicator variables as a whole avoids this problem. Here no attempt is made to 
identify the separate effects of indicator variables5. Bearing these limitations in mind, the 
decomposition reported in table 3.10 suggests that differences in the occupational and 
industrial composition of full- and part-time workers accounted for 10 percentage points of 
the 26 percentage point pay gap in 1998. However, differences in returns to occupation and 
industry actually helped narrow the pay gap in 1998. Breaking down the Oaxaca 
decomposition into its component parts suggests that in 1998 20 of the 26 points of the log 
wage gap resulted from differences in observed characteristics, and the relative decline in 
characteristics of full-time workers accounted for 7 percentage points of the 16 percentage 
point increase in the part-time pay gap. Changes in the occupational, industrial and 
educational composition of the part time workforce were the most important factors in 
explaining this relative decline. Differences in returns are less important in explaining the 
part time pay differential, although increasing differences in observed prices have been 
important in explaining the rise in the pay gap accounting for 9 percentage points of the 16 
percentage point rise in the pay gap, with increasing differences in returns to age being of 
particular importance.
3.12. Conclusion
Since the 1980s a substantial gap has emerged between the pay of full and part time female 
employees. In 1994-5 part-time women earned only 69 percent of the full-time female 
wage. This gap appears to have emerged largely because part-time employees are now 
considerably less well qualified than those working full time. Indeed this research indicates 
that there is little or no part-time pay penalty per se. Part time jobs appear to be 
increasingly dichotomously distributed - with the top one fifth of part timers in highly paid
5 Note too that the index problems arising from the choice o f parameter estimates, discussed in chapter 2, 
also occur here.
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professional jobs while the majority of workers are stuck in low paid, low skill jobs. 
However, we have also reported evidence that suggests that many women working full time 
would prefer to work part time, but may be unable to do so because part-time employment 
is not available in more highly skilled jobs. This constraint on part-time work may 
exacerbate the observed gap between full- and part-time pay. The most immediate policy 
implication to be drawn from this research is that policies should be put in place to improve 
opportunities for those women who want to work part time. Policies, such as the right to 
return to work part time after maternity leave, would go some way towards improving the 
quality of part time jobs on offer.
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of Part and Full Time Female Workers
1978 1988 1998 1980 WES 1990 BHPS 1998 BHPS
PT FT PT FT PT FT PT FT PT FT PT FT
Age
16-24 0.06 0.32 0.09 0.30 0.10 0.14 0.05 0.31 6.44 24.18 15.15 20.99
25-34 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.26 0.21 25.25 30.83 23.43 31.54
35-44 0.31 0.18 0.34 0.22 0.31 0.26 0.32 0.19 35.25 22.39 30.96 22.39
45-59 0.39 0.30 0.34 0.23 0.35 0.31 0.37 0.28 33.07 22.60 30.46 25.08
Education
Degree 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.22 0.03 0.04 4.89 12.17 8.34 17.07
Alevels 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.19 0.25 0.28 0.13 0.17 23.53 32.77 35.49 44.12
5 + ‘O’s 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.26 0.38 27.32 29.91 28.34 23.44
< 5  ‘O’s 0.21 0.30 0.29 0.37 0.37 0.28 0.01 0.05 12.36 10.63 9.28 7.03
N o qual 0.62 0.44 0.45 0.23 0.21 0.12 0.56 0.37 31.90 14.52 18.55 8.34
Married or Coha siting
Share .89 0.58 0.84 0.59 0.77 0.65 0.88 0.56 .833 .627 .738 .649
Num ber o f  Children
0 0.37 0.67 0.37 0.71 0.36 0.68 0.37 0.77 41.19 75.54 40.65 72.74
1 0.24 0.17 0.24 0.17 0.24 0,17 0.25 0.13 22.67 15.02 25.66 17.15
2 0.29 0.11 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.28 0.07 27.03 7.58 24.67 7.74
3 0.11 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.48 0.80 9.11 1.86 9.02 2.36
Years W ork Experience
FT - - - - - - 9.48 12.40 8.89 11.73 7.77 10.36
PT - - - - - - 6.90 2.15 8.70 2.16 6.77 2.35
N 2386 2887 1996 2684 1643 2348 1284 1602 1010 1398 1208 1563
Note: Excludes those in FT education
Table 3.2: Inequality Measures
FES Hourly Earnings
FT Women PT Women
1968 1978 1988 1998 1968 1978 1988 1998
90-10 Log(Wage) 
Differential
.945 .889 1.153 1.197 .979 1.058 1.122 1.256
90-50 Log(Wage) 
Differential
.536 .480 .622 .609 .687 .656 .758 .839
50-10 Log(Wage) 
Differential
.409 .409 .531 .588 .292 .431 .364 .417
Coefficient of Variation .473 .393 .478 .570 .843 .825 .965 .757
SD of Logs .393 .389 .473 .499 .478 .473 .516 .532
Gini Coefficient .224 .205 .253 .271 .291 .288 .315 .316
Source: FES
Table 3.3: Wage Equations - All Women
1980 1990 1998
C o e f se C o e f Se C o e f se
Part-time -.021 .020 -.172 .022 -.215 .018
Age .015 .009 .100 .006 .086 .006
Age2/100 -.026 .011 -.115 .008 -.096 .008
Degree or equivalent .716 .048 .701 .028 .671 .028
“A ” levels or equivalent .373 .025 .424 .021 .344 .024
5 “O” levels or .081 .019 .211 .022 .221 .026
equivalent
Fewer than 5 “O” levels -.038 .069 .151 .027 .128 .031
One kid -.076 .024 -.006 .021 .023 .020
Two kids -.100 .026 .037 .022 .058 .022
Three + kids -.113 .035 -.028 .033 .043 .032
Full-time experience .022 .005 -.003 .002 .011 .003
Full time experience .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
squared
Part-time experience .016 .006 -.036 .004 -.042 .005
Part time experience .000 .000 .001 .000 .001 .000
squared
Full-time * Part time -.001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
experience
Constant 1.881 .145 -.484 .099 -.304 .105
FStat(pvalue) 22.52 121.21 128.22
R2 .225 .447 .439
Obs. 1971 3473 3788
Note: Regional dummies also included in the regressions.
Table 3.4 (a): Multinomial Logit Results for Selection into PT and FT Employment
1978 1988 1998
PT FT PT FT PT FT
Coef s.e. Coef s.e. Coef s.e. Coef s.e. Coef s.e. Coef s.e.
Age .038** .004 -.009* .004 .013** .005 .026** .005 .002 .005 .044** .006
Age2/ 100 -.043** .005 -.001 .005 -.010 .006 -.050** .007 .003 .007 -.068** .007
Degree -.040 .041 .112** .041 -.081* .036 .303** .039 -.124** .029 .398** .030
A levels .005 .021 .087** .021 -.078** .024 .262** .027 -.007 .023 .250** .026
5 0  levels .018 .024 .050** .023 -.011 .026 .227** .028 -.046 .030 .206** .033
< 5 0  levels .009 .014 .105** .013 -.040* .018 197** .021 .016 .021 .163** .025
Children <5 -.081** .018 -.376** .022 -.072** .022 -.353** .029 .020 .020 -.245** .026
One Child .068** .017 -.137** .016 .135** .020 -.238** .023 .156** .021 -.201** .023
Two Children .120** .017 -.246** .017 .251** .021 -.410** .026 .229** .022 -.350** .025
Three plus 
children .068** .022 -.243** .023 .196** .029 -.373** .036 .216** .030 -.475** .038
Married 
Log other HH
.155** .019 -.020 .015 .092** .021 .031 .022 .064** .021 .110** .022
income
(weekly)
.018** .005 -.048** .006 .040** .010 -.03** .008 .026* .011 -.038** .008
Constant 
P>Chi2 
Pseudo R2 
Log likelihood 
Obs.
-1.202**
.000
.150
-6668
7278
.078 .681** .070 -.741**
.000
.171
-4173
4611
.108 .043 .110 -.455**
.000
.127
-4327
4535
.114 -.361** .115
Notes: Regional dummy variables also included.
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Table 3.4(b)
1980 1990 1998
PT FT PT FT PT FT
Coef s.e. Coef s.e. Coef s.e. Coef s.e. Coef s.e. Coef s.e.
Age 049** .008 .006 .006 .022** .007 .024** .006 -.031** .007 .060** .007
Age2 / 100 -.055** .010 -.018* .008 -.021** .008 -.049*8 .009 .046** .009 -.089** .009
Degree .068 .056 .030 .055 -.115** .039 .332*8 .041 -.213** .039 .295** .041
A levels -.027 .029 .085** .024 -.034 .023 .227** .026 -.146** .030 .239** .034
5 O levels -.048* .021 .064** .017 -.006 .022 .192** .026 -.066* .031 .216** .036
< 5 0  levels .005 .075 .067 .061 -.038 .027 .093** .031 -.102* .040 .177** .045
Child < 5 -.122** .028 -.334** .028 -.038 .026 -.291** .033 .003 .030 .001 .035
One Child HI** .027 -.184** .023 .121** .024 -.251** .028 .281** .028 -.257** .031
Two Children .156** .029 -.329** .026 .222** .025 -.456** .032 .453** .031 -.471** .036
Three plus 
children
.106** .037 -.281** .033 .185** .035 -.558** .050 .470** .046 -.593** .057
Married 
Log other
.033 .094 -.061 .078 .071** .023 .065** .023 -.010 .023 .129** .025
household
income
on** .004 .014** .003 .017 .010 -.066** .009 .048** .010 -.065** .010
Constant 
P>Chi2 
Pseudo R2 
Log
likelihood
Obs.
-1.139**
.000
.1544
-310.63
3396
.179 .094 .141 -.700**
.000
.170
-3328
3679
.135 .331* .134 .052
.000
.116
-3015
3221
.142 -.462** .146
Notes: Regional dummy variables also included.
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Table 3.5(a): Wage Equations
Selection No Selection
1978 1988 1998 1978 1988 1998
PT FT PT FT PT FT PT FT PT FT PT FT
Coef Se Coef se Coef se Coef se Coef Se Coef Se Coef Se Coef se Coef Se Coef se Coef se Coef Se
Age .027** .007 .060** .004 .048** .009 .088** .006 .045** .008 .106** .007 .050** .006 .059** .004 .050** .008 .088** .006 .040 .129 .106** .007
Age2/100 r.036** .009 -.072** .005 -.056**.011 -.106** .009 -.047** .011 -.126** .0 1 0 -.062** .001 -.070**.001 -.057** .002 -.105** .001 -.047** .003 -.126*8.001
Degree or .771** .106 .694** .036 .696** .095 .643** .040 .775** .065 .723** .039 .724** .064 .705** .032 .6 8 6 ** .066 .638** .037 .850** .070 .722** .038
equivalent
“A” levels or .484** .045 .409** .023 .591** .050 .547** .030 .382** .042 .471** .040 .466** .029 .414** .019 .584** .041 .547** .027 .382** .045 .487** .027
equivalent
5 “0 ” levels .130** .046 .233** .028 .179** .052 .322** .035 .227** .054 .310** .049 .127** .034 .225** .023 .180** .043 .325** .030 .243** .061 .327** .036
or equivalent
Fewer than 5 .124** .024 .113** .016 .127** .029 .2 2 2 ** .027 .143** .034 .262** .038 .124** .019 .109** .013 .123** .028 .225** .019 .124** .031 .279** .024
“0 ” levels
One kid -.063** .026 -.105** .0 2 0 - .0 2 0 .038 -.122** .027 .007 .046 -.091** .027 -.033 .0 2 0 -.098**.017 -.006 .033 -.1 2 2 ** .026 -.152** .046 -.084**.029
Two kids -.095** .028 -.148** .027 -.036 .038 -.220** .038 .038 .045 -.078* .036 -.047** .017 -.1 2 0 * * .0 2 2 -.014 .027 -.229** .033 -.163** .029 -.083* .033
Three + kids -.088* .040 -.2 0 2 ** .039 -.064 .060 -.316** .083 - .0 2 0 .058 -.261** .075 -.057* .025 -.172**.033 -.048 .041 -.322** .051 -.202* *.044 -.285**.061
Constant .771** .138 .319** .070 .699** .165 .081 .113 .572** .158 -.344** .132 .699** .007 .185** .006 .698** .0 1 2 .125** .009 .361** .636 -.261** .0 1 0
MU(1) -.773** .232 .487** .099 -.196 .329 -.150 .158 1.729* .442 
*
-.325 .195
Fstat 14.53 72.41 15.55 59.17 14.81 5.88 15.01 7.53 14.81 59.17 14.93 48.70
(pvalue) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 )
R2 .170 .353 .262 .391 .206 .325 .174 .359 .262 .391 .214 .326
Obs. 2054 2500 1150 1641 1314 1864 2054 2500 1150 1641 1314 1864
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Table 3.5(b)
Selection
1980
PT
Coef Se
FT
Coef se
1990
PT
Coef se
FT
Coef Se
1998
PT
Coef Se
FT
Coef Se
1980
PT
Coef Se
FT
Coef Se
1990
PT
Coef
FT 
Se Coef Se
1998
PT
Coef
FT 
se Coef Se
Age * .0 1 0 .037** .009 .058** .012 .109** .008 .053** .011 .1 1 0 ** .008 .039** .0 1 0 .028** .009 .062** .011  .1 1 0 ** .008 .057** .011.106 .008
Age2/ 100 -.046** .0 1 2 -.045** .011 -.066**.015 -.136** .0 1 2 -.056** .015 -.130** .011 -.050** .0 0 2 -.035** .001 -.070** .002 -.136** .012 -.061** .002-.125** .001
Degree or 769** .069 .535** .104 .802** .088 .703** .047 .847** .071 .672** .053 .770** .063 .539** .067 .788** .068 .699** .047 .860** .058.699** .056
equivalent 
Alevels or .407** .045 .327** .037 .534** .046 .414** .042 .314** .044 .365** .050 .405** .035 .323** .033 .531** .038 .434** .043 .341** .036.400** .028
equivalent 
5 0  levels or .018 .026 .143** .028 .227** .033 .242** .041 .217** .041 .217** .050 .016** .025 .132** .024 .227** .032 .266** .041 .2 2 1 ** .032.252** .026
equivalent 
Fewer than - .1 2 0 .156 .030 .103 .156** .039 .120* .048 .109 .051 .164** .057 - .1 2 2 .106 .0 2 2 .075 .153** .044 .155** .049 .115* .049.202** .042
5 Olevels 
One kid -.085* .034 -.106** .033 -.039 .048 -.100** .037 .032 .046 .001 .034 -.080** .029 -.070* .033 -.023 .037 -.094* .038 .007 .037.023 .032
Two kids -.107** .039 -.153** .054 .013 .046 -.171** .058 .055 .050 -.092 .050 -.1 0 1 ** .024 -.088* .043 .035 .032 -.200** .058 .030 .033 -.112* .053
Three+ kids -.149** .048 -.182** .056 - .1 0 0 .062 -.386**.104 .011 .071 -.152** .014 -.144** .036 -.125* .061 -.081 .049 -.447** .107 -.013 .049-.208 .111
Constant 1.655** .187 1.557** .154 .031 .224 -.583**.144 .141 .177 -.662** .144 1.625** .057 1.551** .1 1 2 .019 .014 -.473** .148 .001 .014-.422** .011
MU(1)
Fstat
(pvalue)
R2
Number o f  
observations
13.71
(.0 0 0 )
.237
1084
9.83
(.0 0 0 )
.193
887
14.23
(.0 0 0 )
.283
830
41.74
(.0 0 0 )
.399
1117
18.30
(.0 0 0 )
.296
928
43.92
.388
1187
-.127
13.84
(.0 0 0 )
.237
1084
.390 .452
9.51
(.0 0 0 )
.197
887
.237 -.223
13.72
(.0 0 0 )
.283
830
.552 -.510** 
42.94 
(.0 0 0 ) 
.377 
1117
.164 .277
17.43
(.0 0 0 )
.297
928
.395 -.590* 
42.79 
(.0 0 0 ) 
.392 
1187
.234
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Table 3.5(c)
No Selection Selection
1980 1990 1998 1980 1990 1998
PT FT PT FT PT FT PT FT PT FT PT FT
Coef Se Coef Se Coef se Coef se Coef Se Coef se Coef Se Coef Se Coef Se Coef Se Coef se Coef Se
Age .026* .0 1 2 .004 .013 .063** .014 .103** .0 1 0 .031* .014 .089** .009.028* .013 .003 .0 1 2 .061** .014 . 1 0 2 ** .009 .027 .014 091** .009
AgeA2/100 -.041** .015 - .0 1 2 .016 - .017 -.127**.013 -.034 .019 -.107** .012-.042**.003 -.0 1 1 ** .0 0 2 -.073** .003 -.125** .003 -.028**.003 -.109**.003
.076**
Degree .804** .073 .608** .098 .805** .085 .684** .048 .825** .068 .672** .053.803** .063 .611** .069 796** .069 .676** .047 .807** .060 .671** .049
A level .419** .046 .341** .038 .527** .045 .390** .042 .313** .043 .350** .049.410** .035 .342** .034 .524** .038 .390** .030 .301** .037 .348** .026
501evels .021 .026 .146** .028 .228** .034 .229** .040 .199** .040 .197** .050.024 .025 .146** .024 .227** .032 .230** .025 .193** .031 .196** .025
< 5 Olevels -.1 2 2 .158 .025 .101 151** .039 .104* .048 .1 0 2 * .049 .138* .056-.132 .109 .023 .081 149* * .044 .109** .036 .094* .047 .136** .040
One kid -.073* .034 -.062 .035 -.049 .049 -.075* .037 .038 .045 .030 .032-.075* .032 -.061* .031 - .0 2 1 .040 -.064 .034 .064 .039 .025 .030
Two kids -.090* .039 -.080 .057 .008 .046 - .1 2 0 * .059 .056 .050 -.068 .046-.087**.027 -.080* .038 .033 .033 -.114* .046 .079* .033 -.072 .042
Three+ kids -.1 2 1 * .049 -.084 .058 -.095 .062 -.302**.109 .043 .070 .006 .095-.118**.036 -.083 .052 -.059 .049 -.307** .087 .069 .047 -.013 .087
Full-time .0 1 2 .008 .032** .008 .003 .008 .008* .004 .030** .007 .018** .004.012 .036 .033** .005 .005 .007 .007* .003 .030** .006 .019** .003
experience
FT ExpA2/100 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 -.052** .000 .027 .024 -.014 .011 -.063**.020 .031** .009-.015* .006 -.052** .003 .0 0 2 .011 -.0 1 2 ** .004 -.071** .0 1 0 -.031** .003
PT experience .015* .007 .014 .011 -.008 .007 -.040**.013 -.004 .008 -.055** .009.013 .007 .014* .007 -.005 .005 -.041** .009 -.009 .006 -.055** .008
PT expA2/100 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 -.024** .000 .038* .017 .175** .013 .032 .023 .232** .036-.017**.006 -.024 .016 .003 .008 .0 0 2 .018 -.039**.010 .233** .0 2 2
FT*PT exp/100 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 -.062** .0 0 0 -.025 .035 .014 .052 -.063 .043 .030 .036-.023* .011 -.059** .017 .001 .005 .025 .018 -.036* .017 .027* .014
Constant 1.753** .206 1.925** .195 -.044 .241 -.512**.157 .497** .2 2 2 -.332 .1671.850 .011 1.953 .011 .114* .052 -.4 4 4 ** .011 .724** .014 -.381** .0 1 0
MU(1) -.398 .180** -.061 .143 -.517* .2 0 0 -.164 .140 -.513* .219 .088 .172
Fstat 1 1 .2 2 1.17 12.46 35.62 16.64 41.40 1.92 9.75 1 2 .68 34.68 16.57 39.69
(p-value) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 )
R2 .244 .229 .304 .420 .317 .438 .248 .229 .310 .421 .321 .439
Obs. 1084 887 830 1117 928 1187 1084 887 830 1117 928 1187
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Table 3.6: Decomposing the Wage Gap of PT/FT Women
Human Capital Specification
GHS WES BHPS WES BHPS
1978 1988 1998 A 1980 1990 1998 A 1980 1990 1998 A
Differential -.068 -.237 -.264 -.196 -.104 -.232 -.260 -.156 -.104 -.232 -.260 -.156
Observed .014 -.116 -.109 -.123 -.016 - .1 1 2 -.069 -.053 -.105 -.141 -.131 -.026
X's
Age .092 .078 .025 -.067 .015 .094 .042 .027 -.009 .090 .033 .042
Education -.045 -.095 -.084 -.039 -.023 -.096 .069 .092 -.025 -.090 -.067 -.042
Kids -.039 -.084 -.037 .0 0 2 -.028 -.083 .032 .06 -.025 -.052 - .0 1 0 .015
Region -.003 - .0 1 1 -.006 -.003 .003 -.007 .005 .0 0 2 .003 • o o -4 -.005 -.008
Experience - - - -.047 -.076 -.081
Lambda .008 -.004 -.006 -.014 .017 -.019 -.004 - .0 2 1 - .0 0 2 -.006 .000 .002
Observed -.083 - .1 2 1 -.155 -.072 -.088 - .1 2 0 -.191 -.103 .001 -.091 -.130 -.131
Prices
Age -.565 -.647 - - .6 8 6 .193 -.820 -.870 - .502 -.745 - -1.63
1.251 1.063 1.128
Education .004 -.039 -.092 -.096 -.017 .016 -.023 -.006 -.0 2 2 .042 - .0 1 0 .0 1 2
Kids .031 .140 -.033 -.064 -.011 .115 .047 .058 - .0 1 2 .073 .050 .062
Region - .0 0 2 -.006 -.050 -.048 -.145 .022 .076 .221 -.165 -.016 -.073 .092
Experience - - - -.131 .1 1 0 .125
Lambda -.104 -.087 .732 .836 -.230 .099 .307 .537 - .1 1 2 - .1 1 2 -.198 -.086
Constant .553 .518 .538 -.015 .123 .492 .423 .3 i o o .557 1.105 1.16
4
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Table 3.7: Occupational Composition of Full and Part time Female Employees
Occupation 1980 1990 1998 Change
Proportion part-time
Prof/Manager .225 .137 .163 -.062
Non-
manual(other)
.488 .398 .427 -.061
Personal
Services
.808 .622 .678 -.130
Skilled manual .484 .308 .315 -.169
Semiskilled
manual
.386 .452 .416 .030
Unskilled
manual
.8 6 8 .795 .826 -.042
Distribution o f FT female employees
Prof/Manager .089 .157 .201 .1 2 2
Non-
manual(other)
.604 .623 .585 -.019
Personal
Services
.059 .067 .063 .004
Skilled manual .072 .052 .049 -.023
Semiskilled
manual
.143 .078 .085 -.058
Unskilled
manual
.033 .023 .017 -.016
Distribution o f PT female employees
ProfTManager .021 .035 .051 .030
Non-
manual(other)
.471 .570 .565 .094
Personal
Services
.2 0 2 .152 .172 -.030
Skilled manual .055 .032 .029 -.026
Semiskilled
manual
.074 .089 .078 .004
Unskilled
manual
.176 .123 .106 -.070
Number obs.
1971 1010 1208
Table 3.8: Earnings Ratios by Occupation
Occupation 1980 1990 1998
Professional /  Managerial .993 .998 .936
Non-manual (other) 1.007 .793 .793
Personal Services .915 .979 .844
Skilled manual .955 .788 .652
Semiskilled manual 1.068 .806 .768
Unskilled manual .972 .813 .826
117
Table 3.9:Wage Equations
1980 1990 1998
PT FT PT FT PT FT
Coef se Coef Se Coef Se Coef Se Coef Se Coef Se
Age .0 2 2 .012 .007 .013 .058** .013 .095** .0 1 0  .026 .014 .076** .010
Age2/ 100 -.034* .014 -.014 .016 -.070** .017 -.117** .013 -.030 .018 -.093** .012
Degree .751** .076 .583** .103 .549** .097 .438** .055 .518** .073 .439** .058
A levels .373** .047 .298** .041 .357** .050 .229** .049 .153** .044 .206** .052
5 0  levels -.017 .028 .1 1 0 ** .032 .136** .036 .103* .044 .064 .042 .087 .051
<5 0  levels -.1 2 0 .150 .002 .100 .075 .042 .004 .049 .031 .049 .066 .056
One kid -.060 .033 -.050 .034 -.043 .048 -.067* .034 .005 .041 .020 .032
Two kids -.068 .039 -.064 .057 .012 .048 -.101 .058 .012 .047 -.045 .044
Three + kids -.1 1 2 * .048 -.051 .059 -.041 .062 -.290** .110 .039 .065 .035 .091
FT experience .0 1 2 .008 .031** .008 .001 .008 .0 0 0 .004 .018** .007 .017** .004
Ft expA2/100 .0 1 2 .019 -.050** .018 .027 .025 .001 .010 -.036 .020 -.033** .009
Pt exp .015* .007 .011 .011  -.008 .007 -.022 .013 -.009 .007 -.042** .010
PtexpA2/100 -.017 .022 -.009 .033 .028* .014 .088 .051 .039 .022 .176** .036
FT*PT exp -.058 .045 -.058 .046 -.005 .034 -.008 .050 -.028 .040 .029 .035
/1 0 0
Prof/Manager -.008 .103 .096 .084 .414** .100 .496** .102 .635** .077 .370** .114
Non-manual .116** .029 .118 .064 .264** .045 .324** .096 .323** .039 .148 .111
(other)
Personal -.042 .026 -.044 .073 .047 .050 -.065 .103 .038 .044 -.054 .115
Services
Skilled manual -.052 .078 -.044 .090 .026 .088 .167 .107 .046 .094 .009 .117
Semi-skilled .071 .049 .009 .067 .093 .066 .153 .105 .072 .056 -.118 .113
manual
Agriculture .069 .152 -.143 .112 -.045 .104 -.642** .133 -.054 .141 -.025 .067
Energy, .023 .135 .089 .066 -.011 .071 .105* .045 .193 .166 .173** .044
mining,
minerals
Engineeering .033 .121  .016 .059 .144 .098 .024 .034 .232* .110 .067 .039
and vehicles
Other -.056 .126 .033 .061 -.050 .059 -.093* .041 -.142 .114 -.035 .043
manufacturing
Construction .262 .188 .028 .103 -.183 .186 -.170 .191 -.032 .114 -.107 .084
Services -.092 .116 -.034 .058 -.249** .031 -.239** .035 -.259** .029 -.198** .031
Constant 1.882** .239 1.840** .207 .000 .272 -.427* .174 .644** .221 -.141 .205
Fstat 11.03 8.73 12.75 39.13 19.79 39.76
(p-value) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 ) (.0 0 0 )
R2 .286 .253 .385 .343 .451 .526
Number 1084 8 86 746 1030 864 1106
observations
Note: omitted categories are, for occupation, unskilled manual, and for industry, transport and 
communications.
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Table 3.10: Decomposing the Pay Gap -  Full Specification
1980 1990 1998 Change
Log Wage Differential -.104 -.235 -.262 -.158
Observed X's -.131 -.204 -.199 -.068
Age ■ o o .082 .025 .017
Education -.0 2 0 -.053 -.045 -.026
Kids -.019 -.049 -.004 .019
Region .001 -.008 -.009 -.008
Experience -.045 -.057 -.059 -.014
Occupation -.028 -.081 -.061 -.036
Industry -.014 -.039 -.047 -.033
Observed Prices .027 -.031 -.063 -.090
Age .275 -.670 -.930 - .8 6 6
Education - .0 2 2 .053 - .0 2 2 .039
Kids - .0 1 0 .059 .011 .031
Region -.107 -.052 -.019 .111
Experience -.104 .073 .050 .154
Occupation .002 -.032 .146 .127
Industry -.049 .007 -.024 .025
Constant -.042 .427 .726 .432
Figure 3.1: Changes in Full and Part time Employment, 1968-99
■« full-time  a -----part-time
.35
.25
78
fesyr
Note: Source FES. Sample includes all women aged 17-59. FT defined as working over 
30 hours per week, PT defined as working more than 2 hours and less than or equal to 
30 hours per week. Self employed and students excluded.
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Figure 3.2: Full Time and Part Time Employment by Age
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Figure 3.3: Employment Rates by Education 
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Figure 3.4: Relative Hourly Earnings Ratios, 1968-99
■o FT Female / Male Earnings Ratio  a PT Female / Male Earnings Ratio
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Figure 3.5: Indexed Real Hourly Earnings; 10th, 50th and 90th Percentile
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Figure 3.6: Gender Earnings Ratio by Pereentile
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3.6 (continued)Figure
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Figure 3.7: Part-time Women in the Full-time Male and Female Wage
Distributions
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Figure 3.7(continued)
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Figure 3.8: Changes in the Median Percentile Ranking 
(a) FT and PT women in male wage distribution
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Appendix A3.1: Mean Values from the Multinomial Logit Model
1978 1988 1998 1980 1990 1998
Age 37.3 36.4 38,3 38.4 37.4 37.0
Degree or .021 .058 .135 15.9 .076 .127
equivalent 
A levels or .095 .139 .242 .028 .254 .400
equivalent 
5 0  levels or .070 .101 .093 .136 .263 .241
equivalent 
Fewer than 5 .244 .325 .321 .308 .131 .082
0  levels
Children < 5 .209 .2 0 2 .2 1 2 .253 .187 .111
One Child .229 .217 .216 .237 .182 .170
Two Children .239 .199 .214 .257 .180 .135
Three plus .1 1 0 .093 .096 .108 .078 .048
children
Married .789 .698 .703 .988 .736 .673
Log other .789 5.96 5.56 4.28 7.03 7.02
household
Income
(weekly)
Full-time 1 .00 9.57 9.10
work
experience
Part-time 3.76 4.17 4.21
work
experience
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE FAMILY GAP IN PAY ACROSS SEVEN INDUSTRIALISED
COUNTRIES
4.1 Introduction
Despite a good deal of progress in recent years, women still tend to have lower 
employment rates than men and to earn lower hourly wages if they do work. There is a 
large literature that examines the gender gap in pay within countries and a growing 
literature that examines the gender gap in pay across countries (see, for instance, Blau 
and Kahn, 1992,1995,1996, and 1998; Callan, Adams, Dex, Gustafsson, Schupp, and 
Smith, 1996). It is taken as given in these literatures that much of the differential in 
hourly earnings between women and men is due to the fact that women bear children 
and also tend to have primary responsibility for their care. Studies within countries 
provide evidence of a persistent family gap in pay between women with children and 
women without children (see, for instance, Waldfogel, 1998a for the U.S., and Joshi, 
Paci, and Waldfogel, 1999 for the U.K.). However, evidence comparing the family gap 
in pay across countries has been lacking. Thus, we do not know whether countries have 
similar family pay gaps, or whether countries that have larger family gaps in pay also 
have larger gender gaps in pay. We also do not know much about the relationship 
between the effects of children on employment and their effects on wages. In countries 
where children have a large negative effect on women’s employment, do they also have 
a large negative effect on women’s wages, or is the opposite true? Put another way, do 
women in some countries accommodate their family responsibilities by reducing their 
employment while women in other countries instead remain in employment but at lower 
wages?
In this paper, we use microdata on employment and earnings from seven 
industrialized countries to examine these questions. We find that there are large 
differences across countries in the family gap in pay, with the United Kingdom 
displaying the largest wage penalties to children among the seven countries we study
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here. We also find that there appears to be a relationship between gender and family pay 
gaps, and between gender and family employment gaps, across countries. Countries 
where there is a large negative effect of children on women’s pay tend to have a large 
gender gap in pay as well, and countries where mothers have lower employment rates 
have lower employment rates of women overall. We also find that in countries where 
children have a large negative effect on employment, they tend to have a large negative 
effect on pay as well.
4.2 Background 
The Gender Gap in Pay
It has long been observed that women receive lower hourly wages than men. 
Although this “gender gap in pay” between men and women has narrowed in many 
countries over the past few decades, a persistent gap remains. Human capital theory (see 
for instance Mincer and Polacheck, 1974 and Becker, 1985) is the most widely accepted 
explanation put forward by economists to account for both the existence of the gender 
gap in pay, and for its narrowing in recent years.1 According to human capital theory, the 
fact that historically women have had lower levels of wage-enhancing human capital 
such as education and work experience than otherwise comparable men explains why 
women receive slower wages in the labor market. In recent years, as women have 
obtained more education and have taken shorter periods of time out of the labor market 
for marriage and childbearing, their wages relative to men’s have improved (although 
note also that as women re-enter the labor market with lower than average levels of
1 Attention to issues of human capital has a long history in economics. For an 
excellent historical overview, see Polachek (1995a), who credits Ben-Porath (1967) with 
being the first to apply human capital theory to individuals’ decisions about how to 
invest over their lifetime. Studies that applied human capital theory to the study of the 
gender gap in pay include Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Becker, 1975; Polachek, 1975a 
and b, Weiss and Gronau, 1981; Mincer and Ofek, 1982; Goldin and Polachek, 1987. 
See also Goldin’s (1990) excellent book on the gender gap in the United States. Other 
theories that have been proposed to account for the gender gap in pay include 
occupational segregation and discrimination (see, for instance, Bergmann, 1974; see also 
Blau, Ferber, and Winkler (1998) for a useful overview of both human capital and other 
theories).
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work experience, average wages of women are held down, see O’Neill and Polachek,
1993).
In spite of women’s recent progress in closing the gender gap in pay, to the 
extent that women still retain primary responsibility for children, there are at least four 
reasons to expect their wages to continue to lag behind otherwise comparable men’s (see 
Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Becker, 1985). First, if taking care of children involves a 
great deal of effort, women who are involved in taking care of children may have less 
effort to bring to the labor market and/or may select jobs that require less effort and 
therefore would be lower paid. Second, if women take some time out of the labor 
market after having children, they would accumulate less human capital over their 
lifetime than otherwise comparable men. Third, if women change jobs after having 
children, they would have lower levels of tenure when they return to work than 
otherwise comparable men. Fourth, if women at the start of their careers anticipate 
having children and working less intensively over their lifetime, they may invest less in 
education and/or may choose less competitive careers, resulting in lower lifetime 
earnings.
The Family Gap in Pay
As was apparent in the above discussion, a key factor in explaining the gender 
gap in pay is the fact that women have more responsibility for children than men do. 
This suggests that the gender gap in pay should be largest for women who have 
responsibility for children and smallest for women who do not. Put another way, there 
should be a “family gap in pay” -  a differential in hourly wages between women who 
have children and women who do not.
A growing body of research has investigated this family gap in pay in the United 
States and has found that women with children do have lower wages than women 
without children. One of the earliest to document this phenomenon was Polachek 
(1975b), who noticed in studying pay differences associated with marriage that there 
were differences associated with motherhood too. More recent studies in the U.S. have 
found that as the gender gap in pay between women and men has narrowed, pay 
differences between women with and without children have persisted. For instance,
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Waldfogel (1998a) reports that even after controlling for age, work experience, 
education, marital status, race, and ethnicity, having children lowers a woman’s pay by 
about 10 percent (see also Hill, 1979; Fuchs, 1988; Korenman and Neumark, 1992; 
Neumark and Korenman, 1994; Waldfogel, 1997a and b; Waldfogel, 1998b; Waldfogel 
and Mayer, 2000; Budig and England, 2001). Pay penalties to children have been found 
in the United Kingdom as well (see, for instance, Joshi, 1991; Waldfogel, 1995; Joshi, 
Paci, and Waldfogel, 1999). However, as discussed in the next section, there appears to 
be quite a bit of variation in the family gap in pay across countries.
Cross-Country Differences in the Gender Gap and Family Gap in Pay
Welfare state analysts such as Gosta Esping-Anderson (1990) typically divide 
industrialized countries into three regime types: Anglo-American or Anglo-Saxon; 
Continental European; and Nordic or Scandinavian.2 These regime types reflect 
differences in the countries’ political, institutional, and other structures. The Anglo- 
American group, which includes Britain and its former colonies, has welfare states that 
are characterized by a fairly high reliance on means-tested public assistance programs, in 
contrast with the Continental European or Nordic models, which rely to a larger extent 
on universal social insurance programs. A further point of difference is that that Nordic 
and Continental European countries tend to have more fully developed family leave and 
child care policies than the Anglo-American countries (Waldfogel, 1998a). As we can 
see in Figure 4.1, the ratio of female to male earnings has risen in countries from all 
three regime types in recent years. The Figure 4.also shows that the gender pay gap 
tends to be smaller in the Nordic countries and higher in the Anglo-American countries, 
with the continental European countries displaying a mixed pattern.
Some analysts have linked these patterns to the pattern of family policies and 
equal opportunity policies on offer in these countries, arguing for instance that the
2 See also Sainsbury (1994) whose typology takes gender more explicitly into 
account.
3 The data used to produce in Figure 1 were originally collected by Francine Blau 
and Lawrence Kahn, updated by Heather Joshi, and then updated again by Wen-Jui Han. 
We are grateful to all these individuals for sharing these data with us, and to Wen-Jui 
Han for producing Figure 1 for us.
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Scandinavian countries' strong female-male earnings ratios reflect at least in part their 
strong family and equal opportunity policies while the weak performance of the Anglo- 
American countries reflects their weak policies (Joshi, Paci, and Waldfogel, 1998; 
Waldfogel, 1998).4
Implicit in these analyses is the notion that lower wages for women with children 
in countries without well-developed family policies can go a long way toward 
explaining the higher gender pay gaps in those countries. However, direct evidence on 
this point has been lacking. Although there have been many analyses of the pay effects 
of children in recent years in the United States (see for instance Korenman and 
Neumark, 1992; Neumark and Korenman, 1994; Waldfogel 1997b) and the United 
Kingdom (see for instance Joshi 1991), and at least one in Australia (Baxter, 1992), 
studies of the pay effects of children in Scandinavian and continental European 
countries have been much rarer.5 Moreover, even where individual country studies 
exist, it can be difficult to compare results across studies given differences in samples, 
methodology, model specification, and so on. In this study, we overcome that difficulty 
by conducting our own estimates of the family gap in pay using comparable microdata 
from seven industrialized countries, drawing primarily on the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) database. Although several studies have used LIS data to study gender 
differentials in employment and pay (see, for instance, Gomick, 1999; Jacobs, and 
Gomick, 2001; Sorensen, 2001), none of these prior studies has had as its primary focus 
the pay effects of children. Ours is the first study to investigate the family gap in pay 
using data from more than a few countries.
In the sections that follow, we describe the data and methods and then present 
results. We conclude with suggestions for further research.
4 See also the work of Gomick, Meyers, and Ross (1998) who examined women’s 
employment across a range of industrialized countries and Gustafsson, Wetzels, 
Vlasblom, and Dex (1996) who examined women’s labor force transitions in connection 
with childbirth in Germany, Sweden, and Great Britain.
5 An important exception is a recent study by Albrecht, Edin, Sundstrom, and 
Vroman (1998) which found that in Sweden, children tended to have a positive or not 
significant effect on women’s wages. See also Rosholm and Smith (1996) who find no 
significant effects of children on women’s wages in Denmark.
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4.3 Data and Methods
Our data come primarily from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), a project in 
Walferdange, Luxembourg that brings together in one accessible location comparable 
microdata from a range of industrialized countries. LIS does not release the data to 
researchers; rather, LIS mounts the datasets on a central computer, where analyses can 
be run (via remote access) by registered LIS users. In operation since 1983, LIS places 
particular emphasis on harmonizing the data, so researchers can estimate models using 
comparably defined variables. However, since LIS does not gather the data itself, there 
are some differences across datasets in what variables are available, and sample sizes 
vary widely. Further information on LIS is available at the LIS website 
(http://www.lis.ceps.lu; see also Smeeding, 2001 for a helpful overview).
We included in our sample every Western industrialized country in the LIS 
database for which gross hourly wages could be computed, in each case using the most 
recent year of data that was available. Because the Swedish dataset in LIS did not 
include earnings data, we instead used data from the most recent year (1991) of the 
Swedish Level of Living Survey (LNU), a nationally representative household dataset 
that is frequently used in studies of labor supply and earnings.6 Our final set of 
countries includes at least one representative of each regime type. Our sample countries 
(and original data source and year) are: Australia (Australian Income and Housing 
Survey, 1994), Canada (Survey of Consumer Finances, 1994), United Kingdom (Family 
Expenditure Survey, 1995), and United States (March Current Population Survey, 1994) 
from the Anglo-American group; Germany (German Social Economic Panel Study,
1994) from Continental Europe; and Finland (Income Distribution Survey, 1991) and 
Sweden (Level of Living Survey, 1991) from the Nordic group.7
6 The Level of Living Survey is used by permission of the Swedish Institute for 
Social Research in Stockholm, Sweden. For further information on this dataset, see 
Fritzell and Lundberg (1998).
Each of these datasets comes from a large nationally representative survey 
(although as noted earlier sample sizes vary a good deal across countries). We present 
unweighted estimates because the way in which weights are defined varies somewhat 
across countries.
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For each of our sample countries, we use a sample of prime-age women and 
men, those between the ages of 24 and 44. We exclude individuals younger than 24 in 
order to avoid estimating wage equations for young people who are still in school. We 
exclude individuals older than 44 because women in that age range who have no 
children are very likely to have had children in the past; thus, including women older 
than 44 would confound our comparison of women with children and women without 
children.
Our key outcome variables are: employment, defined as having a job during the 
survey week; full-time employment, defined as having a job during the survey week and
Q
working 30 or more hours per week; gross hourly wages, defined as gross annual 
earnings divided by annual hours worked (which is the product of weeks worked and 
hours worked per week); and the log of hourly wages. Individuals who describe 
themselves as self-employed are excluded from our sample, but all other workers are 
included.9 We particularly wanted to include part-time workers because of the 
importance of part-time work among women with children. However, as detailed 
below, we conduct some analyses separately for full-time workers due to concerns about 
measurement error and part-time wages.
The datasets held by LIS, and the LNU data for Sweden, contain detailed 
demographic and human capital information that we use to construct independent 
variables for our employment and wage models. A description of these variables, and 
means for the key family status variables in our samples, are shown in the Appendix.
It is important to note the limitations of the data we use. We are limited in that
8 The definition of full-time is not consistent across countries. For instance, in the 
U.S., usually 35 or more hours per week is considered full-time, whereas in the U.K., a 
cut-off of 30 hours per week is used. We use 30 hours per week here because it 
represented the best compromise among the definitions used by the various countries in 
this study.
9 For the most part, the data held by LIS have been cleaned and do not contain 
extreme values. However, this was not the case for the wage data for the United States. 
Therefore, for the U.S. sample, we had to exclude extreme wage values (wages less 
than $2.00/hour or greater than $200/hour); this affected only 1.3% of the observations 
in the U.S. sample.
137
we can only use those data elements that are available across all our sample countries. 
Therefore, because most of the available datasets are cross-sectional, we are not able to 
trace out women’s earnings or employment histories over time, as they marry and have 
children. Thus, we are not able to control for pre-existing differences among women 
that may be correlated with both having children and with having lower wages or lower 
levels of employment. Moreover, we do not have measures of actual work experience. 
Thus, we are not able to control for time out of the labor force associated with 
childbearing, which as we saw is an important factor in accounting for the gap in hourly 
pay between women who have had children and those who have not. As such, the 
analyses we present here should be considered primarily descriptive and as pointing to 
the overall general magnitude of the family gaps in pay that exist in various countries 
and the extent to which these gaps vary across countries. More precise estimates of the 
causes of those family gaps and the shares due to heterogeneity, work experience, and so 
on would require more detailed analysis of longitudinal data within countries (data that 
for the most part are not available through LIS or any other cross-national database).
4.4 Raw Gender and Family Gaps in Employment and Full-Time Employment
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the raw gender and family gaps in 
employment and full-time employment in our sample countries. Comparing all women 
in a country to all men in the same country, we find that the raw gender gap in 
employment ranges widely: it is largest in Australia, where women’s mean employment 
rate is 24 percentage points lower than men’s, and smallest in Sweden, where women’s 
employment is 4 points higher than men’s.
Women without children are generally much more likely to be employed. In all 
but one of our sample countries, when we compare women with children to women 
without children relative to men, we find a substantial family gap in employment, 
ranging from a high of 29 percentage points in the UK to a low of 11 in Finland (the one 
exception is Sweden, where the employment rate of women with children is less than 1 
percentage point lower than that of women without children). Turning to full-time 
employment in panel B of Table 4.1, we find larger gender gaps in employment but
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again a large range, with a high of 41 percentage points in Australia and a low of 0 in 
Finland, and even larger family gaps in employment, ranging from a high of 51 
percentage points in the UK to a low of 13 in Sweden.
Figure 4.2 shows how these mean employment rates vary by the age of the 
youngest child. Across all but one of our sample countries (Sweden again is the 
exception), employment rises as the age of the youngest child rises, but there are some 
differences in timing. In Australia and Germany, for instance, there is a sharp increase 
in employment when the youngest child turns one and another large increase as the 
youngest child moves from age five to age six or seven (which may reflect women 
returning to work when their children start school). In Canada and the U.S., 
employment is somewhat flatter in the early years and then increases from age five to six 
(when children start school), while in the U.K., employment is low (relative to Canada 
and the U.S.) throughout the pre-school years but then rises to Canadian and U.S. levels 
by age six. In Finland, employment rates rise as children age from one and two to four, 
but from a fairly high base, while in Sweden, employment rates hover at around 80 
percent until children reach age seven at which point they rise to 85 or 90 percent. 
Interestingly, employment rates become very similar across our sample countries by the 
time children reach age 11 which probably reflects the fact that this is when children 
leave primary school and start middle or secondary school.
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2 indicate that, across our sample countries, women, and 
especially women with children, have lower levels of employment, with particularly 
large differences in mean levels of full-time employment. Figure 4.2 indicates that these 
differences are most pronounced for women with young children in most of our sample 
countries.
Marital status also affects the probability of mothers being employed. Table 4.2 
reports the employment rate, the share employed full time, and earnings as a proportion 
of male earnings for women who are married and single, with and without children. 
Again, there are marked differences in employment patterns across countries, with these 
differences being greatest for those with children. Looking first at married mothers, we 
find that employment rates range from 54 percent in Australia and 60 percent in the UK,
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to 70 percent in Finland and 82 percent in Sweden. Contrasting employment rates of 
married and single mothers, it is notable that while in Germany and Finland single 
mothers are more likely to work than married mothers, in most countries the reverse is 
true. The difference in employment between married and single mothers is largest in the 
UK, where single mothers are 23 percentage points less likely to work than those 
without children, and Sweden, where this gap is 22 percentage points.
Similar differences are observed in the second panel of Table 4.2, which reports 
full time employment rates. The final panel reports average wages of women in different 
family types as a ratio of the average male wage, and this shows that earnings of single 
mothers’ are lower than those of married mothers in all countries except Canada and 
Finland.
Table 4.3 shows how employment rates vary with age across countries. Marked 
differences across countries emerge, particularly in full time employment rates. Full 
time employment rates vary even more widely than total employment rates, from 25 
percent in Australia and 27 percent in the UK to 64 percent in Finland and 81 percent in 
Sweden. For single mothers employment ranges from just 37 percent in the UK and 43 
percent in Australia, to 68 percent in Germany and 78 percent in Finland. We might 
expect employment to decline during the years when women have responsibilities for 
young children and therefore employment in the 30-34 age group to be lower than 
among those aged 25-29. However, what we find is that full time employment rates 
remain relatively constant over the 25-44 age range in Canada, the US and Finland. In 
Australia, UK, Germany and Sweden, however, full time employment rates dip for 
women in their 30s and then show some increase when women reach their 40s. The final 
panel shows the ratio of the average female wage to the average male wage in each age 
group. Women in the 25-29 age group earn close to 90 percent of the average wage of 
men aged 25-29 in all countries. However, in all countries this wage ratio falls with age 
and at age 40-44 the wage ratio varies from 69 percent in the UK and 70 percent in the 
US to 83 percent in Germany and 86 percent in Australia.
Table 4.4 shows the ratio of women's mean hourly wages to men's mean hourly 
wages for all women, and then women by family status, in our sample countries. The
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raw gender gap in pay varies a good deal by country, ranging from a high of 23 percent 
in the UK to a low of 11 percent in Australia. The raw family gap in pay varies as well: 
in five of our sample countries (Australia, Canada, Germany, Finland, and Sweden), 
women with children are paid about the same as or even more than women without 
children, while in the other two there is a family gap in pay, 8 percent in the US and 13 
percent in the UK.
When only full-time workers are considered, the wages of women without 
children exceed the wages of women with children in each of our sample countries. 
This difference in results between all workers and full-time workers is due to the fact 
that women who work part-time are observed to have higher hourly wages than full-time 
workers in the raw data in several of our sample countries. This raises the possibility 
that some of the part-time wages are measured with error; it is also possible that part- 
time workers in other countries do not face the wage penalties that part-timers face in 
the US and UK (see, for instance, Ferber and Waldfogel, 1998 for the US; Harkness, 
1996 for the UK).
The raw wage data in Table 4.4 indicate that there are substantial differences 
between the earnings of women with children and women without children in several of 
our sample countries, and in all our countries when only full-timers are considered. The 
raw wage data also suggest that there is some relationship between a country’s gender 
gap in pay and its family gap in pay. When we plot a country’s gender gap in pay and its 
family gap in pay (see Figure 4.3), we find that countries with higher family gaps in pay 
do tend to have higher gender gaps in pay. Interestingly, we also find that countries with 
higher gender employment gaps tend to have higher family employment gaps (see 
Figure 4.4).
The raw data can also tell us something about the relationship of the employment 
and wage effects of children. Is it the case that countries where the employment rate of 
mothers is lower than that of other women are also countries where the wages of 
mothers are lower than those of non-mothers? Or, is there a trade-off, such that women 
with children either reduce their employment, or work at lower wages? Figure 4.5, 
which plots a country’s employment gap between mothers and non-mothers against its
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wage gap between mothers and non-mothers, suggests that there is no simple 
relationship between a country’s family gap in pay and its family gap in employment, 
but for the most part the relationship appears to be positive.
The raw data can not tell us to what extent the employment and wage gaps 
between mothers and other women simply reflect differences in human capital or 
demographic characteristics between the two groups. It may be that women who have 
children are less-educated or are from disadvantaged racial or ethnic groups in some of 
our countries but not others. If so, these differences in characteristics might account for 
some of the observed employment or pay differences between mothers and other 
women. Therefore, in the next sections, we estimate the effects of children on women’s 
employment and wages, controlling for some measures of these other characteristics. 
Although as noted earlier, we lack measures for some important characteristics, most 
notably work experience (but also differences in attitudes towards work and family and 
towards career), nevertheless controlling for other human capital and demographic 
characteristics will allow us to determine the extent to which the gender gaps and family 
gaps we see in the raw data are due to differences in those characteristics and the extent 
to which they persist even after controlling for those characteristics.
4.5 The Effect of Children on Women’s Employment
We model a woman's employment decision as a function of the following human 
capital and demographic variables: age and its square, a set of dummy variables for level 
of education, a set of dummy variables for ethnicity, the amount of other family 
members’ earnings, the amount of other family income, and a set of dummy variables 
for region and whether the woman resides in an urban area. In addition, we include a set 
of controls for her responsibility for children, which we measure with a set of dummy 
variables for the age of her youngest child, using the three categories youngest child 
under age one (infant), youngest child age one to five (pre-schooler), or youngest child 
age six to seventeen (school-age child).10 Because the presence of a husband may affect
10 There is some ambiguity in the coding for Germany, where we find very few (7) 
women with a child age 0 in the data.
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a woman’s employment decision, we also control for marital status by including a 
dummy variable for being married.11 We estimate similar models for full-time 
employment (defined as working 30 or more hours per week), since as we saw in the 
raw data in many instances the largest impact of children is not on the employment 
decision but rather on the decision to work full-time. We estimate both the employment 
and full-time employment models using probit (because the outcome variables are 
categorical), and report marginal effects (and their standard errors).
The marginal effects of children (and their standard errors) on employment and 
full-time employment from the probit models estimated for our seven sample countries 
are shown in Table 4.5 (complete results are shown in Appendix Table 4.2). In all four 
Anglo-American countries and in Germany, there is a strong relationship between the 
age of the youngest child and women's employment. As suggested by the raw data in 
Figure 4.2, employment of women in these countries rises steadily as the youngest child 
ages. Marriage, in contrast, seems to be less important, with no significant effect on 
employment in Finland and Germany, and a small negative impact on employment in 
the US and UK. Only in Australia is marriage an important factor in explaining 
women’s employment. The results for the Nordic countries are different, as we might 
have expected given the pattern of the raw data in Figure 4.2. In both Finland and 
Sweden, women with infants and pre-school age children, but not school age children, 
are significantly less likely to be employed, but the effects are small compared to the 
Anglo-American countries and Germany.12 Marriage is associated with lower women’s 
employment in Sweden, but not in Finland.
11 As noted in the appendix, the category of married includes those living as married 
in all of our sample countries except the U.S. and Germany. Although we also control 
for other family members’ earnings (including those of the husband or partner), to the 
extent that these are measured with error, the dummy variable for being married may 
also pick up some effects of income.
i "y The small effect of children under the age of one on women’s employment in 
Finland and Sweden probably reflects the fact that these countries have very generous 
parental leave provisions which many women take advantage of. Since women on 
maternity leave are counted as employed, the high share of women taking maternity 
leave would boost the share employed among women with children under the age of 
one.
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The results for full-time employment are similar. We find very large negative 
effects of children, generally declining by the age of the child, in the Anglo-American 
countries and Germany. In contrast, we find much smaller effects of children in Finland 
and Sweden. Being married again has a negative effect in Sweden; we also see a 
negative effect of being married on full-time employment in Australia and the US.
Although the pattern of results is similar for the four Anglo-American countries 
and Germany, it is worth noting that the magnitude of the effects varies a good deal 
across these countries. Children reduce women's employment much more in Australia, 
Germany, and the UK than they do in Canada and the US. And, in turn, children have a 
much larger effect on women’s employment in these countries than they do in our two 
Nordic countries. These differences across countries raise the question of the extent to 
which institutional or policy differences might account for these differences in 
outcomes. With data from just one point in time, we can not answer this question in this 
paper, but the variation in results across countries suggests that it is worth considering in 
future research.13
4.6 The Effects of Children on Women’s Wages
We estimate human capital earnings functions with the natural logarithm of 
hourly wages as our dependent variable and a set of family status and other variables 
(detailed below) as our independent variables. To control for a woman’s responsibility 
for children, we include controls for the number of children, with dummy variables for 
one child, two children, or three or more children. Our wage model also includes 
controls for: marriage; age and its square; a set of dummy variables for level of 
education; a set of dummy variables for ethnicity; and a set of dummy variables for 
region and whether the woman lives in an urban area. Because as noted earlier, we are 
concerned about the possibility of measurement error in the part-time wages, we 
estimated this model for all workers and for full-time workers only.14
13 We hope to be able to address this type of question in future work, by using 
multiple waves of data from LIS in conjunction with data on policies and institutions in 
the various countries.
14 We also estimated models in which we added a control for whether the woman
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There are many reasons why children might affect women’s wages (see Mincer 
and Polachek, 1974; Becker, 1985). Children may affect women’s wages directly, by 
for instance lowering a woman’s effort on the job, or indirectly, by lowering the amount 
of work experience and job tenure a woman accumulates over time. The lower wages of 
women with children may also reflect other pre-existing differences among women, 
such as differences in their attitudes or commitment to a career. Or, the lower wages of 
women with children may reflect employer preferences or discrimination. Since we can 
not control for effort, experience, tenure, employee attitudes or commitment, or 
employer preferences or discrimination in our datasets, we can not place a causal 
interpretation on the wage effects of children. We can only determine whether such 
“child penalties” exist in our sample countries and how much they vary across countries 
once we control for other characteristics that can be measured in our datasets.
The effects of children from the wage models (coefficients and standard errors) 
are shown in Table 4.6 (full results are shown in Appendix Table 4.3). In our results for 
all workers, shown in panel 1, we find sizeable negative effects of children on women’s 
wages in all four Anglo-American countries. Because our dependent variable is the log 
of hourly wages, the coefficients can be interpreted as percentage effects. Thus, looking 
at the Anglo-American countries, we find a pay penalty for one child that ranges from a 
low of 3 percent in the US and 4 percent in Canada to a high of 7 percent in the UK, a 
pay penalty for two children that ranges from 5 percent in Canada to 23 percent in the 
UK, and a pay penalty for three or more children that ranges from 5 percent in Australia 
to 31 percent in the UK. It is worth noting that in each instance, the pay penalty to 
children is higher in the UK than in the other Anglo-American countries. The results for 
Germany are less conclusive, with an 11 percent penalty for two children but no 
significant penalties for one child or for three or more children. In Finland, in contrast, 
we find no significant penalty to one or two children, and a small pay penalty (6 percent)
works part-time (less than thirty hours per week) since working part-time may account 
for some of the lower wages of women with children. The results of these models (not 
shown) suggest that although working part-time does have a significant negative effect 
on women’s hourly wages in two of our countries (the U.S. and U.K), significant 
negative effects of children in those countries remain even after controlling for part-time 
working status.
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to three or more children, while in Sweden, we find no significant child penalties at all.
When we restrict our sample to full-time workers (see panel 2 of Table 4.6 and 
of Appendix Table 4.3), we find generally larger negative effects of children in five of 
our countries (Australia, Canada, Germany, Finland, and Sweden) and smaller effects in 
the other two countries (the UK and US). Nevertheless, the overall pattern of results is 
similar to that found for all workers, with the largest pay effects of children found in the 
UK and the smallest in the Nordic countries. Interestingly, the US has relatively low 
child penalties when we restrict the sample to full-time workers (because the penalties 
become somewhat smaller in the US while becoming somewhat larger in Finland and 
Sweden).
Taken together, these wage models provide evidence of negative pay effects of 
children across our sample countries. Even more interestingly, they also provide 
evidence that these effects vary a great deal by country. As noted above, we can not 
definitively explain these negative pay effects of children - they may reflect individual 
factors such as effort or commitment, work experience, or tenure, or employer factors 
such as preferences or discrimination that we do not observe in our datasets15 - but it is 
worth speculating as to why they vary so much across countries. We consider several 
alternative explanations below.
Endogeneity Bias
One potential problem with the results from the OLS log wage regressions is that 
the decision to have children may be endogenous. That is, women who earn lower 
wages may have more children, rather than vice versa, and the strength of this 
relationship may vary across countries. If so, this endogeneity might bias our estimates 
of the pay effects of children and the extent to which they vary across countries.16 In
15 Another possibility is that at least some portion of these pay penalties may be due 
to differences in the occupations of women with children and women without children. 
We plan to control for occupation in future research (details on occupational coding are 
not currently available from LIS).
16 A more general problem is that decisions regarding employment and childbearing 
may be made simultaneously and may be affected by differences in attitudes and norms 
across countries. See, for instance, Kieman (1992) and Hobcraft and Kieman (1995) for 
discussions of the factors that influence a woman’s decision to become a parent and how
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order to deal with this potential endogeneity bias, ideally we would want an instrument 
that affects a woman’s number of children (but not her wage). Angrist and Evans (2001) 
discuss the difficulties of finding an instrument for childbearing, the problem being that 
factors that affect a woman’s fertility also tend to be correlated with wages and 
employment. As we lack data on background variables that might affect a woman’s 
preferences regarding number of children, we instrument the number of children a
17woman has by the average number of children of all women by age and region . We 
therefore compare OLS regressions, where the number of dependent children in the 
family is included as an explanatory variable, with instrumental variable (IV) estimates 
where the number of children is instrumented by the average number of children by age 
and region. To carry out the IV estimation we therefore regress the actual number of 
children on the average number of children by age and region. From this we then predict 
the number of children a woman has, and this prediction then replaces actual number of 
children in the regression equation. The results from OLS and instrumental variable 
estimation are reported in Appendix Table 4.5. Note however that finding an instrument 
for childbearing is fraught with difficulties, and as region and age are also correlated 
with wages our instrument is unlikely to be a strong one.
For all workers (panel 1) the Hausman test statistic is insignificant in all 
countries. The fact that the Hausman statistic is insignificant in all countries indicates 
that either the instrument too is endogenous (as indeed the decision about where to live 
may be), that the predictive power of the instrument is weak (Nakurma and Nakurma 
1985), or that the number of children a woman has is exogenous to wages. For full time 
workers (panel 2), the Hausman test statistic is again insignificant in all countries except 
the Canada and Sweden. In Canada instrumentation suggests a greater penalty to having 
children, suggesting that in Canada women with higher wages are more likely to be 
working full-time and have children. However, in Sweden instrumentation actually 
reduces the wage penalty. The reduced wage penalty found in the Sweden could capture 
the effect of lower wages on the probability of having children.
those may vary across countries.
17 The mean number o f children is computed for women across one-year age groups by standard
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Selection Bias
Another possibility is that the difference in the negative pay effects of children 
across countries reflects the differential selection of women into employment across our 
sample countries. If women with children and low earnings potential are more likely to 
work in the Anglo-American countries, for instance, then the pool of working mothers 
might include more women with lower wages and thus we would estimate a larger 
negative effect of children on women’s pay. However, as we saw in Figure 4.5 earlier, 
the employment and wage effects of children tend to be correlated. In countries such as 
the Anglo-American group where children have a large negative effect on wages, they 
also tend to have a large negative effect on employment. This evidence does not support 
the hypothesis that differential selection into employment plays an important role in 
explaining the differences in the pay effects of children across countries.
To test this hypothesis more formally, we estimated Heckman (1979) sample 
selection correction models, using the age structure of the children in the household, the 
amount of other family members’ earnings, and the amount of other family income as 
our identifying variables. Specifically, we included in our wage models the same 
variables as before (age, age squared, controls for level of education, race/ethnicity, 
married, dummy variables for one child, two children, or three or more, region, and 
urban residence), while including in our employment probit models age, age squared, 
controls for level of education, race/ethnicity, married, number of children under age 1, 
number age 1 to 4, and number age 5 to 17, other family members’ earnings, other
1 ftfamily income, region, and urban residence. The results, shown in Table 4.7, suggest 
that the estimated effects of children on women’s pay are not affected a great deal by 
sample selection bias. The sample selection correction term, lambda, is not statistically 
significant in any of our countries except the US, where it is strongly positive. And, the 
relative ranking of the countries in terms of the magnitude of their family penalties is 
much the same as it was in the uncorrected wage models, shown in Panel 1 of Table 4.6: 
the UK has the largest pay penalties to children, followed by the other three Anglo-
regions as defined in the appendix.
18 We also estimated similar models for selection into full-time employment. The 
results of these models are available upon request.
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American countries, then Germany, and then the two Nordic countries. This evidence 
does not favor selection as a primary reason for the differences in the family gap in 
wages across countries.
Wage Structure
Another possibility is that the differences in the wage effects of children across 
countries reflect differences in wage structure. A series of studies by Blau and Kahn 
(1992, 1995, 1996, and 1998) have found that to a large extent, the difference in the 
gender earnings gap across countries can be explained by the difference in the extent of 
earnings inequality across countries. Blau (1992) illustrates this by first ranking 
countries by their gender earnings ratios and then ranking countries by their mean 
female percentile in the male wage distribution. She finds that Sweden has a high gender 
earnings ratio (77 percent in her data) in spite of having a relatively low female 
percentile (28) in the male wage distribution, while the US has a lower gender earnings 
ratio (67 percent) in spite of having a higher female percentile (33) in the male wage 
distribution. The reason for this discrepancy between the two measures is that the 
penalty for one’s position in the wage distribution varies widely across countries, 
depending on the dispersion of earnings in a country, in the above example, the penalty 
for a low percentile position is greater in the US than in Sweden, because the US has a 
more unequal wage structure. Thus, if one wants to understand the difference in the 
gender gap in pay between two countries such as the US and Sweden, taking wage 
structure into account is important.19
This explanation, however, may not fit as well when it comes to explaining 
differences in the family gap in pay across countries. Consider Table 4.4, panel A, 
which shows that among all workers the wages of women with and without children are 
nearly identical in Finland and Sweden. In this case, wage structure would not explain 
the smaller family gap in these two Nordic countries; the main reason for the smaller 
family gap is that there is little or no difference in pay between women with and without 
children, rather than that the difference is penalized less than it is in other countries.
19 In a similar vein, Edin and Richardson (2001) find that changes in solidarity wage 
policy have been an important factor in narrowing the gender earnings gap within a 
country (Sweden) over time.
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To illustrate this more clearly, we calculated the position of women in each 
country in the male earnings distribution in their country, and then calculated the 
average percentile ranking of women in each country. The results are shown in Table 
4.8. Looking first at the results for all workers, we can see that in four countries there is 
at most a 1 or 2 point family gap as measured by the difference between the mean 
percentile rankings of women with children and women without children: in Australia, 
both women with children and women without children have wages that are on average 
at about the 40th percentile of the male wage distribution; in Canada, women without 
children are at the 40th percentile while women with children are just two points behind; 
in Finland, women with children are at the 36th percentile while women with children 
are 2 point behind; and in Sweden, women with children are at the 32nd percentile while 
women with children are 1 point behind. The results for the other three countries are 
quite different: in the US and Germany, there is about a 6 point family gap, with women 
without children at the 43rd (US) or 45th (Germany) percentile and women with 
children at the 37th percentile and 39th percentiles respectively; and in the UK, the 
family gap is over 11 points, with women without children at the 40th percentile as 
compared to women with children at the 29th percentile.20 Overall, these results are 
quite consistent with the pattern of results we obtain when we use the gender earnings 
ratio as our measure, as we can see in Figure 4.6. On both measures, we find the largest 
family gaps in pay in the US, Germany, and UK.
So, how important is wage structure in accounting for the differences in the 
family gap in pay across countries? Following Blau (1992), it is informative to compare 
the rankings of countries using the percentile position of women with their rankings 
using the gender pay ratio, as this will tell us how important a role wage structure plays
20 When we restrict the analysis to full-time workers only, the percentile ranking of 
U.K. women with children improves dramatically, which makes sense given the links in 
that country between motherhood, part-time work, and low pay, whereas we find the 
opposite result for Sweden, where as we saw earlier the wages of mothers who work 
full-time tend to be somewhat lower than those of mothers who work part-time. One 
might wonder whether these results are driven by the fact that most women in the age 
group considered here are mothers. However, in each of our sample countries, at least 
one third of women in the sample do not have children.
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in the differences across countries. Given our interest in the position of women with 
children as compared to women without children, we compare these groups separately, 
as shown in Figure 4.7. Looking first at the non-mothers, we find that using the mean 
percentile ranking as opposed to the mean gender pay ratio changes the ranking of our 
countries a good deal, with all of our seven countries changing position. We also find 
that, while there is relatively little spread in the pay ratio between countries, with the pay 
ratio of non-mothers relative to men ranging from 82 to 86 percent, there is much more 
variation in the mean percentile ranking. The mean percentile ranking of non-mothers in 
the male wage distribution ranges from 32 in Sweden to 45 in Germany. When we turn 
to mothers, we find a much larger spread in the pay ratio of mothers relative to non- 
mothers, ranging from a low of 70 percent in the UK to a high of 92 percent in 
Australia. In contrast to our results for non-mothers (and to Blau’s (1992) results for 
women overall), measuring mothers’ pay by their mean percentile ranking in the male 
distribution does not for the most part alter the ranking of the countries. Four countries 
change position: Sweden and Finland are now further down the ranking while the US 
and Canada move up. Thus, wage structure seems to be important in understanding why 
mothers are lower paid relative to men in the US or Canada than they are in Finland or 
Sweden.
However, wage structure does not fully explain why mothers are lower paid 
relative to non-mothers. If a country such as the UK adopted Sweden’s pay structure, 
this would reduce the penalty that mothers face in the labor market for being at a lower 
percentile in the male wage distribution, but it would not change the fact that they are at 
a lower position. Thus, changing the pay structure alone would not close the family gap 
in pay between mothers and non-mothers in the UK or the US or Germany, since 
mothers in those countries are at a much lower percentile ranking than non-mothers to 
start with.
Differences in Family Policies
Another possibility is that the differences we observe in the pay effects of 
children across countries reflect differences in family policies across countries. 
However, whether adopting changes in family policy such as maternity leave or child
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care improves the pay position of mothers is an open question. It is possible that the 
wage parity achieved by Nordic mothers relative to non-mothers comes about as a result 
of their extensive family policies, which support the labor force attachment of women 
with children and thus are likely to raise women’s levels of work experience and job 
tenure (Waldfogel, 1998a; Joshi, Paci, and Waldfogel, 1998). But this parity may come 
at the price of lower wages for women overall, if employers shift the costs associated 
with such policies to those perceived to be most likely to benefit from them, namely, 
women. The low position of all Swedish women in the male wage distribution, and the 
under-representation of Swedish women at the top of the distribution (see Albrecht, 
Bjorklund, and Vroman, 2001; Sorensen, 2001) may reflect the price women pay for 
Sweden’s extensive family policy supports, or it may reflect other factors entirely. We 
are not able to estimate the effect of family policies here, but clearly, more research on 
this question, and on the impact of family policies more generally on the employment 
and pay of mothers, and non-mothers, is warranted.
4.7 Conclusions
This paper adds to the growing literature on the “family gap in pay” by tackling 
the question of whether the family gap in pay that has been documented for some 
Anglo-American countries is unique to those countries or whether a comparable gap is 
found in other Western industrialized countries. The results for the seven countries 
examined here indicate that, controlling for differences in eamings-related 
characteristics, the effect of children on women’s pay is largest in the United Kingdom, 
followed by the other Anglo-American countries and Germany, and smallest in the 
Nordic countries.
We also sought to learn whether there is a link between the family gap in pay and 
the gender gap in pay across countries, such that countries with higher family pay gaps 
tend to have larger gender pay gaps as well. This was in fact the case in our data, as we 
saw in Figure 4.3, with the UK displaying both the largest gender gap in pay and the 
largest family gap in pay. We also examined the relationship between the employment 
gap between mothers and other women, and the wage gap between mothers and other
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women, and found that they were positively correlated. Thus, we found no evidence 
that women with children make a choice between lower employment or lower wages; 
the two seem to go together. This suggests that the high pay penalty to children in the 
UK, for instance, is not simply due to the fact that women with children are more likely 
to work in that country. We found little evidence to support the hypothesis that 
endogeneity or differential selection into employment account for the differences in the 
family gap across countries. Nor did we find much evidence that wage structure, which 
has been found to be so important in explaining the gender gap in pay, explains much of 
the cross-country differences in the family gap in pay.
Why does the family gap in pay vary so much across countries? What role do 
family policies such as maternity leave and child care play in closing the pay gap 
between mothers and other women? And what impact do such policies have on the pay 
of women overall? This study, using data from one point in time, could not answer these 
questions, but our results suggest that they are worth investigating in future. Studies that 
track the wages of mothers, and other women, over time within countries as family 
policies change would be particularly useful. So too would multi-country studies that 
use data from multiple points in time.
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Table 4.1: Employment Rates of Men and Women Age 24-44 in the Sample Countries
A. Share Employed AU 1995 
(N=4,980)
CN 1994 
(N=30,227)
UK 1995 
(N=4,403)
US 1994 
(N=42,919)
GE 1994 
(N=5,113)
FI 1991 
(N=9,804)
SW 1991 
(N=2,184)
All men .863 .792 .806 .871 .861 .787 .793
All women .624 .697 .645 .688 .707 .798 .836
Women without children .823 .788 .842 .799 .829 .870 .842
Women with children .520 .648 .550 .634 .634 .760 .833
Gender gap (line 2 - line 1) -.239 -.095 -.161 -.183 -.154 .011 .043
Family gap (line 4 - line 3) -.303 -.140 -.292 -.165 -.195 -.110 -.009
B. Share Employed FT AU 1995 CN 199 UK 1995 US 1994 GE 1994 FI 1991 SW 1991
All men .830 .762 .790 .844 .830 .777 .771
All women .421 .542 .421 .573 .490 .758 .653
Women without children .731 .677 .763 .731 .722 .851 .745
Women with children .258 .469 .256 .495 .352 .710 .611
Gender gap (line 1 - line 2) -.409 -.220 -.369 -.271 -.340 .019 -.118
Family gap (line 3 - line 4) -.473 -.208 -.507 -.236 -.370 -.141 -.134
' 'fotes: Authors' estimates from LIS data. Employment is defined as the share who have a job during the survey week. Full-time employment 
is defined as the share who have a job during the survey week and who work 30 or more hours per week
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Table 4.2: Employment Rates, Full Time Employment and Female/Male Wage
Ratio by Family Type
Married Single
Kids No Kids Kids No Kids
Employment Rates
AU 94 .53 .82 .44 .82
CN 94 .66 .81 .53 .76
UK 95 .60 .87 .37 .80
US 94 .64 .80 .62 .80
GE 94 .62 .83 .70 .83
FI 91 .74 .83 .85 .89
SW 91 .82 .82 .60 .75
FT Employment
AU 94 .26 .71 .26 .76
CN 94 .47 .70 .43 .65
UK 95 .27 .79 .19 .73
US 94 .48 .73 .54 .74
GE 94 .32 .67 .49 .76
FI 91 .69 .81 .84 .87
SW 91 .81 .78 .50 .71
Wage / Male Wage
AU 94 .935 .861 .784 .853
CN 94 .830 .824 .854 .823
UK 95 .713 .824 .643 .837
US 94 .798 .841 .655 .831
GE 94 .857 .803 .895 .880
FI 91 .856 .840 .752 .840
SW 91 .838 .971 .809 .901
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Table 4.3: Employment Rates, Full Time Employment and Female/Male Wage
Ratio by Age Group
Age Group 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 Difference 
(age 25-99 to 
40-44)
Employment Rate
AU 94 .66 .55 .60 .69 +.03
CN 94 .67 .69 .70 .73 +.07
UK 95 .63 .61 .62 .74 +.12
US 94 .67 .68 .70 .70 +.03
GE 94 .76 .72 .68 .67 -.09
FI 91 .81 .78 .79 .81 0.00
SW 91 .78 .85 .88 .84 +.06
FT Employment Rate
AU 94 .55 .34 .35 .42 -.13
CN 94 .55 .53 .52 .57 +.02
UK 95 .49 .38 .35 .45 -.04
US 94 .58 .57 .56 .57 0.00
GE 94 .63 .49 .41 .41 -.10
FI 91 .78 .74 .75 .77 -.01
SW 91 .74 .63 .67 .64 -.10
Female / Male Wage Ratio
AU 94 .949 .906 .859 .859 -.090
CN 94 .879 .832 .849 .750 -.129
UK 95 .882 .799 .669 .695 -.187
US 94 .878 .841 .740 .700 -.178
GE 94 .902 .872 .879 .797 -.105
FI 91 .963 .842 .823 .757 -.206
SW 91 .916 .876 .812 .752 -.164
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Table 4.4:Mean Hourly Wages of Women Relative to Mean Hourly Wages of Men in the Sample Countries
A. Women’s Wage / 
All Men’s Wage
AU 1994 
(N=3,473)
CN 1994 
(N=21,053)
UK 1995 
(N=3,166)
US 1994 
(N=32,806)
GE 1994 
(N=3,607)
FI 1991 
(N=7,064)
SW 1991 
(N=l,755)
All women 88.9% 82.8% 75.6% 78.5% 85.7% 84.0% 83.9%
Women without children 85.7% 82.4% 83.0% 83.5% 84.8% 84.0% 85.0%
Women with children 91.7% 83.1% 70.3% 75.5% 86.4% 83.9% 83.4%
Gender gap (line 1-100%) - 11.1% - 17.2% - 23.4% -21.5% -14.3% -16.0% -16.1%
Family gap (line 3-line 2) + 6.0% + 0.7% - 12.7% - 8.0% - 1.6% -0.1% - 1.6%
B. FT Women’s Wage / FT 
Men’s Wage
AU 1994 
(N=2,909)
CN 1994 
(N=l 8,337)
UK 1995 
(N=2,573)
US 1994 
(N=27,400)
GE 1994 
(N=3,135)
FI 1991 
(N=6,813)
SW 1991 
(N=l,541)
All FT 84.6% 77.4% 81.9% 79.2% 82.6% 80.7% 82.7%
FT without children 85.9% 80.5% 83.9% 84.1% 85.2% 83.1% 85.6%
FT with children 82.4% 75.0% 79.0% 75.6% 78.8% 79.2% 81.0%
Gender gap (line 1-100%) -15.4% -22.6% -18.1% -20.8% -17.4% -19.32% -17.3%
Family gap (line 3-line 2) - 3.5% - 5.5% - 4.9% - 8.5% - 7.4% -3.9% - 4.6%
Note: Wages are defined as gross annual earnings divided by annual hours worked (the product o f weeks worked and hours per week).
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Table 4.5: Effects of Marriage and Age of Youngest Child on Women’s Employment, Marginal Efl ‘ects from Probit Models
A. Employment AU 94 CN 94 UK95 US 94 GE94 FI91 SW91
Married -.203** -.019 -.080* -.071** - .0 0 2 .001 -.082
(.037) (.013) (.038) (.013) (.044) (.017) (.041)
Child age <1 - 597** -.277** -.479** -.273** -.297 -.056* -.156*
(.024) (.018) (.038) (.016) (.249) (.028) (.094)
Child age 1-5 _ 4 2 4 ** -.219** -.402** -.197** -.347** -.078** -.103**
(.028) (.0 1 1 ) (.030) (.009) (.032) (.0 2 0 ) (.036)
Child age 6-17 _190** -.095** -.142** -.068** -.127** .041* .001
(.030) (.0 1 1 ) (.032) (.009) (.028) (.016) (.034)
Pseudo R2 .205 .121 .256 .094 .126 .180 .109
No. observations 2654 16077 2438 22091 2372 4870 1060
B. Full Time 
Employment
AU 94 CN 94 UK95 US 94 GE94 FI91 SW91
Married -.219** -.019 -.066 -.052** .006 -.030 -.155*
(.049) (.015) (.048) (.015) (.052) (.018) (.067)
Child age <1 -.431** -.249** -.387** -.290** -.453 -.025 -.056
(.014) (.016) (.019) (.014) (.067) (.029) (.099)
Child age 1-5 -.465** -.273** -.502** -.272** -,4 7 4 ** -.095** -.166**
(.019) (.0 1 1 ) .0 2 0 ) (.009) (.0 2 2 ) (.0 2 2 ) (.046)
Child age 6-17 -.311** -.149** -.358** -.131** -.280** .035 -.114*
(.024) (.0 1 1 ) .024) (.0 1 0 ) (.028) (.018) (.048)
Pseudo R2 .231 .089 .278 .0911 .216 .167 .077
No. observations 2654 16077 2438 21682 2372 4870 1059
Notes:
1. Employment and full-time employment models also include controls for age, age squared, education, race or ethnicity (except in Sweden), presence o f  a working 
husband/partner, other family members’ earnings, other family income, region, and urban residence (except in Germany). See Appendix 4 for variable definitions and 
Appendix Table 4.3 for complete results.
2.* indicates statistically significant at p<.05; ** indicates statistically significant at p<.01
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Table 4.6
All Workers AU 94 CN94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
Married .035 -.005 .037 .060** -.058 .034* .033 *
(.038) (.015) (.027) (.009) (.032) (.014) (.018)
One child -.078 -.036* -.071* -.027* -.018 -.026 -.008
(.045) (.017) (.030) (.0 1 1 ) (.036) (.016) (.0 2 1 )
Two children -.106* -.050** -.232** -.067** -.175** - .0 1 2 -.014
(.044) (.017) (.029) (.0 1 1 ) (.041) (.017) (-0 2 1 )
Three or more -.053 -209** -.309** -.088** .068 -.064** -.025
children (.062) (.027) (.045) (.016) (.072) (-025) (.025)
N 1547 10219 1564 15307 1515 3592 874
Adj R2 .065 .097 .295 .234 .119 .198 .1787
Full-Time Workers AU 94 CN 94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
Married .035 -.005 .016 .059** .013 .0 2 0 .037**
(.036) (.015) (.029) (.0 1 0 ) (.031) (.013) (.018)
One child - .1 1 0 * -.036* .0 1 0 -.014 -.041 -.037* -.031
(.046) (.017) (.036) (.oil) (.037) (.015) (.0 2 1 )
Two children -.168** -.050** -.169** -.040** -.108* - .0 2 2 -.056**
(.049) (-017) (.037) (.0 1 2 ) (.046) (.016) (.0 2 1 )
Three or more -.193* -.209** - 2 7 9 ** -.062** -.079 -.075** -.1 0 2 **
children (.082) (.027) (.059) (.018) (.091) (.023) (.027)
N 1046 7885 999 11588 1107 3385 685
Adj R2 .090 .137 .308 .275 .1 2 2 .241 .1996
Notes:
1. Log wage models include controls for age, age squared, education, race or ethnicity (except for Sweden), region, and urban residence (except for Germany). 
Model 1 is estimated for all workers; model 2 is estimated only for full-time workers (those who work 30 or more hours per week). See appendix 4 for variable 
definitions and Appendix 4.5 for complete regression results.
2. * indicates statistically significant at p<.05; ** indicates statistically significant at p<.01
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Table 4.7
Effects of Marriage and Children on Women's Log of Hourly Wages, Coefficients (and Standard Errors) from OLS Regressions, 
Corrected for Sample Selection Bias
AU 94 CN 94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
Married .037 -.009 .048* .059 ** -.031 .034 ** .033 **
(.038) (.017) (.027) (.010) (.031) (.017) (.018)
One Child -.086 ** -.035 ** -.093 ** -.067 ** -.019 _ 044 ** -.006
(.049) (.019) (.033) (.013) (.037) (.018) (.021)
Two Children -.120 ** -.050 ** -.255 ** -.105 ** - 107 ** -.027 -.013
(.048) (.019) (.032) (.013) (.042) (.019) (.020)
Three or More -.113 ** -.123 ** -.321 ** -.152 ** .003 -.063 ** -.026
Children (.061) (.026) (.044) (.016) (.064) (.024) (.025)
Lambda .030 -.011 .031 .162 ** .019 .028 -.028
(.049) (.033) (.034) (.031) (.055) (.024) (.043)
N 1,046 16,077 2,438 22,091 1,107 4,870 685
Notes: Log wage models include controls for age, age squared, education, race or ethnicity (except for Sweden), region, and urban residence. 
Model is estimated for all women in the sample using the standard sample selection correction technique as described in the tex t. See 
appendix for variable definitions. Complete regression results available from the authors on request.
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Table 4.8
Mean Percentile Ranking of Women in the Male Wage Distribution
AU 1994 CN 1994 UK 1995 US 1994 GE 1994 FI 1991 SW 1991
1. All women
2. All workers:
40.59 38.65 33.78 39.14 41.71 34.29 30.95
a. Women without children 41.09 40.09 40.34 42.82 44.77 35.80 31.68
b. Women with children 40.15 37.70 28.95 36.91 39.06 33.39 30.62
c. Family gap for all workers 
3. Full-time workers only:
0.94 2.39 11.39 5.91 5.71 2.41 1.06
a. Women without children 40.63 39.23 41.26 44.30 45.03 35.38 32.87
b. Women with children 37.10 35.61 36.05 38.62 38.12 32.28 28.53
c. Family gap for FT workers 3.53 3.62 5.21 5.68 6.91 3.10 4.34
Note: Percentile ranking in the male wage distribution is calculated for each woman, and then the mean for all women in the group is 
calculated. The family gap for all workers is the mean percentile ranking of women workers with children minus the mean percentile ranking 
of women workers without children; the family gap for FT workers is the mean percentile ranking of full-time women workers with children 
minus the mean percentile ranking of full-time women workers without children.
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Figure 4.1:
Female-Male Hourly Earnings Ratios, 1967-1995
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Figure 4.1 (continued)
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Figure 4.1 (continued)
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Figure 4.2
Share Employed, by Age of the Youngest Child
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The Family Gap in Pay and the Gender Gap in Pay
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Figure 4.4
The Family Gap in Employment and the Gender Gap in Employment
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The Family Gap in Pay and the Family Gap in Employment
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Figure 4.6
Family Gaps in the Seven Countries
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Figure 4.7 
Rankings of the Seven Countries
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Figure 4.7 (continued)
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Appendix 4.0
Variable Definitions
Dummy variable for whether employed during survey week.
Log of gross hourly wage (annual wage and salary income divided by 
worked & hours worked).
Age in years.
Age in years squared.
Dummy variable for whether married. Includes those cohabiting or
Employed 
Log wage 
weeks 
Age
Age squared 
Married 
living
together as married except in U.S. and GE.
Child<l Dummy variable for whether youngest child is under age 1.
Child 1-5 Dummy variable for whether youngest child is age 1 to 5.
Child 6-17 Dummy variable for whether youngest child is age 6 to 17.
1 ChildDummy variable for having 1 child.
2 Children Dummy variable for having 2 children.
3+ Children Dummy variable for having 3 or more children.
Partner work Dummy variable for whether husband/partner works.
Other earn Other family members’ earnings.
Other income Other family income (total family income minus own earnings and other
earnings).
Education Dummy variables defined by country:
AU 8 categories (no qualifications, basic vocational, skilled
vocational,
associated diploma, undergraduate diploma, bachelor degree, 
postgraduate diploma, higher degree)
CN 7 categories (grade 8 or lower, grade 9-10, grade 11-13 not h.s.
grad, gradel 1-13 h.s. grad, post-secondary no degree, post sec. 
certificate or diploma, university degree)
UK 13 categories (dummy variables for left school at age 0- 
13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24 and age 24 and over)
US 8 categories (elementary, some high school, high school, some 
college, associate degree, bachelor degree, masters, doctorate) 
GE 7 categories (no degree, other degree, secondary, tech school
degree, high school degree, technical college, university)
FI 7 categories (no years of schooling, 10-11, 12, 13-14, 15, 16,
post-grad education)
SW 8 categories (unspecified, primary 1, primary 2, secondary 1, 
secondary 2, university 1, university 2, research)
Race or Ethnicity/Nat’l Origin. Dummy variables defined by country:
AU
CN
UK
US
eskimo/aleut/indian,
4 categories (oceania, antarctica, europe or USSR, africa or 
middle east, asia, americas)
3 categories (English, French, other)
Not available
6 categories (white, black, asian/pacific islander, 
other race, hispanic)
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GE 4 categories (W. German, Foreign, E. German, immigrant)
FI 2 categories (Finnish-speaking, Swedish-speaking)
SW Not available.
Region Dummy variable defined by country:
AU 7 categories (New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Southern 
Western Australia, Tasmania, A.C.T and N.T.)
10 categories (Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova 
Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan,
Columbia)
11 categories (North, Yorkshire and Humberside North West,
Australia,
CN
Scotia, New 
Alberta, British
UK
East
Midlands, West Midlands, East Anglia, Greater London, South 
East, South West, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland)
US 9 categories (New England, Middle Atlantic, East North 
Central, North Central, South Atlantic, East South 
Central, West South Central, Mountain, Pacific)
16 categories (West Berlin, Schleswig Holstein, Hamburg, 
Lower Saxony, Bremen, North Rhine Westfalia, Hesse, 
Rhineland, Badenwurttemburg, Bavaria, East Berlin, 
Mecklenburg, Brandenburg, Sachsen, Thueringen, Saxony)
11 categories (Uusimaa, Turku/Pori, Home, Kymi, North 
Karelia, Kuopio, Central Finland, Vaasa, Oulu, Lapland, other) 
7 categories (Stockholm, bigger cities, south, north, north 
sparsely populated, Gothenburg, Malmo)
Urban Dummy variables defined by country:
AU 2 categories (state capital, rest of country)
6 categories (urban 500,000+, urban 100,000 to 499,999, urban 
30,000-99,999, urban 2,500-29,999, urban <2,500, rural)
5 categories (Greater London, Metropolitan districts and central 
Clyde, non metropolitan, 3.2+ persons, non-metropolitan 0.9-3.2 
persons, non metropolitan under 0.9 persons)
9 categories (city<l,000,000, city 1-2.5 million, city 2.5-5 
million, city >5 million, suburb <1,000,000, suburb 1-2.5 
million, suburb 2.5-5 million, suburb>5 million, non­
metropolitan)
Not available.
2 categories (urban, non-urban)
6 categories
GE
FI
SW
CN
UK
US
GE
FI
SW
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Table A4.1: Means of Family Status Variables Used in Employment and Wage Models
A. Employment Models
AU 94 CN 94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
Married .736 .724 .726 .619 .666 .677 .763
Child <1 .075 .065 .077 .064 .002 .077 .030
Child 1-5 .264 .248 .291 .288 .224 .266 .323
Child 6-17 .315 .312 .308 .323 .400 .342 .305
B. Wage Models
AU 94 CN 94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
Married .708 .730 .755 .593 .634 .644 .763
One Child .187 .218 .218 .244 .270 .262 .207
Two Children .251 .258 .267 .252 .219 .265 .327
Three or More 
Children
.109 .078 .076 .094 .041 .084 .154
C. FT Wage Models
AU 94 CN 94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
Married .630 .709 .711 .566 .535 .633 .736
One Child .177 .221 .178 .247 .236 .262 .223
Two Children .161 .232 .167 .227 .150 .259 .295
Three or More 
Children
.046 .063 .056 .078 .025 .081 .130
Table A4.2: Marginal Effects from Employment Models
A. All Employed
AU 94 CN94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
Married -.203**
(037)
-.019
(-013)
-.080*
(.038)
-.071**
(.013)
-.002
(.044)
.001
(.017)
-.082
(.041)
Child under 1 -.597**
(.024)
-.277**
(.018)
-.479**
(.038)
-.273**
. (,0.16)
-.297
(.249)
-.056*
(.028)
-.156*
(.094)
Child 1-5 -.424**
(.028)
-.219**
( . n i l ,
-.402**
§ § S f l
-.197**
(.009)
-.347**
( . 032)
-.078**
00 3 0 ) _______
-.103**
(.036)
Child 6-17 -.190**
(.030)
-.095**
(.013)
-.142**
(.032)
-.068**
(.009)
- . 1 2 7 * *
(.028)
.041*
(.016)
.001
(.034)
Ethnicity 1 -.012
(.029)
.018
(.015)
- .061**
_________
.173**
(.047)
.029
(.026)
-
Ethnicity 2 -.255**
(.070)
-.061**
(012)
- .013
(.014)
.048
(.049)
-
Ethnicity 3 -.195**
(.043)
- - -.015
( 0 4 S )
.136
(.065)
-
Ethnicity 4 - - - -.015
(.021)
- -
Ethnicity 5 - - - -.000
(.056)
- -
Partner works .308**
(.040)
.110**
(.012)
.199**
(.044)
.071**
(.013)
-.034
(.040)
- .020
(.052)
Other income/1000 -.006** -.007**
(.000)
-.037**
(.003)
-.005**
(.000)
-.005**
( . 001)
-.003**
(.000)
.004
(.187)
Other earning/1000 .001
(.000)
-.004**
(.000)
-.001
(.001)
-.001**
(.000)
.001**
(.000)
-.001**
(.000)
.533**
(.158)
Age -.030
(.025)
.025**
(.008)
-.043
(.024)
.015*
(.007)
.012
(.022)
-.010
(.016)
.067**
(.025)
Age squared/100 .041
(.036)
-.033**
(.012)
.068
(.036)
-.022*
(.010)
-.020
(.032)
.014
(.022)
-.095**
(.036)
Education 2 -.103
(167)
.015
, 0 2 1 )
.242
(-073)
.029
(.018)
-.128*
(.066)
.067**
( 0 1 3 ) ________
.138**
(.023)
Education 3 ■ M
(.153)
.080** .241**
(.056)
.175**
(.015)
-.078
( .057)
.107**
(.013)
.134
(.023)
Education 4 -.039
SU f . -
.181**
J i l 'A L
.330**
(.070)
.197**
(.013)
-.205**
(.038)
.131**
(011)
.178**
(.027)
Education 5 -.311*
(.148)
.170**
(.014)
.331**
IfSSf i
.246**
(.010)
-.009
< 0 3 3 )
.127**
(.014)
.308**
(.063)
Education 6 -.296*
1.147)
.264**
(.015)
.355**
(.030)
.247**
(011)
.073
(.068)
.162**
(.008)
.169**
(.018)
Education 7 -.275
(.150)
.268**
(011)
.311**
(.021)
.238**
(.010)
-.084
(.049)
.153**
(.014)
.171**
(.031)
Education 8 -.364**
(.118)
- .305**
( . 0 2 3 )
.259**
(.010)
.164**
(.019)
Education 9 - .319**
(.025)
Education 10 - - .335**
(.016)
-
Education 11 - - .314**
(.018)
-
Education 12 - - .305**
(.024)
-
Education 13 - - .308**
( . 0 2 1 )
-
Pseudo R2 .205 .121 .256 .094 .126 .180 .109
No obs 2654 16077 2438 22091 2372 4870 1060
Regional and urban dummies are also included.
** Significant at 1 percent, * Significant at 5 percent
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B. Full Time Employment
AU 94 CN94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
Married -.219**
(.049)
-.019
(.015)
-.066
(.048)
-.052**
(.015)
.006
(.052)
-.030
(.018)
-.155*
( . 0 6 7 )
Child under 1 -.431**
(.014)
-.249**
(.016)
-.387**
(.019)
-.290**
(.014)
-.453
(.067)
-.025
(.029)
-.056
(.099)
Child 1-5 -.465**
(019)
-.273**
(011)
-.502**
(.020)
-.272**
(.009)
-.474**
( .022)
-.095**
(.022)
-.166**
(.046)
Child 6-17 -.311**
(.024)
-.149**
(O il)
-.358**
(024)
-.131**
(.010)
-.280** 
L ( . 028,
.035
( . 018,
-.114*
(.048)
Ethnicity 1 .048
( . ( .3m
.050**
( " I ? )
- .013
( 0 1 ? )
.090
(.051)
-.011
( .032)
Ethnicity 2 -.150*
(.065)
-.003
(012)
- .006
(.016)
.117
(.064)
-
Ethnicity 3 -.079
(.040)
- - -.061
(051)
.203*
(.087)
-
Ethnicity 4 - - .002
( 0 2 3 ,
Ethnicity 5 - - .031
( . 0 6 1 )
Partner works .234**
(.042)
.058**
(.058)
.090
(.048)
.019
(.015)
-.118*
(.050)
- .084
(.075)
Other income -.005**
( .001)
-.008**
(.000)
-.003** 
( 003)
-.001**
(.000)
-.006**
( n o n
-.003**
(.000)
-.510*
(.256)
Other earning -.001
(.000)
-.001**
(.000)
-.001
(.001)
-.002**
(.000)
-.001
(.000)
-.001**
(.000)
.158
(-185)
Age -.038
(.026)
.024**
(.009)
-.017
(.026)
.030**
(.007)
.018
(.026)
-.018
(.017)
.047
(.034)
Age squared/100 .046
(.038)
-.032*
(.013)
.022
(.037)
-.045**
(011)
-.035
(.038)
.027
(024)
-.063
(.050)
Education 2 .185
(.127)
.030
(.026)
.165
(.231)
.033
(.022)
-.157*
(.065)
.075**
(.015)
.213
(.090)
Education 3 .043
(.114)
.097**
(.027)
.381**
(111)
.206**
(019)
-.035
(.062)
.116**
(.nis)
.256*
(073)
Education 4 .058
(.119)
.191**
(-021)
.417**
(.111)
.221**
(.018)
-.148**
(.039)
.145**
(.016)
.274*
(.083)
Education 5 -.033
(.115)
.178**
(.022)
.516**
(.083)
.278**
(.016)
.015
(.038)
.147**
(.018)
.370**
(107)
Education 6 -.089
(.105)
.265**
(.020)
.574**
(.068)
.285**
(.016)
.164
(.081)
.196**
( .010)
.306**
(.059)
Education 7 -.129**
(.101)
.299**
(.019)
.536**
(.058)
.279**
(.017)
-.130**
( .048)
.191**
(.019)
.279
(.085)
Education 8 -.172
(-107)
- .556**
<054}
.328
( .017)
.337**
(.048)
Education 9 .563**
Education 10 .560**
( .050)
Education 11 .584**
(.031)
Education 12 .494**
( .081)
Education 13 .522**
(.068)
Pseudo R2 .231 .089 .278 .091 .216 .167 .077
Noobs 2654 16077 2438 21682 2372 4870 1059
Regional and urban dummies are also included.
** Significant at 1 percent, * Significant at 5 percent
176
Table A4.3: Wage Equations -  Full Results
A. Employment ___________________________   _^
AU 94 CN 94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
Married .035
(.038)
-.005
(.015)
.037
(-027)
.060**
(.009)
-.058
( ,032)
.034*
_ f t  1_4)___
.033
(.018)
One Child -.078
(.045)
-.036*
(.017)
-.071*
(.030)
-.027*
(.011)
-.018
( .0 3 6 )
-.026
(016)
-.008
(.021)
Two Children -.106*
(.044)
-.050**
( 0 1 7 )
-.232**
(.029)
-.067**
J , 0 ! 1 L
-.175**
(.041)
-.012
(.017)
-.014
(.021)
Three + Children -.053
(.062)
-.209**
(.027)
-.309**
( . 0 4 5 )
-.088**
J , 0 1 6 )
.068
( .072)
-.064**
( .025)
-.025
(.025)
Ethnicity 1 .013
(.045)
.002
(.027)
.112**
(.017)
.096
(.070)
-.035
(.030)
Ethnicity 2 -.202
. . ( . 1 3 3 )
-.096**
(.020)
- .022
(.020)
.066
( .087)
- -
Ethnicity 3 -.139
(.072)
- - -.031
( 4 )62 !
-.022
( 1 1 0 )
- -
Ethnicity 4 - - - -.013
(.030)
- -
Ethnicity 5 - - - .082
(.079)
- - -
Age .069
(.038)
.098**
(.014)
.107**
(.024)
.097**
(.009)
.074*
(.030)
.022
1 , 0 1 7 )
.013
(.016)
Age squared/100 -.088
f t p
-.117**
(.020)
-.135**
(.035)
-.123**
(.013)
-.087*
(.044)
-.019
(.024)
-.009
(.023)
Education 2 .064
( ,J69)
.115
(.052)
-.182
( ,227)
.064
.(.•034)____
-.350** 
(■084)
.051**
(.017)
-.114
(.098)
Education 3 -.044
(.155)
.176**
(.054)
-.045
( , 1 5 4 )
.288**
J ,0 3 0 >
-.388**
( .054)
.175**
(-018)
-.063
(.098)
Education 4 -.054 
(. 160)
.317**
(.046)
.068
(.152)
.399**
(.031)
-.389**
(.047)
.336**
(.026)
-.047
(.094)
Education 5 -.210
(167)
.315**
(.048)
.203
(.153)
.523**
(.032)
-.128**
(.043)
.410**
(.031)
.018
(.093)
Education 6 -.281
( .156)
.425**
( 0 4 5 )
.425**
(.153)
.718**
( .031)
-.045
(.093)
.533**
(.028)
.082
(.096)
Education 7 -.253
( .159)
.671**
(.046)
.472**
(.162)
.890** 
( .037)
-.066
( .058)
.755
( .084)
.116
(.095)
Education 8 -.346**
(.151)
- .430**
(.166)
1.030**
(.046)
.230*
(.096)
Education 9 - .644**
(-156)
- - -
Education 10 - - .646**
(.158)
- - - -
Education 11 - - .742**
(.169)
- - - -
Education 12 - - .520**
(.171)
- - - -
Education 13 - - .550**
( .183)
- - - -
Adj R2 .065 .137 .295 .234 .119 .198 .179
No obs 1547 7885 1564 15307 1515 3592 874
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B. Full Time Employment
AU 94 CN 94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
Married .035
( .036)  _______
-.005
( .015)
.016
(.029)
.059**
( .010)
.013
( .031)
.020
( .013)
.033
( .018)
One Child -.110*
(.046)
-.036*
(.017)
.010
(036)
-.014
( .011)
-.041
(.037)
-.037* 
(•015)__
-.008
(.021)
Two Children -.168**
(.049)
-.050**
(.017)
-.169**
(.037)
-.040**
(.012)
-.108*
(.046)
-.022
(.016)
-.014
(.021)
Three + Children -.193*
(.082)
-.209**
(.027)
-.279**
(.059)
-.062**
(.018)
-.079
(.091)
-.075**
(.023)
-.025
(.025)
Ethnicity 1 .008
(.045)
.003
(.027)
- .113**
( .018)
.068
(.069)
-.041
(.029)
-
Ethnicity 2 -.202
(.130)
-.096**
(.020)
- .028
( .021)
-.026
(.086)
- -
Ethnicity 3 -.044
(.069)
- - -.020
(.068)
-.012
( .102)
- -
Ethnicity 4 - - - -.006
(.031)
- -
Ethnicity 5 - - - .109 - - -
Age .079*
(.038)
.098**
( 0 1 4 )
.107**
(.027)
.099** 
(3)10) __
.058
(-030)
.014
rm t )
-.009
(.024)
Age squared/100 -.100
(.055)
-.117**
(.020)
-.131**
(.040)
-.123**
(.014)
-.070
(.044)
-.005
(.023)
-.009
(.023)
Education 2 .070
(.170)
.115*
(.052)
-.031
( .374)
.082
( .037)
-.127
(.094)
.056**
(-016)
-.114
(.098)
Education 3 -.037
(.155)
.176**
(.054)
.390
(.232)
.338**
( -  03 5j_
-.290**
(.083)
.173**
(017)
-.063
(.098)
Education 4 -.036
(.163)
.317**
(.046)
.557*
02 3 0)
.457**
(.034)
-.284**
1 0531)
.351** 
(4)26) J
-.047
(.094)
Education 5 -.210
( . 167 )
.315**
( .048)
.667**
( .232)
.564**
( .035)
-.062
( .043)
.434**
(.029)
.018
(.093)
Education 6 -.274
(.157)
.425**
(.045)
.860**
(.231)
.764** 
_ ( . 0 3 4 J _ _  J -.057(.091)
.551**
6 0 2  6 )  __
.082
(.096)
Education 7 -.247
1 ,159)____
.671**
(.046)
.841**
( .238)
.972**
( .039)
-.040
(.060)
.707**
(.077)
.116
(.095)
Education 8 -.345
( .151)
- .912
( .240)
1.077**
(.048)
- - .230
(.096)
Education 9 - 10.60**
(-233)
.890**
( .037)
- - -
Education 10 - - 1.071**
( .235)
1.030**
(.046)
- - -
Education 11 - - 1.146**
(.242)
- - - -
Education 12 - - .827**
( .244)
- - - -
Education 13 - - .980**
( .254)
- - - -
Adj R2 .090 .137 .308 .275 .122 .241 .179
No obs 1046 7885 999 11588 1107 3385 874
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Table A4.4: OLS and Instrumental Variable estimates of the Impact of Children on Employment
1. All Workers
AU 94 CN 94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Married -.222** -.252** -.037** -.045** -.077* -.082* -.077** -.077** -.018 -.038 .008 -.088 -.093 -.094
(.035) (.055) (.012) (.014) (.032) (.034) (.013) (.007) (.041) (.046) (.014) (.048) (.057) (.018)
Number _ 119** -.086* -.064** -.047** -.089** -.081** -.059** -.060** -.119** -.088** -.011* .100 -.038** -.035*
Children (.008) (.055) (.003) (.014) (.008) (.020) (.003) (.007) (.009) (.035) (J006) (.053) (.011) (.018)
Adj R2 .198 .19384 .138 .137 .253 .253 .109 .109 .146 .142 .159 .092 .061 .061
Hausman
Test
0.70 1.20 0.46 -.020 0.93 2.18* 0.19
N. 2654 16077 2438 22091 2372 4870 1060
2. FT Workers
AU 94 CN 94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Married -.177**
(.035)
-.196**
(.047)
-.025
(.013)
-.031*
(.015)
-.039
(.033)
-.040
(.035)
-.055**
(.014)
-.050**
(.014)
-.047
(.042)
-.078
(.048)
-.017
(.015)
-.104
(.051)
-.138
(.073)
-.144
(.074)
Number
of
Children
-.159**
(.008)
-.138**
(.046)
-.094**
(.004)
-.083**
(.016)
-.138**
(.008)
-.137**
(.021)
-.086**
(.003)
-.096**
(.008)
-.160**
(.010)
- HI**
(.037) .021**
(.006)
.079
(.056)
-.070**
(.015)
-.061**
(.023)
Adi R2 .251 .242 .116 .115 .253 .253 .119 .119 .243 .234 .159 .110 .103 .066
Hausman
Test
0.47 0.70 0.08 -1.34 1.42 1.85 0.50
N 2654 16077 2438 21682 2372 4870 1059
Note: Number of children is instrumented by the average number of children of women by age and region.
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Table A4.5: OLS and Instrumental Variable estimates of the Impact of Children on Wages 
3. All Workers ___________  _______
AU 94 CN 94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Married .025 .015 -.004 .027 .045 .056 .065** .065** -.074 -.073 .039** -.040 .034 .024
(.038) (.075) (•016)_ (.026) (.027) (.030) (.009) (.011) (.032) (.051) (.014) (.071) (.018) (.019)
Number o f -.039* -.024 -.038** -.090** -.107** -.129** -.036** -.037** -.030 -.033 -.017* .069 -.009 .004
Children (.016) (.095) (.006) (.034) (.011) (.032) (.004) (.011) (.017) (.068) (.006) (.075) (.007) (.010)
Adi R2 .063 .062 .095 .090 .296 .294 .236 .236 .124 .107 .198 .159 .218 .215
Hausman Test .158 -1.58 -0.77 -0.06 -0.05 1.17 1.901
Number obs 1547 10219 1564 15307 1515 3592 874
4. FT Workers
AU 94 CN 94 UK 95 US 94 GE 94 FI 91 SW 91
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Married .025 -.038 .003 .046 .027 .042 .066** .073** .014 -.025 .026* -.022 .037 .025
(.038) (.076) (.015) (.025) (.029) (.033) (.009) ( .o i l ) (.031) (.040) (.013) (.065) (.018) (.019)
Number o f -.039* .026** -.051** -.130** -.087** -.121** -.031** -.044** -.047* .063 -.022** .030 -.030** -.013
Children (.016) (.123) (.007) (.037) (.014) (.039) (.004) (.013) (.020) (.075) (.006) (.070) (.018) (.011)
AdjR2 .095 .064 .137 .141 .308 .304 .277 .277 .124 .099 .241 .224 .202 .196
Hausman Test .916
*COr-HCNt -0.77 -1.03 1.54 1.17 2.227**
Number obs 1046 7885 999 11588 1107 3385 685
Note: Number of children is instrumented by the mean number of children by age and region
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CHAPTER FIVE:
GRADUATE EARNINGS IN BRITAIN, 1974-95
5.1 Introduction
Much has been made of the rise in wage inequality in Britain, an important part 
of which in the eighties was a rise in earnings gaps between workers with and without a 
degree. What is much less well understood is the extent to which these shifts in wage 
structure have continued into the nineties, how they have affected men and women 
differently and how relative comparisons of different educational groups (other than 
degree/non-degree or degree/no educational qualifications comparisons) have evolved.
In this chapter we shed some light on these questions, looking at changes in the 
wage returns to education between 1974 and 1995 using General Household Survey 
data. We pay particular attention to changes in the relative supplies of workers with 
different educational qualifications to explore how changing supply has varied with the 
labour market rewards accruing to different groups in the labour market. In the 1970s 
the very big shifts in supply resulting from the expansion of the higher education system 
seemed to depress the relative wages received by the more highly educated. After this 
decade, however, it is clear that changes in relative earnings are bigger than those 
predicted by relative supply shifts alone as one identifies groups of workers (the more 
skilled) who have experienced simultaneously rising relative wages and employment.
Indeed, it seems that a positive covariation between the relative wages and 
employment of the more educated has been the norm since the start of the 1980s, 
suggesting relative demand shifts in favour of more educated workers have occurred. 
This has been well documented for graduates versus non-graduates (Machin, 1996a; 
Schmitt, 1995), but looking in more detail at gender differences, and considering more 
detailed breakdowns of educational groupings (including subject of study for graduates) 
uncovers other interesting patterns. Essentially shifts in relative demand favouring more 
highly educated workers were more pronounced for women than for men, and are of 
differing magnitude as one move down the distribution of educational qualifications (for 
example there seem to be much less of a shift in relative demand between degree
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holders and those with A levels only as compared to shifts between those with A levels 
and no qualifications).
The chapter is structured as follows. Section II describes changes in educational 
attainment between the mid-seventies and mid-nineties. Section III presents descriptive 
material on wage gaps between workers with different qualifications and how they have 
evolved through time and reports education wage premiums and changes in them that 
emerge from simple earnings regressions. Section IV then computes relative demand 
shifts between different educational groups from the wage and supply changes 
documented in Sections II and III. Section V fixes a particular education cohort by 
looking at changes over time for those who in the survey year who are 3-10 years out of 
full-time education. In Section VI we then move on to look at changes in the graduate 
wage premium by subject of study. Section VII investigates whether one can identify a 
gender bias in terms of the impact of technological change on the extent of skill 
upgrading and Section VIII concludes by summarising the main findings.
5.2. Changes in the Distribution of Educational Qualifications
Throughout this chapter we utilise data from the General Household Survey 
(GHS) and restrict out analysis to economically active men aged 16-64 and women aged 
16-59. This gives samples of about 10-13000 people per year on whom we have data on 
education and around 5-9000 people working full time with wage data. Due to problems 
with the GHS hours question changing over time we consider weekly earnings 
throughout. The remainder of this Section documents trends over time in the distribution 
of educational qualifications.
Changes in the Distribution of Educational Qualifications
It is well known that over recent decades the workforce has become much better 
qualified. This reflects several changes in the educational system including the 
expansion of higher education, the move towards vocational education, changes in 
school leaving ages and changes in examinations systems. Overall these moves mean 
that the average person in the education distribution now possesses more formal 
qualifications than before, and that far fewer people have no formal educational
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qualifications.
Table 5.1 reports the distribution of educational qualifications by sex using GHS 
data grouped into three-year intervals between 1974-6 and 1993-5.1 The numbers given 
are the shares of the employed in each highest educational qualification category. There 
are clearly sharp increases in the percentage of people in the higher educational 
categories. The supply of highly educated labour has risen at a rapid rate. Indeed there is 
a 155 percent increase in the share of graduates in the male population between the mid- 
1970s and mid-1990s; and an even bigger percentage increase, of 347 percent, for 
women. Other qualification groups also increase their shares rapidly. For men there is 
(roughly) a doubling of the proportion of people with A levels, the share of this group 
rising by 95 percent for those with two or more A levels as their highest qualification 
and 149 percent for those with one A level. For women the shares rise faster at 110 
percent for those with two A levels and 202 percent for those with one A level. Finally, 
the move towards vocational qualifications2 is also brought out in the Table. For men, 
the share with higher vocational qualifications rises by 146 percent, and the share with 
lower vocational qualifications increases by 123 percent. For women comparable 
percent increases are huge at 418 and 900 percent, reflecting the fact that hardly any 
women possessed vocational qualifications in the mid-1970s.
Relative Supply Changes Across Decades
As the reported supply changes cover a relatively long time period they may 
mask differences in supply trends over shorter periods. And, because we are interested 
in the extent to which changes in the supply of education have the potential to dampen 
education based wage differentials it is interesting to look at the evolution of supply 
over different time periods. Table 5.2 shows changes in relative supply for sub-periods 
between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s for various pairwise comparisons of groups with 
different educational qualifications. The pattern revealed by the Table is clear. The 
supply of graduates relative to three benchmark groups (all non graduates, those with A
1 The three year grouping is to ensure sample sizes are large enough.
2 Higher vocational qualifications include HNC, HND and full City and Guilds 
awards. Middle vocational qualifications include ONC, OND and City and Guild Part II.
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levels and those with no qualifications) shows a rapid increase in the 1970s, a 
deceleration in the 1980s and then a speeding up in the 1990s (though in most cases not 
to the same rate of increase as the 1970s). The rate of increase is faster for women in all 
cases.
Perhaps the most striking result from the Table is that the relative supply of all 
qualification groups increased rapidly in all periods compared to those with no 
qualifications, reflecting skill upgrading across the labour force.3 The relative supply of 
graduates and those with higher vocational qualifications increased most rapidly, 
although the latter was at a very low level in the seventies (particularly for women). The 
relative supply of those with A levels has seen a fast rise too, in particular since the 
1980s, while the supply of those with higher vocational qualifications has also grown 
quickly, particularly amongst women. For men, however, the rate of increase in supply 
of those with higher vocational qualifications slowed relative to those with A levels and 
middle level vocational qualifications from the 1990s.
5.3 Trends in Relative Wages
If a group of people with particular educational qualifications increases its 
population share this gives potential employers a larger group of workers to choose 
from. If employers’ demand requirements do not change, then increases in relative 
supply should induce a fall in the relative wages of the group in question. In this Section 
we examine the extent to which this has happened. We begin by documenting relative 
wage premia for different educational groups, and then move on to compare the 
magnitude of relative wage shifts across decades. We consider the role of changing 
demand for particular sorts of workers with differing educational qualifications in the 
next Section.
Relative Wage Differentials
Relative weekly wage ratios for full-time workers are reported in Table 5.3. 
Various education-based differentials are reported between the mid-70s and mid-90s.
3 This remains the case for computations based on total hours rather than 
employment.
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They show that the more highly educated earn more, but there is some evidence of a fall 
in this earnings differential in the 70s, a rise in the 80s and a more mixed pattern in the 
90s. However, these raw earnings ratios do not standardise for the different 
characteristics of workers within education groups and, as such, inference based upon 
them could be misleading. To properly consider the evolution of relative wage 
differentials through time one should standardise for the different characteristics of 
individuals in the sample. The next sub-section uses regression techniques to do so.
Estimated Wage Differentials Between Education Groups
Table 5.4 reports coefficient estimates (and associated standard errors) on 
education dummy variables included in semi-log earnings equations estimated for full­
time employees. The upper panel of the Table reports estimates for men and the lower 
panel reports those for women. Each coefficient reported comes from a regression 
based on the sample of individuals (i = 1,2,....N) in the pairwise education comparison
log(Wit) = a . + AD* + r tX i« + ^  
of interest over a given time period t:
where log(W) is log earnings, D is a dummy variable distinguishing between the 
education groups of interest, X is the set of control variables and e is an error term.
So, to illustrate the way in which the results are reported, Table 5.4 gives time- 
varying estimates of p, the education based wage premium, for different education 
groups. The upper panel reports results for men, and the lower panel results for women. 
In the first row of the Table the estimate of p compares the (characteristics corrected) 
log earnings of those with degrees and those without. In this formulation D is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for those with a degree and 0 for those without. The second row just 
focusses on people with degrees or A levels and estimates an earnings equation for this 
sub-set of individuals, with D again being a dummy variable for whether an individual 
has a degree or not, and P being the ceteris paribus log (earnings) difference between 
people with a degree and A levels. Analogous comparisons between other education 
groups are given in the other rows of the Table. Sample sizes for each comparison are
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given in Appendix Table A5.1.
The control variables included in the specifications reported in Table 5.4 are age, 
age squared, a dummy variable reflecting whether people are teachers or not4, plus sets 
of region and industry dummy variables. It should be noted that the pattern of results, 
particularly the way estimates of P shift over time, remains very robust to alternative 
specifications. Two examples are given in Tables A5.2 and A5.3 of the Appendix, 
which include health and non-white variables.5
For comparisons based on individuals with degrees, the estimated coefficients 
show a pattern of a declining graduate earnings premium in the 1970s, followed by 
increases in the 1980s and 1990s. This pattern broadly holds if the comparison group is 
non-degree, A levels or no qualifications. It is also true for both men and women. 
However, the magnitudes of the changes in the graduate earnings premium are rather 
different for different comparison groups, and differ by gender.6
In terms of the comparison between people with A levels and those with no 
educational qualifications, the coefficient on the A level dummy variable falls for men
4 This teacher dummy variable is included because teachers with degrees earn 
substantially less than other graduates.
5 The basic pattern of results over time remains, but is somewhat dampened in 
cross-section comparisons, if one includes a full set of occupation controls. See 
Appendix Table A4.
6 Appendix Table A5 reports formal statistical tests of whether the estimates of p 
in Table IV are significantly different for men and women. The pattern is mixed but on 
the whole points to statistically significant differences in the earlier years, with 
male/female gaps in education based wage differentials tending to converge by the 
1990s.
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in the 1970s, with little change for women, but rises thereafter. Shifts in the wage 
structure for people possessing higher vocational qualifications are a little different. 
For men, the high vocational/A levels wage gap remains much the same in the 70s, and 
falls to zero by the 90s. For women, while the cross-section differential is a little larger, 
a similar pattern of change in the high vocational/A levels wage gap emerges.
But there are some notable gender differences when one looks at what has 
happened to the relative wages of those possessing higher vocational qualifications as 
compared to either the middle vocational group or those with no qualifications. For men 
the high vocational/middle vocational wage gap falls a little in the 70s and then rises 
back up to its mid-1970s level by the mid 1990s. For women, the magnitude of change 
is larger with a very sharp fall in the 1970s, an increase in the 80s, before flattening off 
in the 90s. The final comparison drawn in the Table, between high vocational 
qualifications and no educational qualifications shows a fall in the 70s for both men and 
women, and increasing again throughout the 80s.
Because patterns of labour force participation for both men and women have 
altered very markedly over this time period one may be concerned that these cross-time 
patterns of change in education based earnings differences may be biased by 
compositional changes in the labour force. In particular, since the 1970s male and 
female participation rates have gone in opposite directions, reflecting the rapidly falling 
employment rates of less skilled men and the rising employment rates of women.
We have therefore experimented with trying to correct the estimated wage 
differentials for any selection bias due to the changing composition of employment over 
time. To do so we adopt a standard Heckman (1976) type correction to the wage 
equation. In practice this is done by estimating a probit model of employment 
participation across the working age population and then including a variable to correct 
for sample selection (the inverse Mills ratio) from this probit specification in the wage 
equation. The most crucial issue concerns the identification of the coefficient on this
7 This correction is adopted to allow for the fact that people with positive 
earnings may be a selected sample of individuals in that their characteristics may be 
different from those who are out of work. For an earnings equation log(W) = X0 + 8 the 
issue arises because the equation is based only upon people who have W>0. As such it 
is possible that the mean of the error term e (E(e)) may not equal 0 as one would require
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correction factor, which requires one to include variable(s) in the employment 
probability equation that are excluded from the wage equation. The identification 
restrictions we adopt are to include family non-labour income and the employment 
status of other working age adults in the employment probit, whilst excluding them from 
the wage equation.
Selection corrected wage equations are given in Table A5.6 of the Appendix.8 
The specifications reported there are identical to those in Table 5.4 except they also 
include the inverse Mills ratio from the first stage probit. Selection bias is not very 
important for men in all educational comparison groups. For women selection bias is 
more important, with larger shifts in the estimated coefficients. The basic thrust of the 
results however remains. But, because of the scope for selection to alter the nature of 
the reported results, from now on we report results that both do and do not control for 
possible selection bias.
The Magnitude of Changes in Relative Wage Differentials
Our principal interest is the evolution of education-specific wage differentials 
over time. Table 5.5 therefore converts the estimates of log earnings differentials into
for estimates of 0 to be unbiased. To ensure the error term does have a zero mean one 
needs to include a selection correction term (the inverse Mills ratio) in the wage 
equation. To see this note that the earnings equation for those with positive earnings can 
be written [log(W)| W>0] = X0 + o(cp/0) + v where E(v) = 0 and cp and O are the density 
function and distribution function of the standard normal distribution. The inverse Mills 
ratio can be calculated from a first stage probit model explaining the probability that an 
individual has positive earnings, Pr[W>0] = 0(Z£ + ©).
8 The coefficients on the key variables in the probit equations used to generate 
the inverse Mills ratio are given in Table A7 of the Appendix.
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changes observed in the 1970s, 80s and 90s. The Tables report annualised log changes 
in education based wage differentials over these time periods (for two particular time 
periods s and t, with t>s, these correspond to [pt - Ps]/[t - s]). Two sets of changes are 
reported in each case, one from the models in Table 5.4, the other from the selectivity 
corrected wage equations in Appendix Table A5.6. Whilst the cross-section 
comparisons are affected (particularly for women), the overall pattern of change is, for 
the most part, robust to the selection corrections.
Table 5.5 makes it clear that, while one can identify some similar patterns in the 
direction of shifts in educational wage differentials across qualification groups, the 
magnitudes of some of these shifts are rather different. This, of course, is what we 
would expect given that, as we have shown earlier, the magnitudes of relative supply 
shifts differ.
For men the numbers in Table 5.5 make it clear that the relative wages of more 
educated groups fell in the 1970s. This is in line with the relative supply changes 
documented earlier. According to Table 5.5, between 1975 and 1980 the wage 
differential between men with and without degrees fell by about 1.1 percent a year. The 
biggest falls seem to be relative to the no qualifications group: for example, the wage 
differential between those with a degree and no qualifications fell by 1.1 percent a year, 
and by a huge 1.6 percent a year between those with higher vocational qualifications and 
those with no qualifications. The other comparisons in the Table also show falls in the 
1970s, but they are more moderate than when benchmarked against the no educational 
qualifications group.
In the 1980s and 1990s, however, relative wages of the more educated rose 
relative to their less qualified counterparts, despite increasing relative supply. For men, 
this is true of all comparisons in the 80s except for high vocational/A levels, where the 
relative wage premia received by those with higher vocational qualifications fell 
slightly. In terms of magnitude, the biggest increases in education based wage premia 
occurred relative to the no qualifications group. For example, the degree/no 
qualifications wage premium rose twice as fast in the 80s as the degree/A levels and 
degree/no degree premium. In the 90s the degree/no qualifications wage premium 
continued to rise, but the Degree/A levels premium seemed to fall or (at worst) stop
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rising.
The lower panel of the Table shows more qualified women experiencing a fall in 
educational wage premiums in the 70s but rapid increases (faster than those for men) in 
the 80s. The shifts in wage structure by education for women are, however, somewhat 
different to those for men. Female graduates have improved their relative wage position 
by more than men since the start of the 1980s. This is the case despite faster relative 
supply increases which were documented earlier. This gender difference suggests that 
the relative demand for female graduates has grown faster than the relative demand for 
male graduates over this period. This is what we turn to next.
5.4. Implied Relative Demand Shifts
We are now in a position to calculate the extent to which the observed wage 
shifts reflect supply or demand factors, or both. As in Autor and Katz (1998), we assume 
CES technology and two factors of production (high and low-skilled labour). Assuming 
the economy operates on its labour demand curve9, then a simple expression can be 
defined to show the relationship between changes in wage differentials for two different 
groups of workers i and j (AWy/Wy) and changes in the relative supply (ASy/Sy) and 
demand (ADy/Dy) of those groups:
AWy _ 1 j-APij AS^
Wy cry Dij Sy
where ay is the aggregate elasticity of substitution between the two groups. Under CES 
production cross-price elasticities are constant. As in reality there are more than two 
factor inputs, estimation within this conditional demand framework requires the effects 
of changes in other input prices to be incorporated within the demand shift term. 
Therefore oy reflects both substitution possibilities at the firm production level, and also 
substitution possibilities in consumption. The aggregate theta is larger than that reported 
at the firm level therefore under this conditional demand framework. As we have 
computed AW/W and AS/S equation (2) can be used to calculate the implied relative
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demand shifts, AD/D, if one is prepared to make an assumption about the ease with 
which employers can substitute between different sorts of workers. There are ranges of 
estimates of a  that have been estimated (see Hamermesh’s, 1993, book). Katz and 
Murphy (1992) and Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) assume its value to be 1.4 and, as 
this does not seem implausible, we do the same.
Table 5.7 reports the demand shifts implied by the estimated wage differentials 
and the supply changes presented earlier for c = 1.4.10 Again the Table reports two sets 
of estimates, which depend upon whether or not the selection correction was 
implemented. There is clear evidence of demand shifts in favour of the relatively more 
educated in almost all cases. Relative demand for graduates has increased vis-a-vis 
those without degrees. The biggest shifts are away from those with no qualifications, as 
the shifts against those with A levels are much more moderate. As hinted at earlier there 
are very marked gender differences, with demand for those with degrees relative to those 
without rising by about 6 percent per year for men and 9 percent per year for women.
That the most marked shifts in demand have been against those with no 
qualifications is very clear if one looks at separate comparisons between people with 
degrees or A levels and those with no qualifications. Both the degree/no qualifications 
and the A levels/no qualifications comparisons point to big shifts in wage and 
employment in favour of the more educated. Again these shifts are more marked for 
women than for men.
Other pairwise comparisons of education groups show interesting trends. In 
particular the demand for higher vocational qualifications has fallen or remained stable 
relative to A levels or middle vocational qualifications (the latter comparison of high 
vocational/middle vocational falls massively for women). But, at the same time, the 
high vocational group has faced big increases in demand vis-a-vis people with no 
qualifications. This is particularly marked for women.
9 Supply is assumed to be inelastic in the short-run.
10 The choice of a = 1.4 is not critical. Estimates based on o = 1 or 2 give 
similar results.
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Overall, the story emerging seems to be that relative supply changes have 
influenced relative wage differentials but that relative demand has shifted too. In 
particular changes in the demand for highly educated workers seem to have grown faster 
than changes in relative supply and this explains the simultaneous rise in employment 
and relative wages for more highly educated workers.
Even more striking is the fact that there is an important gender component. 
Despite faster increases in the relative supply of more highly educated workers among 
women than men, the relative wages of educated women have grown even faster. This 
suggests that demand has shifted towards the more educated even faster for women than 
for men. Put alternatively, it seems that the skills possessed by female graduates are 
increasingly demanded by employers who are willing to pay them higher relative wages.
5.5 Changes in the Graduate Wage Premium For Labour Market Entrants
Because shifts in relative supply have taken place so rapidly in recent years it 
may be more appropriate to look at cohorts of workers who have recently entered the 
labour market after finishing their education. This section therefore looks only at 
workers who are three to ten years out of the education system at the time of the survey.
Table 5.7 reports changes in relative supply for these labour market entrants. A 
slightly different picture does emerge. In particular it suggests that supply changes have 
been faster for this group than for the whole population, and that there is some sign of 
faster increases in the supply of more educated workers in the 1990s. There is less 
evidence of marked gender differences here.
Despite this there is not much evidence of falling wage premiums for the more 
educated groups in the 1980s and 1990s. Table 5.8 reports coefficients on the education 
variables from standard wage equations which are comparable to those in Table 5.4 
(coefficients from selection corrected earnings equations are given in Appendix Table 
A5.811). Table 5.9 converts the estimated coefficients into within-decade changes and 
shows that there is scant evidence of falling wage premiums in periods of more rapidly 
increasing relative supply. This is true for both men and women.
11 Coefficients on the identifying variables from the probit models generating the 
selection term are in Appendix Table A9.
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Indeed, when one computes the implied relative demand shifts for labour market 
entrants they are sizable and, due to the rapid expansion of supply at the same time as 
rising relative wages, show an increase in the 1990s. These are reported in Table 5.10. 
For more recent entrants to the labour market employers are clearly prepared to pay 
more despite there being a larger pool to choose from than in earlier years. It seems veiy 
likely that employers would link the higher qualifications of more recent entrants to 
skills that are more applicable in the modem workplace and that is why they demand 
still more of them despite their increased supply. This is entirely in line with recent 
work on changes in wage inequality which, in the face of rapid technological change and 
the changing demands of the modem employer, argues more recent cohorts have 
experienced more wage dispersion than their older counterparts (Gosling, Machin and 
Meghir, 1995).
5.6 Changes in the Graduate Wage Premium by Subject of Degree
Since 1980 the General Household Survey has collected information on the 
subject area of people’s first degrees. Table 5.11 reports changes in the subject 
composition of degrees between 1980-2 and 1993-5, again looking at men and women 
separately. For both sexes, the share of degrees in the Arts falls (from 15 to 11 percent 
for men, from 38 to 25 percent for women). At the same time, the percentage of 
science/engineering graduates rises from 40 to 45 percent for men, and from 15 to 24 
percent for women.
Table 5.12 converts these numbers into annualised supply changes, relative to the A 
levels group. The supply changes towards science/engineering graduates are quite 
marked. Again the effects are larger for women than for men, especially at the start of 
the 90s. In the light of such compositional changes, and given that the earnings of 
graduates have risen since the start of the 1980s, it is interesting to see if there are 
differences by subject of degree. Table 5.13 reports the characteristics corrected wage 
premiums derived from log earnings equations.12 For men there is evidence of rising
12 Sample size constraints mean that these are estimated from single wage 
equations in a given time period with four subject of degree dummies entered (relative 
to the base group of A levels only). Sample sizes for each regression and F-tests 
showing that the four dummies are significantly different from one another in all time
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wage premiums relative to A levels throughout the 80s (except for the residual ‘other ‘ 
group), but falls in the early 90s. For women arts and science graduates the wage 
differentials rise through the whole time period. Table 5.14 shows the magnitude of the 
changes in relative wage differentials, reporting annualised changes in log earnings 
premia. Like the earlier changes we also report changes in earnings differentials from 
models that correct for possible selection bias.13
These patterns of changes in wage differentials and relative supply translate into 
an implied relative demand shift very much in favour of engineering and science 
graduates. In particular the demand shifts, given in Table 5.15, are very large for female 
science and engineering graduates. There is also some evidence of important relative 
demand shifts in favour of female social science and business graduates. Clearly part of 
the rapidly improving labour market position of female graduates is related to subject of 
study.
5.7 Is There a Gender Bias to Skill-Biased Technological Change?
Many people believe the key factor behind relative demand shifts in favour of 
the skilled is skill-biased technological change (SBTC) (see Bound and Johnson, 1992, 
or Johnson, 1997, for more discussion). It is probably surprising therefore that there has 
not been much investigation into whether the effects of SBTC differ by gender. Given 
that the earlier sections show differential rates of skill upgrading in Britain for men and 
women it seems natural to ask if there is also a gender bias of SBTC that has influenced 
the skill structure of the labour market.
In Britain the lack of detailed industry data on wages and employment by 
education group and gender makes it hard to carry out the kinds of exercises at the 
disaggregate level that investigations of the role of SBTC have carried out using data on
periods are given in Table A10 of the Appendix.
13 The selectivity corrected earnings regressions are given in Table A11 of the 
Appendix.
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all workers (e.g. US work by Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994, UK work by Machin, 
1996b, and international evidence in Berman, Bound and Machin, 1998 or Machin and 
Van Reenen, 1997). Nevertheless we can carry out some exercises at the broad 1-digit 
industry level by aggregating the GHS data used earlier.
We follow the literature on SBTC by presenting two pieces of evidence, one of 
which pertains to indirect evidence based on shift-share decompositions of industrial 
skill upgrading over time, the other of which looks at regression based correlations 
between skill upgrading and direct measures of technology. For the former we use the 
by now familiar decomposition (see Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994) of changes in 
the skill composition of industry wages and/or employment into a component that 
reflects changes within industries and one that reflects changes between industries.14 
This decomposition breaks down the aggregate change in the
skilled proportion over a given time period, AP, for industries (i= 1,2, N) as:
AP = X A(I>iPi + Z Ap‘®i
i i
where: Pi = SK/Lj is the proportion (in wage bill or employment) of skilled workers in 
industry i and ®j = L /L  is the share of total wage bill or employment in industry i. A bar 
over a variable denotes a time mean. The first term on the right hand side of the equation 
is the change in the aggregate proportion of skilled workers attributable to shifts 
between industries with different proportions of skilled workers. The final term in the 
expression is the change in the aggregate proportion of skilled workers attributable to 
changes in the proportion of skilled workers within industries.
14 For decompositions of this sort based on international data see Berman, Bound 
and Machin (1998).
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Table 5.16 reports the results of this decomposition for changes in graduate wage 
bill shares15 for 9 GHS industries in the 70s, 80s and 90s. The results show almost all 
the relative demand shifts in favour of graduates to have happened within, rather than 
between, industries. This is not at all surprising given the coarse industry definition 
forced upon us by the nature of the data. However, what we are more interested in here 
is whether rates of male and female skill upgrading are concentrated in the same 
industries or not. The correlation coefficients given in the final column of the Table 
strongly support that they are. This is drawn out more fully in Figure 5.1 which presents 
scatterplots of male and female within-industry components of skill upgrading. The 
Figure shows that there are some differences - most notably the big increases in graduate 
wage bill shares for women in public services - but mostly the patterns by gender are 
similar. This is true for all three time periods considered.
Turning next to more direct tests of whether there exists a gender bias in SBTC 
effects on skill upgrading we have assembled data for our GHS industries on the 
proportion of men and women in each industry who use computers at work. This data 
comes from the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) in the mid 1980s and is 
aggregated up to industry level from the individual level BSAS data. For the nine 
industries we look at there is a positive correlation of industry computer use by gender 
with the correlation coefficient of male and female computer usage being .57 (p-value = 
.10).
We look at the correlation between skill upgrading and industry computer usage 
in Table 5.17. The Table reports regressions of changes in the graduate wage bill share 
for three time periods (1974-80, 1980-90 and 1990-94) on computer usage, industry 
employment growth and period dummies to see if one can uncover any evidence of a 
complementarity between skill upgrading and computer usage (these kinds of 
regressions are reported for US industries in Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1997, and for UK
15 Recall from the discussion above that, for an elasticity of substitution near 
unity, the graduate wage bill share measures the relative demand shift between graduates 
and non-graduates.
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and US industries in Machin and Van Reenen, 1998). Irrespective of whether one 
conditions on industry employment growth the estimated coefficient on the computer 
usage variable is positive and significant in all the regressions. Industries with more 
workers using computers have experienced faster skill upgrading. More importantly for 
our focus the magnitude of the complementarity between skill upgrading and computer 
usage is rather similar for men and women, suggesting that SBTC effects associated 
with new computer technologies have had similar effects on male and female graduate 
wage bill shares. Interestingly, the coefficients on the year dummies (which can be 
thought of as measuring the rate of skill upgrading after netting out computer usage and, 
in the more detailed specifications, industry employment growth) are larger for women 
than for men, suggesting faster skill upgrading for women in the 80s and 90s.
5.8 Concluding Remarks
There have been important shifts in the distribution of educational qualifications 
in Britain since the 1970s. There are now many more individuals who possess some 
kind of formal educational qualification and there has been a large increase in the share 
of the population who have a degree. The observed changes that we have documented 
in this report point to sizable increases in the relative supply of more educated labour 
since the 70s. There is an important time dimension to this with the 70s seeing faster 
increases in relative supply than the 80s and 90s.
Patterns of change in education based wage differentials are, at first glance, in 
line with the observed supply shifts. Wage differentials for the more educated fell in the 
1970s, but then showed sharp rises in the 1980s and, in some cases, the 1990s. These 
overall labour market trends suggest that education based wage differentials are doing 
more than merely responding to shifts in relative supply. Indeed, the fact that the 1980s 
and 1990s saw simultaneously rising wages and employment for the more educated 
suggests that relative demand rose faster than relative supply as employers both 
demanded more educated workers and, at the same time, were prepared to pay them 
relatively higher wages.
Changes in relative wages by education show very clearly that changes in 
demand have dominated over changes in supply, particularly when one considers 
differences by gender. It is well known that the male/female wage differential has fallen
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in recent years, despite increases in female labour force participation (Harkness, 1996). 
In this chapter we shed more light on what may be behind this by showing that, while 
relative demand shifts in favour of the more highly educated have occurred for both 
sexes, they are more marked for women than for men (with the exception of recent 
labour market entrants where gender differences are less marked). In particular, there 
seem to have been very big demand shifts in favour of female graduates with degrees in 
science and engineering (and, to a lesser extent, in social studies and business).
Finally, when we investigate whether one can identify a gender bias associated 
with skill biased technological change we find little evidence of such an effect. Faster 
skill upgrading appears to have occurred in much the same industries for men and 
women and correlations of industrial skill upgrading with computer usage seem to be 
similar across the sexes. This probably suggests that the gender earnings gap has been 
closing as a result of reduced discrimination, which has enabled women to improve their 
labour market position in terms of both wages and employment, and has lead to faster 
relative demand shifts for women than for men. We have only scratched the surface on 
this important question and clearly the extent to which faster relative demand shifts do 
reflect reduced discrimination rather than a gender bias in SBTC is worthy of more 
investigation in future. So is the possible substitution of men and women across the 
skills hierarchy. The comparisons we draw here look at men and women separately. A 
potentially important aspect of recent changes in labour market structure may be the 
extent to which more skilled women are substituting for less skilled men (given that 
according to estimates of wage equations women are still, ceteris paribus, cheaper to 
employ than men within a given skill group).
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Table 5.1: Percent of Employed in Specific Education Groups
(General Household Survey)
1974-6 1979-81 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95 Percent Change [(1993/5 - 
1974-6) /1974-6] X 100
Men
Degree 5.77 8.16 11.39 12.48 15.31 165.34
(1351) (1799) (1872) (2051) (2109)
Higher 4.68 6.78 10.46 11.39 11.88 153.85
vocational (1096) (1494) (1591) (1872) (1636)
Teaching .97 .99 1.05 .95 .94 -3.09
(228) (219) (159) (156) (129)
Nursing .20 .30 .32 .24 .43 115.00
(48) (66) (49) (39) (59)
2+ A 2.36 3.34 3.24 3.79 4.10 73.73
Levels (553) (737) (493) (622) (565)
1 A Level .78 1.67 1.62 1.92 146.15
(182) (254) (266) (265)
Voc 4.44 5.95 8.07 8.87 9.92 123.42
Middle (1039) (1310) (1227) (1457) (1366)
Some 30.61 31.93 27.73 33.62 33.86 10.62
quals. (7170) (7035) (4218) (5524) (4663)
No quals 50.18 42.55 35.36 27.06 21.64 -56.88
(11753) (9375) (5379) (4446) (2981)
Sample 23420 22035 15213 16433 13773
Size
Women
Degree 2.21 3.57 6.20 7.53 10.12 357.92
(343) (566) (777) (1038) (1275)
Higher .73 1.34 2.01 2.91 3.82 423.29
vocational (113) (212) (252) (401) (481)
Teaching 3.14 3.25 3.85 3.15 2.60 -17.20
(487) (514) (482) (434) (328)
Nursing 2.63 3.52 4.58 4.73 5.15 95.82
(408) (557) (573) (652) (649)
2+ Alevels 2.06 3.51 3.44 4.09 4.50 118.45
(320) (555) (431) (564) (567)
1 Alevel .90 2.12 2.17 2.81 212.22
(140) (266) (299) (354)
Voc .40 .97 1.90 3.02 3.88 870
Middle (62) (154) (238) (416) (489)
Some 29.68 35.09 39.08 42.79 43.41 46.26
quals. (4609) (5557) (4894) (5900) (5468)
No quals. 58.25 48.76 36.81 29.61 23.69 -59.33
(9045) (7723) (4610) (4083) (2984)
Sample 15527 15838 12523 13787 12595
Size
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Table 5.2: Shifts in Relative Supply in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s
Changes in Relative Supply (100 ♦Log Annual Changes)
Comparison 1975-80 1980-90 1990-94 1975-94
Men
Degree/Non-Degree 7.462 4.726 5.934 5.700
Degree/A Levels 5.673 -.553 2.386 1.704
Degree/No Qualifications 10.249 8.771 10.691 9.564
A Levels/No Qualifications 4.576 9.324 8.305 7.860
High Vocational/A Levels 6.141 .392 -1.680 1.469
High Vocational/Middle Vocational 1.560 1.192 -1.757 .668
High Vocational/No Qualifications 10.717 9.716 6.625 9.329
Women
Degree/Non-Degree 9.902 7.870 8.113 8.456
Degree/A Levels 6.262 1.650 3.515 3.257
Degree/No Qualifications 13.177 12.438 12.980 12.747
A Levels/No Qualifications 6.915 10.788 9.465 9.490
High Vocational/ A Levels 8.829 1.959 2.922 3.970
High Vocational/Middle Vocational -5.612 -3.564 .506 -3.246
High Vocational/No Qualifications 15.744 12.747 12.387 13.460
Notes:
1. Calculated from Table I.
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Table 5.3: Weekly Wage Ratios by Educational Qualifications, Full Timers
1974-6 1979-81 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95
Men
Degree/Non-Degree 1.717 1.574 1.621 1.68 1.66
Degree/A Levels 1.521 1.448 1.449 1.424 1.312
Degree (no teachers) /As 1.552 1.47 1.478 1.474 1.335
Degree (teachers) /As 1.403 1.351 1.259 1.2 1.207
Degree/No Qualifications 1.85 1.678 1.784 1.94 1.973
A Levels/No Qualifications 1.216 1.159 1.231 1.362 1.504
High Vocational/A Levels 1.26 1.182 1.172 1.099 0.998
High Vocational/Middle Vocational 1.295 1.181 1.243 1.219 1.259
High Vocational/No Qualifications 1.532 1.366 1.442 1.497 1.5
Teachers (no degree) /  Alevels 1.13 1.174 1.121 1.105 1.063
Nurses /A Levels 0.825 0.995 0.961 0.911 0.823
Women
Degree/Non-Degree 1.87 1.716 1.646 1.72 1.701
Degree/A Levels 1.424 1.516 1.492 1.471 1.465
Degree (no teachers) /As 1.327 1.46 1.484 1.459 1.452
Degree (teachers) /As 1.536 1.564 1.513 1.49 1.493
Degree/No Qualifications 2.049 1.883 1.879 2.12 2.134
A Levels/No Qualifications 1.438 1.242 1.259 1.442 1.456
High Vocational/ A Levels 1.251 1.219 1.266 1.18 1.096
High Vocational/Middle Vocational 1.644 1.387 1.371 1.417 1.371
High Vocational/No Qualifications 1.799 1.515 1.594 1.701 1.596
Teachers (no degree) /A Levels 1.259 1.464 1.485 1.408 1.443
Nurses /A Levels 1.015 1.202 1.201 1.219 1.194
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Table 5.4:
GHS Wage Equations (Including age, age2, region, 
industry and teacher dummy), Full Timers
1974-6 1979-81 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95
Men
Degree/Non-Degree .416
(.012)
.359
(.024)
.386
(.012)
.416
(.012)
.435
(.014)
Degree/A Levels .179
(.026)
.142
(.019)
.188
(.021)
.229
(.021)
.204
(.024)
Degree/No Qualifications .551
(.012)
.496
(.011)
.575
(.012 )
.661
(.068)
.685
(.017)
A Levels/No Qualifications .231
(.015)
.224
(.014)
.309
(.017)
.399
(.019)
.452
(.023)
High Vocational/A Levels .077
(.023)
.055
(.019)
.077
(.020 )
.038
(.019)
-.029
(.025)
High Vocational/Middle Vocational .142
(.016)
.098
(.052)
.130
(.015)
.135
(.015)
.162
(.019)
High Vocational/No Qualifications .393
( 011)
.313
(.010)
.389
(.0 1 2 )
.422
(.013)
.418
(.016)
Women
Degree/Non-Degree .363
(.027)
.296
(.020)
.349
(.019)
.393
(.018)
.414
(.019)
Degree/A Levels .153
(.047)
.205
(.029)
.266
(.026)
.260
(.024)
.263
(.030)
Degree/No Qualifications .607
(.032)
.603
(.027)
.662
(.023)
.793
(.022)
.778
(.029)
A Levels/No Qualifications .331
(.024)
.301
(.020)
.363
(.023)
.479
(.022)
.453
(.029)
High Vocational/ A Levels .130
(.065)
.089
(.031)
.138
(.034)
.133
(.028)
.071
(.031)
High Vocational/Middle Vocational .402
(.074)
.176
(.039)
.154
(.049)
.218
(.033)
.214
(.038)
High Vocational/No Qualifications .575
(.044)
.468
(.030)
.534
(.032)
.622
(.027)
.556
(.031)
Notes:
1. Each cell contains a coefficient estimate from a dummy variable included in a semi-log earnings equation.
2. Standard errors in parentheses.
3. Sample sizes and R2's for each regression are given in Table A1 of the Appendix.
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Table 5.5: Shifts in Full Timers Relative Wages in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s 
________(from wage equations including age, age2, region, industry)_______
Changes in Relative Wage (100*Log Annual Changes)
Comparison 1975-80 1980-90 1990-94 1975-94
Men
Degree/Non-Degree, no selection -1.14 0.57 0.48 0.10
Degree/Non-Degree, with selection -1.12 0.61 0.72 0.18
Degree/A Levels, no selection -0.74 0.87 -0.63 0.13
Degree/A Levels, with selection -0.60 0.72 0.32 0.29
Degree/No Qualifications, no selection -1.1 1.65 0.60 0.71
Degree/No Qualifications, with selection -1.06 1.89 0.98 0.91
A Levels/No Qualifications, no selection -1.4 1.75 1.33 1.16
A Levels/No Qualifications, with selection -0.46 1.93 1.10 1.13
High Vocational/A Levels, no selection -0.44 -0.17 -1.68 -0.56
High Vocational/A Levels, with selection -0.20 -0.07 -0.95 -0.29
High Vocational/Middle Vocational, no selection -0.88 0.37 0.68 0.11
High Vocational/Middle Vocational, with selection -0.86 0.03 0.80 0.16
High Vocational/No Qualifications, no selection -1.60 1.09 -0.10 0.13
High Vocational/No Qualifications, with selection -1.58 1.25 0.23 0.29
Women
Degree/Non-Degree, no selection -1.34 0.97 0.53 0.27
Degree/Non-Degree, with selection -0.20 1.36 2.05 1.20
Degree/ A Levels, no selection 1.04 0.55 0.08 0.58
Degree/ A Levels, with selection 2.80 0.51 1.43 1.31
Degree/No Qualifications, no selection -0.08 1.9 -0.38 0.90
Degree/No Qualifications, with selection 0.64 2.33 2.10 1.84
A Levels/No Qualifications, no selection -0.6 1.78 -0.65 0.64
A Levels/No Qualifications, with selection -1.46 2.52 -0.90 0.75
High Vocational/ A Levels, no selection -0.82 0.44 -1.55 -0.31
High Vocational/ A Levels, with selection 0.56 0.19 0.13 0.27
High Vocational/Middle Vocational, no selection -4.52 0.42 -0.10 -0.99
High Vocational/Middle Vocational, with selection -7.64 0.22 1.38 -1.29
High Vocational/No Qualifications, no selection -2.14 1.36 -1.65 -0.10
High Vocational/No Qualifications, with selection 0.60 1.76 -0.10 -1.06
Notes:
1. Calculated from Table IV (no selection) and Table A6 in the Appendix (with selection).
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Table 5.6:
Implied Relative Demand Shifts (a -  I A)
1975-80 1980-90 1990-94 1975-94
Men
Degree/non degree, no selection 5.87 5.52 6.61 5.84
Degree/non degree, with selection 5.89 5.58 6.94 5.95
Degree/As, no selection 4.64 0.67 1.50 1.89
Degree/As, with selection 4.83 0.46 2.83 2.11
Degree/no qualifications, no selection 8.71 11.08 11.53 10.56
Degree/no qualifications, with selection 8.76 11.42 12.06 10.84
A level/no qualifications, no selection 2.62 11.77 10.17 9.48
A level/no qualifications, with selection 3.93 12.03 9.85 9.44
High vocational / A levels, no selection 5.53 0.24 -4.03 0.69
High vocational / A levels, with selection 5.86 0.29 -3.01 1.06
High Vocational / mid vocational, no selection 0.33 1.71 -0.81 0.82
High Vocational / mid vocational, with selection 0.36 1.23 -0.64 0.89
High vocational/no qualifications, no selection 8.48 11.24 6.49 9.51
High vocational/no qualifications, with selection 8.51 11.47 6.95 9.74
Women
Degree/non degree, no selection 8.03 9.23 8.86 8.83
Degree/non degree, with selection 9.62 9.77 10.98 10.14
Degree/As, no selection 7.72 2.42 3.63 4.07
Degree/As, with selection 10.18 2.36 5.52 5.09
Degree/no qualifications, no selection 13.07 15.10 12.45 14.01
Degree/no qualifications, with selection 14.07 15.70 15.92 15.32
A level/no qualifications, no selection 6.83 13.28 8.56 10.39
A level/no qualifications, with selection 4.87 14.32 8.21 10.54
High vocational / A levels, no selection 7.35 2.58 0.75 3.54
High vocational / A levels, with selection 9.61 2.23 3.10 4.35
High Vocational / mid vocational, no selection -11.94 -2.98 0.35 -4.63
High Vocational / mid vocational, with selection -16.31 -3.26 2.44 -5.05
High vocational/no qualifications, no selection 12.75 14.65 10.08 13.32
High vocational/no qualifications, with selection 16.58 15.21 12.25 11.98
Notes:
1. Calculated from the changes in relative supply and relative wages in Tables II and V using the formula given 
in equation (2) in the main text.
204
Table 5.7: Shifts in Relative Supply of Labour Market Entrants in the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s (Entrants defined as 3-10 years after leaving FT education)
Changes in Relative Supply (100*Log Annual Changes)
Comparison 1975-80 1980-90 1990-94 1975-94
Men
Degree/Non-Degree 6.018 2.042 10.384 4.845
Degree/A Levels 5.162 -1.204 3.651 1.493
Degree/No Qualifications 15.142 7.517 19.883 12.127
A Levels/No Qualifications 9.980 8.721 16.232 10.634
High Vocational/A Levels 7.514 -0.283 -5.191 0.736
High Vocational/Middle Vocational 3.784 2.566 -4.091 1.486
High Vocational/No Qualifications 17.494 8.438 11.041 11.369
Women
Degree/Non-Degree 6.778 3.930 8.614 5.665
Degree/A Levels 3.761 0.810 1.958 1.828
Degree/No Qualifications 15.394 9.745 16.521 12.658
A Levels/No Qualifications 11.632 8.935 14.563 10.830
High Vocational/ A Levels 5.113 0.631 -2.886 1.101
High Vocational/Middle Vocational 3.840 0.053 -1.118 0.803
High Vocational/No Qualifications 16.846 9.566 11.697 11.931
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Table 5.8:
GHS Wage Equations (Including age, age2, region, industry and teacher 
dummy), Full Time Labour Market Entrants
1974-6 1979-81 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95
Men
Degree/Non-Degree .182
(.021)
.151
(.018)
.163
(.02 1 )
.228
(.029)
.295
(.025)
Degree/A Levels .133
(.020)
.116
(.031)
.108
(.033)
.210
(.038)
.171
(.040)
Degree/No Qualifications .267
(.031)
.248
(.029)
.284
(.036)
.495
(.043)
.492
(.053)
A Levels/No Qualifications .080
(.026)
.078
(.026)
.156
(.036)
.195
(.041)
.277
(.053)
High Vocational/A Levels .060
(.031)
.101
(.027)
.062
(.032)
.054
(.034)
-.022
(.042)
High Vocational/Middle Vocational .049
(.026)
.045
(.021)
.063
(.025)
.027
(.030)
.123
(.040)
High Vocational/No Qualifications .143
(.025)
.163
(.021 )
2251
(.028)
.296
(.032)
.295
(.050)
Women
Degree/Non-Degree .248
(.034)
.251
(.024)
.241
(.024)
.296
(.025)
.301
(.026)
Degree/A Levels .055
(.055)
.257
(.036)
.155
(.035)
.221
(.038)
.250
(.040)
Degree/No Qualifications .483
(.052)
.523
(.039)
.530
(.046)
.650
(.056)
.607
(.082)
A Levels/No Qualifications .312
(.033)
.210
(.024)
.300
(.036)
.318
(.038)
.334
(.053)
High Vocational/ A Levels .011
(.069)
.079
(.037)
.068
(.044)
.075
(.039)
.007
(.036)
High Vocational/Middle Vocational .236
(.090)
.114
(.055)
.075
(.069)
.164
(.045)
.235
(.057)
High Vocational/No Qualifications .369
(.066)
.320
(.039)
.377
(.054)
.438
(.053)
.366
(.064)
Notes:
1. Each cell contains a coefficient estimate from a dummy variable included in a semi-log earnings equation.
2. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 5.9: Shifts in Full Time Labour Market Entrants Relative Wages in the 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s (from wage equations including age, age2, region,
industry)
Changes in Relative Wage (100*Log Annual Changes)
Comparison 1975-80 1980-90 1990-94 1975-94
Men
Degree/Non-Degree, no selection -0.62 0.77 1.68 0.59
Degree/Non-Degree, with selection -0.62 0.94 1.10 0.56
Degree/A Levels, no selection -0.34 0.94 -0.98 0.20
Degree/A Levels, with selection -0.64 1.20 -1.63 0.12
Degree/No Qualifications, no selection -0.32 2.47 -0.08 1.18
Degree/No Qualifications, with selection -0.32 3.32 -1.43 1.36
A Levels/No Qualifications, no selection -0.04 1.17 2.05 1.04
A Levels/No Qualifications, with selection 0.48 0.87 3.38 1.29
High Vocational/A Levels, no selection 0.82 -0.47 -1.90 -0.43
High Vocational/A Levels, with selection -0.24 0.46 -2.20 -0.28
High Vocational/Middle Vocational, no selection -0.08 -0.18 2.40 0.39
High Vocational/Middle Vocational, with selection 0.00 -0.16 2.25 0.39
High Vocational/No Qualifications, no selection 0.40 1.33 -0.03 0.80
High Vocational/No Qualifications, with selection 0.28 1.70 0.78 1.14
Women
Degree/Non-Degree, no selection 0.06 0.45 0.13 0.28
Degree/Non-Degree, with selection -1.40 0.52 -0.48 0.19
Degree/ A Levels, no selection 4.04 -0.36 0.73 0.03
Degree/ A Levels, with selection 3.98 -0.30 0.50 0.99
Degree/No Qualifications, no selection 0.80 1.27 -1.08 0.65
Degree/No Qualifications, with selection -1.14 1.91 -0.25 0.65
A Levels/No Qualifications, no selection -2.04 1.08 0.40 0.12
A Levels/No Qualifications, with selection -5.92 1.67 2.98 -0.05
High Vocational/ A Levels, no selection 0.14 -0.04 -1.70 -0.02
High Vocational/ A Levels, with selection 1.28 -0.10 -1.63 -0.06
High Vocational/Middle Vocational, no selection -2.44 0.50 1.78 -0.01
High Vocational/Middle Vocational, with selection -2.46 0.61 -1.25 -0.59
High Vocational/No Qualifications, no selection -0.98 1.18 -1.80 -0.02
High Vocational/No Qualifications, with selection 3.56 1.80 -2.10 1.44
Notes:
1. Calculated from Table VIII (no selection) and Table A8 in the Appendix (with selection).
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Table 5.10:
Implied Relative Demand Shifts (a = 1.4) - Labour Market Entrants
1975-80 1980
-90
1990
-94
1975
-94
Men
Degree/Non-Degree, no selection 5.150 3.120 12.736 5.671
Degree/Non-Degree, with selection 5.150 3.358 11.924 5.629
Degree/A Levels, no selection 4.686 0.112 2.279 1.773
Degree/A Levels, with selection 4.266 0.476 1.369 1.661
Degree/No Qualifications, no selection 14.610 10.975 19.771 13.779
Degree/No Qualifications, with selection 14.964 12.165 17.881 14.031
A Levels/No Qualifications, no selection 9.924 10.359 19.102 12.090
A Levels/No Qualifications, with selection 10.652 9.939 20.694 12.440
High Vocational/A Levels, no selection 8.662 -0.941 -7.851 0.134
High Vocational/A Levels, with selection 7.178 0.361 -8.271 0.344
High Vocational/Middle Vocational, no selection 3.672 2.314 -0.791 2.032
High Vocational/Middle Vocational, with selection 3.784 2.342 -0.941 2.032
High Vocational/No Qualifications, no selection 18.054 10.300 10.999 12.489
High Vocational/No Qualifications, with selection 17.886 10.818 12.133 12.965
Women
Degree/Non-Degree, no selection 6.862 5.134 8.796 6.056
Degree/Non-Degree, with selection 4.818 4.658 7.942 5.931
Degree/ A Levels, no selection 9.417 0.306 2.980 3.270
Degree/ A Levels, with selection 9.333 0.390 2.658 3.214
Degree/No Qualifications, no selection 17.054 11.523 15.009 13.568
Degree/No Qualifications, with selection 13.798 12.419 16.171 13.568
A Levels/No Qualifications, no selection 8.776 10.447 15.009 10.995
A Levels/No Qualifications, with selection 3.344 11.273 18.735 10.760
High Vocational/ A Levels, no selection 5.309 0.575 -5.266 1.073
High Vocational/ A Levels, with selection 6.905 0.491 -5.168 1.017
High Vocational/Middle Vocational, no selection 0.424 0.753 1.374 0.789
High Vocational/Middle Vocational, with selection 0.396 0.907 -2.868 -0.023
High Vocational/No Qualifications, no selection 15.474 11.218 9.177 11.903
High Vocational/No Qualifications, with selection 21.830 12.086 8.757 13.947
Notes:
1. Calculated from the changes in relative supply and relative wages in Tables VII and IX using the formula 
given in equation (2) in the main text.
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Table 5.11:
Percent of the Employed With Degrees by Degree Type
1980-82 1984-86 1989-91 1993-95
Men
Arts 14.74 12.79 12.74 11.54
(265) (233) (258) (237)
Science/ Engineering 40.60 41.55 45.38 47.27
(730) (757) (919) (971)
Social Science & 26.42 26.89 28.15 26.63
Business (475) (490) (570) (547)
Other 18.24 18.77 13.73 14.56
(328) (342) (278) (299)
Sample size 1798 1822 2025 2054
Women
Arts 38.24 34.75 30.49 24.80
(239) (266) (311) (310)
Science/ Engineering 14.56 15.69 19.12 24.08
(91) (120) (195) (301)
Social Science & 21.92 23.01 27.25 25.20
Business (137) (176) (278) (315)
Other 25.28 26.54 23.14 25.92
(158) (203) (236) (324)
Sample size 625 765 1020 1250
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Table 5.12:
Log Supply Changes (Relative to As) *100
1981-90 1990-94 1981-94
Men
Arts -2.547 -.434 -1.943
Science/ Engineering .023 3.065 .892
Social Science & Business -.456 .659 -.138
Other -3.933 3.509 -1.807
Women
Arts -1.514 -1.707 -1.569
Science/ Engineering 3.474 9.227 5.117
Social Science & Business 2.929 1.498 2.520
Other -.135 6.297 1.702
Notes:
1. Calculated from Table XI.
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Table 5.13:
Wage Equations With Degree Type Dummies Relative to A levels (Including 
age, age2, region, industry and teacher dummy), Full Timers
1980-82 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95
Men
Arts -.021 .043 .019 .049
(.032) (.035) (.036) (.045)
Science/ Engineering .120 .176 .243 .177
(.023) (.024) (.023) (.027)
Social Science & Business .166 .197 .248 .221
(.026) (.026) (.026) (.031)
Other .223 .252 .263 .165
(.031) (.031) (.035) (.040)
Women
Arts .109 .192 .193 .267
(.037) (.036) (.034) (.049)
Science/ Engineering .243 .314 .319 .366
(.048) (.043) (.034) (.042)
Social Science & Business .223 .220 .263 .203
(.041) (.037) (.030) (.039)
Other .278 .343 .234 .202
(.041) (.037) (.036) (.044)
Notes:
1. Each cell contains a coefficient estimate from a dummy variable included in a semi-log earnings equation. Sample 
size constraints mean only one regression containing four subject of degree dummy variables is estimated for each 
time period.
2. Standard errors in parentheses.
3. Sample sizes, R2's and an F-test testing the equality of the coefficients on subject of degree in each time period are 
given in Table A10 of the Appendix.
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Table 5.14:
Shifts in Full Timers Relative Wages by Degree Type (Relative to As) * 100
1981-90 1990-94 1981-94
Men, no Selection
Arts 0.444 0.750 0.500
Science/ Engineering 1.366 -1.650 0.407
Social Science & Business 0.911 -0.675 0.393
Other -0.833 -2.450 -0.414
Men, with Selection
Arts 0.044 2.350 0.738
Science/Engineering 1.422 -0.200 0.846
Social Science & Business 0.678 0.100 0.500
Other 0.056 -1.100 -0.300
Women, no Selection
Arts 0.933 1.850 1.129
Science/ Engineering 0.844 1.175 0.879
Social Science & Business 0.444 -1.500 -0.143
Other -0.377 -0.800 -0.543
Women, with Selection
Arts 0.089 2.300 0.769
Science/Engineering 0.278 2.825 1.062
Social Science & Business 0.400 -0.725 0.538
Other -0.667 -0.650 -0.662
Notes:
1. Calculated from Table XIII and Appendix Table A11.
212
Table 5.15:
Implied Relative Demand Shifts (Relative to As) a = 1.4
1981-90 1990-94 1981-94
Men, no selection
Arts -1.925 0.616 -1.243
Science/ Engineering 1.935 0.755 1.462
Social Science & Business 0.819 -0.286 0.412
Other -5.099 0.079 -2.387
Men, with selection
Arts -2.485 2.8560 -0.910
Science/ Engineering 2.014 2.785 2.706
Social Science & Business 0.493 0.799 0.562
Other -3.855 1.969 -2.227
Women, no selection
Arts -0.208 0.883 0.012
Science/ Engineering 4.656 10.872 6.348
Social Science & Business 3.551 -0.602 2.320
Other -0.663 5.177 0.942
Women, with selection
Arts -1.389 1.513 -0.492
Science/ Engineering 3.863 13.182 6.604
Social Science & Business 3.489 0.483 3.273
Other -1.069 5.387 0.775
Notes:
1. Calculated from the changes in relative supply and relative wages in Tables XII and XIV using the formula given 
in equation (2) in the main text.
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Table 5.16:
Within/Between Industry Decompositions of Gender-Specific Changes in the
Graduate Wage Bill Share
Men Women
Annualised 
Change in 
Graduate Wage 
Bill Share 
(Percentage 
Points)
Percent
Within
Annualised 
Change in 
Graduate Wage 
Bill Share 
(Percentage 
Points)
Percent
Within
Male/Female Correlations o f  
Within-Industry Component 
(Pearson correlation 
coefficient and p-value in 
parentheses)
1974-80 0.48 108 0.34 103 .94 (.00)
1980-90 0.76 93 0.69 110 .73 (.03)
1990-94 0.87 94 0.79 96 .88  (.0 0 )
Notes:
1. Based on decomposition formula reported in equation (3) of main text.
2. Decomposition breaks down aggregate changes into components related to 9 GHS industries overtime (industries 
are agriculture, energy & water, mining, engineering, other manufacturing, construction, distribution & hotels, 
transport & communication, banking & insurance, and other services).
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Table 5.17:
Regressions of Gender-Specific Industry Skill Upgrading on Computer Usage
Men Women
Computer Usage .013 (.007) .014 (008) .010 (.005) .0 1 0  (.006)
Change in 
Log(Employment)
.048 (.012) -.000 (.014)
1980-90 .003 (.002) .003 (.002) .004 (.001) .004 (.001)
1990-94 .0 0 2  (.0 0 2 ) .0 0 2  (.0 0 2 ) .004 (.001) .004 (.001)
N 27 27 27 27
Notes:
1. The dependent variable is the annualised change in the graduate wage bill share (from the GHS) in 9 industries for 
three time periods (1974-80, 1980-90, 1990-94).
2. The computer data comes from the British Social Attitudes Survey and the is the fraction of men or women within 
the industry who use computers at work.
3. Estimation is by GLS/random effects where the industry errors are allowed to be correlated for industries over 
time.
4. Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses.
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APPENDIX 5
Table A5.1:
R2‘s and Sample Sizes (in Parentheses) for GHS Wage Equations (Table 5.4)
1974-6 1979-81 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95
Men
Degree/Non-Degree .319
(19461)
.350
(17662)
.398
(11482)
.386
(12038)
.330
(9352)
Degree/A Levels .470
(1674)
.152
(2015)
.441
(2008)
.397
(2257)
.350
(2054)
Degree/No Qualifications .333
(10829)
.387
(8825)
.446
(5346)
.473
(4663)
.470
(3365)
A Levels/No Qualifications .232
(10387)
.256
(8026)
.286
(4498)
.317
(3752)
.310
(2461)
High Vocational/A Levels .429
(1561)
.384
(1850)
.350
(1862)
.340
(2139)
.272
(1763)
High Vocational/Middle Vocational .346
(1859)
.295
(2348)
.343
(2245)
.313
(2579)
.272
(2171)
High Vocational/No Qualifications .279
(10716)
.292
(8660)
.341
(5200)
.359
(4545)
.324
(3074)
Women
Degree/Non-Degree .269
(7756)
.284
(7780)
.320
(6021)
.346
(6656)
.292
(5436)
Degree/A Levels .401
(541)
.486
(715)
.374
(958)
.461
(1187)
.327
(1163)
Degree/No Qualifications .272
(4177)
.328
(3332)
.425
(2138)
.551
(2076)
.451
(1619)
A Levels/No Qualifications .183
(4250)
.164
(3327)
.210
(2080)
.315
(1925)
.275
(1402)
High Vocational/ A Levels .340
(374)
.366
(488)
.294
(620)
.400
(770)
.325
(751)
High Vocational/Middle Vocational .515
(109)
.496
(240)
.423
(330)
.436
(545)
.353
(537)
High Vocational/No Qualifications .171
(4010)
.177
(3105)
.247
(1800)
.334
(1659)
.288
(1207)
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Table A5.2:
GHS Wage Equations With Health Limits Activity Dummy Variable, Full
Timers
Coefficient (Standard Error) On Education 
Dummy Variable
Coefficient (Standard Error), on Health 
Limits Activity Dummy Variable
1979-81 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95 1979-81 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95
Men
Degree/Non-Degree .357
(.010)
.385
(.012)
.415
(.012)
.431
(.014)
-.079
(.008)
-.057
(.012)
-.097
(.012)
-.092
(.015)
Degree/A Levels .142
(.019)
.188
(.021)
.230
(.021)
.201
(.024)
.001
(.027)
.015
(.030)
-.087
(.029)
-.097
(.037)
Degree/No Qualifications .494
(.011)
.574
(.012)
.658
(.014)
.681
(.017)
-.069
(.010 )
-.041
(.015)
-.113
(.017)
-.098
(.023)
A Levels/No Qualifications .223
(.014)
.308
(.017)
.396
(.019)
.451
(.023)
-.071
(.010 )
-.043
(.016)
-.102
(.019)
-.135
(.026)
High Vocational/A Levels .055
(.019)
.077
(.020)
.038
(.019)
-.029
(.025)
-.030
(.029)
-.048
(.032)
-.095
(.029)
-.062
(.036)
High Vocational/Middle 
Vocational
.096
(.013)
.130
(.015)
.132
(.015)
.162
(.019)
-.079
(.021 )
-.053
(.026)
-.115
(.024)
-.044
(.029)
High Vocational/No 
Qualifications
.310
(.010)
.387
( 012)
.419
(.013)
.416
(.016)
-.074
(.010)
-.053
(.014)
-.115
(.017)
-.091
(.022)
Women
Degree/Non-Degree .295
(.020)
.349
(.019)
.393
(.018)
.413
(.019)
-.045
(.012)
.002
(.017)
-.045
(.016)
-.031
(.018)
Degree/A Levels .205
(.029)
.267
(.026)
.259
(.024)
.262
(.030)
-.048
(.042)
.063
(.043)
-.028
(.032)
-.027
(.048)
Degree/No Qualifications .601
(.027)
.663
(.023)
.792
(.021)
.777
(.029)
-.046
(.017)
.038
(.024)
-.067
(.023)
-.027
(.035)
A Levels/No Qualifications .301
(.020)
.365
(.023)
.480
(.022)
.454
(.029)
-.036
(.017)
.047
(.025)
-.070
(.024)
.014
(.033)
High Vocational/ A Levels .089
(.031)
.137
(.034)
.131
(.028)
.072
(.031)
.019
(.047)
.026
(.051)
-.045
(.041)
.067
(.050)
High Vocational/Middle 
Vocational
.178
(.039)
.152
(.049)
.217
(.033)
.216
(.038)
-.051
(.060)
.034
(.074)
-.015
(.052)
.072
(.057)
High Vocational/No 
Qualifications
.468
(.030)
.534
(.032)
.621
(.027)
.556
(.031)
-.039
(.017)
.034
(.026)
-.088
(.026)
.013
(.034)
Notes:
1. Each cell contains a coefficient estimate from a dummy variable included in a semi-log earnings equation.
2. Standard errors in parentheses.
3. Each regression includes the same independent variables as in the specifications of Table 5.4.
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Table A5.3: GHS Wage Equations With Nonwhite Dummy Variable, Full
Timers
Coefficient (Standard Error) On Education Dummy 
Variable
Coefficient (Standard Error) on Nonwhite Dummy 
Variable
1974-6 1979-81 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95 1974-6 1979-81 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95
Men
Degree .416 .358 .387 .418 .441 -.127 -.114 -.148 -.164 -.183
/Non-Degree (.012) (.010) (.012) (.012) (.014) (.016) (014) (.022) (.023) (.025)
Degree .175 .140 .194 .231 .205 -.173 -.114 -.131 -.112 -.141
/A Levels (.026) (.020) (.021) (021) (024) (.063) (.045) (.050) (.050) (.041)
Degree .552 .494 .575 .662 .685 -.100 -.097 -.111 -.148 -.141
/No Qualifications (.013) (.011) (.013) (014) (017) (.020) (017) (.027) (.032) (.031)
A Levels .230 .222 .304 .398 .451 -.102 -.091 -.120 -.129 -.207
/No Qualifications (.015) (.015) (.017) (.019) (023) (.020) (.018) (.029) (.035) (.039)
High Vocational .073 .055 .079 .038 -.039 -.203 -.122 -.157 -.123 -.168
/A Levels (.023) (.019) (.020) (.020) (.025) (.064) (048) (.056) (050) (.055)
High Vocational .147 .099 .132 .133 .164 -.207 -.091 -.144 -.154 -.136
/Middle Vocational (.016) (.013) (.015) (.015) (019) (.060) (043) (.049) (.047) (.057)
High Vocational .394 .309 .388 .418 .413 -.105 -.097 -.119 -.160 -.184
/No Qualifications (.012) (010) (012) (-013) (016) (-019) (.017) (.028) (.032) (.036)
Women
Degree .360 .296 .348 .386 .414 -.025 -.028 -.105 -.010 -.041
/Non-Degree (.027) (.020) (.019) (.018) (019) (.024) (.020) (.028) (.026) (.025)
Degree .150 .207 .271 .250 .261 -.064 .098 -.082 .014 -.085
/A Levels (.048) (.030) (.027) (.024) (.030) (.126) (072) (.069) (.051) (.057)
Degree .601 .601 .662 .784 .777 -.021 -.045 -.133 -.097 -.088
/No Qualifications (.032) (.027) (.023) (.022) (.029) (.029) (.028) (.039) (.039) (.047)
A Levels .331 .299 .363 .477 .457 -.017 -.054 -.099 -.094 -.153
/No Qualifications (.024) (.020) (.023) (.023) (.028) (.030) (.028) (.042) (.041) (.045)
High Vocational .136 .088 .133 .122 .071 -.052 .051 .139 -.006 -.146
/  A Levels (.067) (.031) (.034) (.029) (031) (.167) (.078) (.128) (.066) (.059)
High Vocational .412 .170 .148 .206 .213 -.061 -.183 .102 -.072 -.036
/Middle Vocational (.075) (.039) (.049) (.033) (.038) (.349) (.111) (.124) (.081) (.066)
High Vocational .584 .464 .525 .609 .558 -.014 -.050 -.113 -.124 -.130
/No Qualifications (.046) (.030) (032) (.027) (.031) (.030) (.029) (.044) (.045) (.048)
Notes:
1. Each cell contains a coefficient estimate from a dummy variable included in a semi-log earnings equation.
2. Standard errors in parentheses.
3. Each regression includes the same independent variables as in the specifications of Table 5.4.
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Table A5.4: GHS Wage Equations - Controlling for Occupation
1974-6 1979-81 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95
Men
Degree/Non-Degree .226
( 012)
.202
(O il)
.217
(.012 )
.221
(014)
.263
(014)
Degree/A Levels .111
(.026)
.084
( 021)
.106
( 021)
.130
(.023)
.104
(.024)
Degree/No Qualifications .335
(.015)
.328
(014)
.357
(.016)
.372
(.023)
.434
(024)
A Levels/No Qualifications .120
(.015)
.152
(.015)
.182
(.018)
.203
(.022)
.283
(.025)
High Vocational/A Levels .056
(.023)
.039
(019)
.076
(.020)
.064
(.021)
-.020
(.023)
High Vocational/Middle Vocational .093
(.017)
.062
(.013)
.089
(.015)
.078
(.016)
.117
(.018)
High Vocational/No Qualifications .251
(.012)
.213
( 011)
.248
(.013)
.269
(.015)
.274
(.017)
Women
Degree/Non-Degree .265
(.026)
.221
(.080)
.268
(.019)
.253
(.020)
.288
(019)
Degree/A Levels .059
(.047)
.088
(031)
.215
(.027)
.174
(.025)
.183
(.031)
Degree/No Qualifications .464
(.033)
.495
(.029)
.547
(.026)
.608
(.027)
.614
(.033)
A Levels/No Qualifications .279
(.023)
.259
(.020)
.297
(.024)
.372
(024)
.359
(.030)
High Vocational/ A Levels .086
(.062)
.066
(.030)
.110
(.033)
.148
(.028)
.052
(.030)
High Vocational/Middle Vocational .306
(071)
.140
(.038)
.064
(.048)
.190
(034)
.159
(.037)
High Vocational/No Qualifications .486
(043)
.413
(.030)
.438
(.032)
.513
(.030)
.438
(.033)
Notes:
1. Each cell contains a coefficient estimate from a dummy variable included in a semi-log earnings equation.
2. Standard errors in parentheses.
3. Each regression includes the same independent variables as in the specifications of Table 5.4.
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Table A5,5: P-Values Testing Differences in Male /Female Education Based
Earnings Differentials
1974-6 1979-81 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95
Degree/Non-Degree .067 .006 .108 .290 .393
Degree/A Levels .627 .091 .025 .356 .127
Degree/No Qualifications .092 .000 .001 .000 .005
A Levels/No Qualifications .000 .002 .054 .007 .959
High Vocational/A Levels .396 .404 .129 .008 .016
High Vocational/Middle Vocational .000 .093 .601 .026 .227
High Vocational/No Qualifications .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Notes:
1. Based on the Table 5.4 specifications.
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Table A5.6:
GHS Wage Equations and Mills Ratios 
with Sample Selection Correction, Full Timers
Coefficient (Standard Error) On Education Dummy 
Variable
Coefficient (Standard Error) On Inverse Mills Ratio
1974-6 1979-81 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95 1974-6 1979-81 1974-6 1989-91 1993-95
Men
Degree/Non-Degree .415
(.012)
.359
(.010)
.389
(.012)
.420
(.014)
.449
(.015)
-.092
(.015)
-.004
(.015)
.056
(014)
.111
(014)
.114
(.021)
Degree/A Levels .174
(.026)
.144
(.020)
.193
(.021)
.216
(.021)
.229
(.026)
-.200
(.052)
.083
(.044)
.038
(.044)
.263
(.042)
.269
(.060)
Degree/No
Qualifications
.548
(.013)
.495
(.011)
.561
(.014)
.684
(.016)
.723
(.019)
-.097
(017)
-.016
(017)
-.005
(019)
.092
(.020)
.127
(.030)
A Levels/No 
Qualifications
.247
(.015)
.224
(.015)
.296
(.019)
.417
(.019)
.461
(.024)
-.081
(017)
-.065
(.018)
-.035
(019)
.050
(.023)
.075
(.030)
High Vocational/A 
Levels
.053
(.025)
.043
(.021)
.089
(.020)
.036
(.020)
-.002
(.025)
-.159
(.056)
-.069
(.050)
.131
(041)
.246
(.046)
.133
(.055)
High Vocational/Middle 
Vocational
.140
(.016)
.096
(.025)
.132
(.015)
.138
(.015)
.170
(.018)
-.142
(.052)
-.025
(.050)
.115
(.038)
.126
(.036)
.060
(041)
High Vocational/No 
Qualifications
.385
(.012)
.306
(.010)
.384
(.013)
.431
(013)
.440
(.016)
-.086
(016)
-.052
(.018)
-.013
(-017)
.047
(.021)
.040
(.027)
Women
Degree/Non-Degree .253
(.038)
.263
(.027)
.367
(.020)
.399
(.020)
.481
(.026)
-.337
(.058)
-.298
(073)
.032
(.023)
.084
(.029)
.180
(.058)
Degree/A Levels .062
(.064)
.202
(.030)
.264
(.026)
.253
(.025)
.310
(.034)
-.238
(.106)
-.043
(.073)
-.029
(045)
.200
(.051)
.209
(.101)
Degree/No
Qualifications
.542
(.051)
.574
(.042)
.695
(.027)
.807
(.025)
.891
(.046)
-.119
(.072)
.081
(091)
.065
(.027)
.065
(.028)
.202
(.067)
A Levels/No 
Qualifications
.352
(.029)
.279
(.040)
.396
(.028)
.531
(.027)
.495
(.046)
-.147
(.080)
-.070
(.099)
.062
(.030)
.107
(.036)
.125
(.076)
High Vocational/ A 
Levels
.050
(.083)
.078
(.037)
.144
(.034)
.097
(.072)
.102
(036)
-.313
(.154)
-.047
(.094)
.049
(.058)
.186
(072)
.161
(.146)
High Vocational/Middle 
Vocational
.561
(055)
.179
(.037)
.157
(.049)
.201
(.033)
.256
(047)
.096
(.080)
-.005
(.106)
.022
(.094)
-.045
(.067)
.154
(.187)
High Vocational/No 
Qualifications
.417
(.068)
.447
(.067)
.204
(.047)
.623
(031)
.619
(.049)
-.032
(.110)
-.028
(H O )
.094
(.033)
.042
(.032)
.135
(071)
Notes:
1. Each cell contains a coefficient estimate from a dummy variable included in a semi-log earnings equation with 
controls for selection. Non labour income and other member of household working were used as instruments in the 
selection equation for full-time employment (reported in Table A5.7).
2. Standard errors in parentheses.
3. Each regression includes the same independent variables as in the specifications of Table 5.4.
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Table A5.7:
Probit Model - Coefficients on Non Labour Income and Other Person Working
Coefficient (Standard Error) On Non-Labour Income 
(*100)
Coefficient (Standard Error) On Dummy Variable Indicat 
Other Person Working in Household
1974-6 1979-81 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95 1974-6 1979-81 1974-6 1989-91 1993
Men
Degree/Non-Degree -.303
(.006)
-.222
(.005)
-.236
(.007)
-.140
(.004)
-.151
(.005)
.618
(.022)
.612
(021)
.887
(.031)
.621
(.028)
.674
(.027
Degree/A Levels -.231
(.014)
-.191
(.013)
-.205
(.013)
-.115
(.008)
-.103
(.008)
.539
(.069)
.571
(.064)
.661
(.080)
.426
(.070)
.457
(.062
Degree/No Qualifications -.033
(.009)
-.270
(.008)
-.271
(.010)
-.191
(.008)
-.015
(.008)
.662
(.029)
.720
(.030)
.977
(.042)
.783
(.044)
.700
(.043
A Levels/No 
Qualifications
-.337
(.009)
-.272
(.009)
-.251
(011)
-.167
(.009)
-.017
(.010)
.723
(.030)
.774
(031)
.992
(045)
.822
(.048)
.783
(.045
High Vocational/A Levels -.236
(.019)
-.213
(.016)
-.227
(-017)
-.115
(.010)
-.129
(.010)
.774
(031)
.632
(.073)
.776
(.042)
.492
(.076)
.431
(.067
High Vocational/Middle 
Vocational
-.293
(.023)
-.226
(.017)
-.308
(.018)
-.186
(012)
-.174
(011)
.491
(.083)
.433
(071)
.930
(.088)
.600
(.073)
.559
(.063
High Vocational/No 
Qualifications
-.347
(.009)
-.285
(.009)
-.289
(011)
-.218
(.010)
-.206
(.010)
.698
(.030)
.750
(.030)
1.033
(.044)
.871
(.047)
.767
(.046
Women
Degree/Non-Degree -.064
(.020)
-.043
(.005)
-.065
(.006)
-.046
(.005)
-.034
(.004)
-.111
(.026)
.019
(.025)
.154
(.035)
-.036
(035)
.034
(.032
Degree/A Levels -.154
(.020)
-.104
(.017)
-.121
(018)
-.077
(012)
-.049
(.009)
.123
(.027)
-.008
(.097)
.308
(109)
.769
(.099)
-.032
(.082
Degree/No Qualifications -.064
(008)
-.044
(.007)
-.086
(011)
-.090
(010)
-.068
(.008)
-.036
(.034)
.062
(.034)
.276
(053)
.141
(.060)
.246
(,05f
A Levels/No 
Qualifications
-.059
(.008)
-.039
(.007)
-.072
(011)
-.070
(.010)
-.055
(.009)
-.254
(.033)
.092
(034)
.269
(053)
.109
(.061)
.209
(.061
High Vocational/ A 
Levels
-.125
(.022)
-.102
(.020)
-.109
(.022)
-.066
(016)
-.032
(011)
.048
(.125)
.125
(.113)
.244
(.137)
.128
(.122)
-.112
(.10C
High Vocational/Middle 
Vocational
-.054
(.008)
-.065
(.033)
-.106
(.036)
-.129
(025)
-.040
(016)
-.051
(.034)
-.437
(213)
-.233
(-227)
.259
(.171)
.066
(.122
High Vocational/No 
Qualifications
-.141
(.053)
-.036
(.007)
-.071
(.012)
-.086
(012)
-.066
(O il)
-.676
(294)
.070
(034)
.247
(.056)
.152
(.065)
.257
(,06f
Notes:
1. Probit coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).
2. Each regression includes the same independent variables as in the wage equation specifications of Table 5.4.
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Table A5.8:
GHS Wage Equations and Mills Ratios 
with Sample Selection Correction, Full Time Labour Market Entrants
Coefficient (Standard Error) On Education Dummy 
Variable
Coefficient (Standard Error) On Inverse Mills Ratio
1974-6 1979-81 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95 1974-6 1979-81 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95
Men
Degree/Non-Degree .180
(.023)
.149
(.018)
.160
(.021)
.243
(.024)
.287
(.028)
-.321
(.058)
-.126
(.052)
-.055
(.038)
.180
(.064)
-.053
(.079)
Degree/A Levels .144
(.042)
.112
(.033)
.106
(.033)
.232
(.042)
.167
(.042)
-.299
(.124)
-.209
(.109)
-.020
(.073)
.358
(.122)
-.050
(.168)
Degree/No
Qualifications
.242
(.034)
.226
(.033)
.261
(.040)
.558
(.052)
.501
(.063)
-.236
(.074)
-.229
(.073)
-.065
(.055)
.164
(.075)
.032
(.117)
A Levels/No 
Qualifications
.060
(.030)
.084
(.029)
.153
(.040)
.171
(.052)
.306
(.066)
-.273
(.086)
-.216
(.082)
-.012
(.079)
-.074
(106)
.179
(.232)
High Vocational/A 
Levels
.029
(.038)
.017
(.035)
.066
(.035)
.063
(.035)
-.025
(.043)
-.335
(.144)
-.231
(.101)
.242
(.097)
.093
(.125)
-.058
(.275)
High Vocational/Middle 
Vocational
.047
(.026)
.047
(.022)
.062
(.025)
.031
(.030)
.121
(.040)
.038
(.115)
.040
(.104)
-.034
(.084)
.047
(.099)
.121
(.040)
High Vocational/No 
Qualifications
.097
(.032)
.111
(.029)
.207
(.040)
.281
(.077)
.314
(.063)
-.238
(.080)
-.213
(.074)
-.044
(.072)
-.039
(.077)
.073
(152)
Women
Degree/Non-Degree .323
(.068)
.253
(.025)
.224
(.029)
.305
(.030)
.286
(.032)
.199
(.152)
.032
(.150)
-.111
(.094)
.041
(.074)
-.981
(119)
Degree/A Levels .068
(.063)
.267
(.040)
.160
(.035)
.237
(.045)
.257
(.042)
.041
(.100)
-.099
(.129)
.087
(.098)
.387
(.118)
.199
(.127)
Degree/No
Qualifications
.564
(.105)
.507
(.093)
.476
(.095)
.698
(.070)
.688
(.123)
.102
(.115)
-.034
(.182)
-.088
(.137)
.078
(.071)
.117
(.132)
A Levels/No 
Qualifications
.348
(.068)
.052
(.138)
.307
(.053)
.219
(.070)
.338
(.107)
.053
(.118)
-.341
(•286)
.010
(.063)
-.171
(.181)
-.050
(.192)
High Vocational/ A 
Levels
.017
(.068)
.081
(.044)
.046
(.067)
.071
(.040)
.006
(.035)
.100
(.126)
.015
(.144)
-.150
(.338)
.171
(.172)
-.002
(.213)
High Vocational/Middle 
Vocational
.235
(.074)
.112
(.084)
.054
(.079)
.173
(.045)
.123
(.232)
-.008
(.166)
.389
(.268)
-.160
(.323)
-.086
(.123)
-.578
(1.111)
High Vocational/No 
Qualifications
.068
(.063)
.246
(102)
.385
(.058)
.426
(.067)
.342
(.147)
.041
(.100)
-.102
(.129)
.009
(.031)
-.023
(.088)
-.050
(.221)
Notes:
1. Each cell contains a coefficient estimate from a dummy variable included in a semi-log earnings equation with 
controls for selection. Non labour income and other member of household working were used as instruments in the 
selection equation for full-time employment (reported in Table A5.9).
2. Standard errors in parentheses.
3. Each regression includes the same independent variables as in the specifications of Table 5.8.
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Table A5.9: Probit Model, Coefficients on Non Labour Income and Other 
Person Working: Labour Market Entrants
Coefficient (Standard Error) On Non-Labour Income 
(*100)
Coefficient (Standard Error) On Dummy Variable 
Indicating Other Person Working in Household
1974-6 1979-81 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95 1974-6 1979-81 1974-6 1989-91 1993-95
Men
Degree/
Non-Degree
-.154
(.013)
-.101
(.010)
-.087
(011)
-.037
(.007)
-.048
(.009)
.285
(.057)
.295
(.049)
.562
(.066)
.338
(.062)
.384
(.060)
Degree/A Levels -.150
(.026)
-.103
(.022)
-.174
(.025)
-.064
(.015)
-.056
(.014)
.132
(.145)
.338
(.118)
.519
(.142)
.256
(.131)
.145
(.117)
Degree/No Qualifications -.163
(.018)
-.138
(.019)
-.089
(.017)
-.092
(.018)
-.070
(.017)
.353
(.085)
.462
(.086)
.626
(.113)
.378
(.119)
.531
(.123)
A Levels/No 
Qualifications
-.151
(.021)
-.107
(.018)
-.056
(.020)
-.043
(.016)
-.034
(.020)
.391
(.087)
.475
(.087)
.611
(.125)
.597
(.135)
.344
(.140)
High Vocational/A 
Levels
-.175
(.043)
-.092
(.024)
-.016
(.032)
-.051
(.017)
-.032
(.018)
.165
(.180)
.294
(.124)
.319
(.174)
.389
(.157)
.097
(.137)
High/Middle Vocational -.233
(.049)
-.127
(.028)
-.184
(.034)
-.090
(.024)
-.052
(.020)
.099
(.187)
.142
(.127)
.376
(.181)
.323
(.149)
.316
(.131)
High Vocational/ 
No Qualifications
-.168
(.023)
-.144
(.021)
-.063
(.020)
-.074
(.021)
-.042
(.023)
.392
(.091)
.456
(.091)
.518
(.125)
.529
(.132)
.527
(.147)
Women
Degree/Non-Degree -.001
(.010)
.016
(.010)
.005
(.010)
-.020
(.008)
-.001
(.007)
-.156
(.041)
.015
(.039)
.259
(054)
.345
(.062)
.285
(.057)
Degree/A Levels -.131
(.034)
-.073
(.025)
-.061
(.029)
-.062
(.021)
-.063
(.016)
-.342
(.144)
.190
(.115)
.219
(.136)
.403
(.150)
.431
(.116)
Degree/No Qualifications .054
(.021)
.507
(.093)
-.016
(.017)
-.093
(.025)
-.061
(.019)
-301
(.064)
-.034
(.182)
.332
(.113)
.622
(.153)
.559
(.132)
A Levels/No 
Qualifications
.047
(.020)
.033
(.020)
.044
(.031)
-.012
(.016)
-.023
(.025)
-.267
(.062)
.027
(.071)
.468
(.121)
.254
(.160)
.362
(151)
High Vocational/ A 
Levels
-.115
(.042)
-.072
(.137)
-.003
(.041)
-.045
(.028)
-.031
(.020)
-.312
(.171)
.214
(.037)
.126
(.179)
.238
(.186)
.202
(.143)
High /Middle Vocational -.159
(.098)
-.039
(.063)
-.019
(.061)
-.092
(.044)
-.002
(.023)
.117
(.353)
-.485
(.262)
-.349
(.264)
.723
(.232)
.112
(161)
High Vocational/No 
Qualifications
.086
(.022)
.067
(.023)
-.140
(.040)
-.059
(.042)
-.020
(.027)
-.282
(.065)
-.068
(.078)
.377
(.144)
.770
(196)
.385
(.176)
Notes:
1. Probit coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).
2. Each regression includes the same independent variables as in the wage equation specifications of Table 5.8.
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Table A5.10:
R 2‘s, Sample Sizes and F-tests of Equality of Coefficient on Subject of Degree 
Dummies for Wage Equations with Subject Degree Dummies (in Table 5.13)
1980-82 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95
Men 49.2 (1951),
F (3 ,1928) = 17.36
(p=.0 0 )
44.8 (2008),
F (3 ,1985) = 9.93
(p = .0 0 )
40.9 (2257),
F (3 ,2234) = 16.49
(p = .0 0 )
34.9 (2054) 
F(3,2031) = 4.58
(p = .0 0 )
Women 46.9 (742),
F(3, 720) = 6.24,
(p = .0 0 )
38.4 (958),
F (3 ,935) = 5.62
(p = .0 0 )
46.5(1187),
F (3 ,1164) = 3.40
(p = .0 2 )
33.4(1163),
F(3, 1140) = 5.00
(p = .0 0 )
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Table A5.ll: Wage Equations With Degree Type Dummies Relative to A levels 
__________ after Controlling for Selection, Full Timers _________
1980-82 1984-6 1989-91 1993-95
Men
Arts -.033 .018 -.029 .065
(.032) (.034) (.035) (.046)
Science/ Engineering .105 .176 .223 .215
(.025) (.024) (.024) (.029)
Social Science & Business .165 .199 .226 .230
(.027) (.024) (.026) (.033)
Other .229 .244 .234 .190
(.031) (.031) (.034) (.043)
Mills Ratio -.140 .084 .261 .269
(.049) (.040) (.041) (.060)
Probit Model Coefficients (Standard Errors) on:
Non Labour Income* 100 -.190 -.211 -.119 -.103
(.013) (.013) (.008) (.008)
Other Worker .413 .675 .450 .465
(.077) (.080) (.070) (.062)
Women
Arts .190 .211 .198 .290
(.039) (.033) (.032) (.049)
Science/ Engineering .295 .324 .320 .433
(.051) (.043) (.037) (.047)
Social Science & Business .267 .224 .303 .274
(.045) (.037) (.034) (.046)
Other .329 .354 .269 .243
(.045) (.037) (.037) (.049)
Mills Ratio -.033 -.018 .186 .186
(.077) (.044) (.044) (.097)
Probit Model Coefficients (Standard Errors) on:
Non Labour Income -.082 -.121 -.082 -.051
(.015) (.018) (.012) (.009)
Other Worker -.192 .329 .101 -.024
(.078) (.109) (.099) (.082)
Notes:
1. Each cell contains a coefficient estimate from a dummy variable included in a semi-log earnings equation with 
controls for selection. Non labour income and other member of household working were used as instruments in the 
selection equation for full-time employment (probit coefficients and standard errors are given in the Table).
2. Standard errors in parentheses.
3. Each regression includes the same independent variables as in the specifications of Table 5.13.
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CHAPTER SIX
EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS OF BRITISH WOMEN FROM 1974-98:
A COHORT ANALYSIS
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the gender earnings gap is examined as a function of time, age and 
year of birth cohort. This is a shift away from traditional analyses of the gender pay 
gap, which have typically examined differences in average earnings. Here instead, by 
using a production function framework, changes in the earnings of women relative to 
men are analysed as a function of time, age and year of birth cohort. This is 
potentially important because different birth cohorts may share experiences that lead 
to a permanent improvement (or worsening) in the relative earnings of these women. 
Time and age, on the other, reflect temporary changes in relative earnings. This may 
occur if, for example, attitudes towards work or labour force attachment vary across 
birth cohorts in a way not reflected by age or time.
There is a large literature on the gender earnings gap (see Joshi and Paci 1998 
or Harkness 1996 for the UK, and Blau and Kahn 2000 for international evidence on 
the gender pay gap). This literature has tended to focus on the importance of 
differences in male and female worker and employer characteristics to the pay gap. 
A more recent strand of literature has looked at the importance of the ‘family gap’ in 
pay to the gender pay gap, with the gap in pay between women with and without 
children being an important component of the overall gender pay gap (see Harkness 
and Waldfogel, 2000). Other writers have examined the importance of motivation for 
work (see Swaffield, 2000) and differences in work experience and the timing of 
work experience (see Light and Ureta, 1995) for the pay gap. There is little work 
however on the evolution of the pay gap over the lifecycle, or on how this has 
changed across year of birth cohorts. Pencavel (1998) and Pencavel and Coleman 
(1993) have looked at changes in employment and earnings across birth cohorts of 
women in the US. Pencavel notes that the employment rates of women with high and 
low levels of schooling are becoming increasingly divergent among more recent 
birth cohorts and then goes on to see if this can be accounted for by the growing 
wage differential between high and low skill workers. Educational attainment is 
assumed to be endogenous to subsequent labour market outcomes. He finds a 
correlation between employment rates and movements in wages, but concludes that
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wages alone cannot account for the observed changes in the market work behaviour 
of women. The relative earnings of women and men are not explored.
Myck and Pauli (2001) use repeated cross-sections of data from the UK 
Family Expenditure Survey to form a pseudo panel, from which they estimate the 
impact of experience on wages. They find that differences in work experience 
explain little of the gender wage gap, and rather that it is differences in returns to 
experience which helps to generate a wage gap as the pay gap increases with work 
experience. While they find that more recent birth cohorts have been doing better, 
they suggest that this cannot be explained by changes in the relative education or 
work experience of women.
While relatively few studies have taken a cohort based approach to analysing 
the gender pay gap, this method has been widely used to look at wage differentials 
across education groups (see for example Gosling, Machin and Meghir 2000 for the 
UK and Card and Lemieux 2000 for the US). Cawley, Heckman and Vyatcil (1998) 
discuss the problems associated with identifying age, cohort and time effects and this 
is discussed in more detail in Section 6.4. In this chapter, the gender pay gap is 
analysed as a function of time, age and year of birth cohort. The approach taken 
follows that of Card and Lemieux who examine changes in the wage differential 
between high and low educated workers across age, year of birth cohort and time. 
Card and Lemieux associate changes in wage premiums to skilled workers across 
cohorts with changes in supply and demand. The pay premium received by more 
skilled workers is then analysed as a function of the relative supply and demand for 
workers of different skill levels by year of birth cohort, age and time. While Card 
and Lemieux interpret year of birth cohorts as reflections of changes in supply and 
demand conditions in their analysis of the skills pay premium, the interpretation of 
cohort effects in the case of the gender pay gap may be somewhat different. In 
particular, while cohort effects may to some extent reflect changes in the relative 
supply of, and demand for female labour, they are also likely to reflect changes in a 
number of other factors which impact on relative wages. These factors are likely to 
include differences in labour market attachment, work experience and demographic 
differences across cohorts.
The analysis then goes on to examine differences in the pay gap across 
education groups. In the UK, authors have identified an increasing polarisation in the 
employment experience of women. Rake (2000) reports that women with “A”
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levels or above increased their rates of economic activity from 78 percent to 86 
percent between 1984 and 1998. For those with no qualifications, on the other hand, 
activity rates declined from 59 to 50 percent. The difference across education groups 
is even starker for those with children. In 1998 76 percent of high skill women with a 
child under five were economically active compared to just 55 percent of mid skilled 
women and 27 percent of the low skilled. As children get older the gap closes, 
though a significant difference remains. Dex, Joshi and Macran (1996) report a 
similar finding among women returning to work after childbirth. They conclude that 
improved equal opportunities legislation has mainly benefited highly educated 
women who have increasingly been able to maintain continuous employment 
histories and suffered little in the way of occupational downgrading as a result of 
childbirth. For lower skilled women however the gains have been much smaller. 
They estimate that two thirds of women have not benefited much from policy 
changes since the 1970s. These differences in labour market attachment by education 
have direct implications for relative earnings.
This chapter examines the gender earnings gap of full time workers as a 
function of age, year of birth cohort and time. The analysis is restricted to full-time 
workers partly because of data limitations, discussed in more detail below. There is, 
however, also evidence that full time workers are rewarded differently from those 
working part time, and analysis of the gender pay gap therefore should look at these 
two employment categories separately (see for example Blank 1998, Harkness 
1996). The chapter is arranged as follows. Section 6.2 describes the data and presents 
some descriptive statistics on the gender pay. Section 6.3 then goes on to outline the 
theoretical framework, while Section 6.4 presents the empirical results. In Section 
6.5 the chapter goes on to assess the impact of shifts in supply and demand 
conditions on the gender pay gap and Section 6.6 includes controls for changes in 
wage inequality of the pay gap. Section 6.7 then looks at differences by education 
group. In Section 6.8 some robustness checks of the chosen measure of the pay gap 
are performed. Section 6.9 concludes.
6.2. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Throughout this chapter data is used from the 1974-1998/9 General Household 
Survey. As the General Household Survey became a biennial/ survey from 1996/7, 
there is no data for 1997/8. The sample includes all those aged 20-59. This gives
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between 10,000 and 16,000 observations for each year and a total of 332,177 
observations. One limitation of the General Household Survey is that hourly wages 
cannot be computed because overtime hours are not recorded but weekly earnings 
include overtime payments. For this reason this chapter focuses only on the 
employment and wages of those working full-time (with full time employment being 
defined as working over 30 hours per week). Wages are defined as weekly wages 
and are recorded in January 2000 prices, and are reported for a total of 148,562 
individuals.
The data is organised into 13 age groups with intervals of approximately 
three years, and eight time periods again spanning three years. The specific age 
bands are ages 20-22, 23-25, 26-28, 29-31, 32-34, 35-37, 38-41, 42-44, 45-47,48- 
50,51-53,54-56 and 57-59. The time periods are 1974-76, 1977-79, 1980-82, 1983- 
85, 1986-88,1989-91, 1992-94 and 1995-98 (note that there is no data for 1997). The 
number of observations within each age / time cell are reported in Appendix Table 
A6.1 and range from 740 to 2,182.
The Evolution of the Raw Log Wage Gap by Age, Time and Cohort
It is well know that the gender pay gap has fallen since the early 1970s, with 
the biggest changes in relative earnings occurring in the early 1970s, around the time 
of the Equal Pay and Sex Discrimination Acts, and during the 1990s. Figure 6.1 plots 
the raw log wage gap of female to male weekly earnings [log W f-  log Wm] between 
1974/76 and 1995/98. It shows a decline in the gender pay gap from -.493 log points 
in 1974/76 (equivalent to a gender earnings ratio of 61 percent) to -.322 log points in 
1995/98 (or a gender earnings ratio of 72 percent). These changes in the log wage 
gap at the mean however mask marked differences in the relative earnings of women 
at different ages. Figure 6. 2 shows how the pay gap has changed over time for four 
different age groups, while in Table 6.1 the raw wage gaps are reported for all 13 age 
groups and 8 time periods. For young workers (aged 23-25) the wage gap is the 
smallest in all years, and also showed a significant reduction, of .199 log points, over 
the period (from -.326 to -.127 log points). This was equivalent to an increase in the 
gender earnings ratio from 72 percent to 88 percent. Improvements in relative wages 
were greatest however for those in their 30s, with the wage gap for those aged 32-34 
falling by .302 log points, from -.550 to -.248 (or an increase in the gender earnings 
ratio from 58 to 78 percent). For those over 40, however, improvements in relative
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earnings have been smaller, with the wage gap falling by between -.181 log points 
for those age 42-44 and by -.152 for those aged 51-53. In 1995-98 the gender 
earnings ratio stood at 67 percent for those aged 42-44 and 69 percent for those age 
51-53, compared with 56 percent and 60 percent respectively in 1974-76.
An alternative representation of the change in the gender earnings ratio by 
age and year is given in Figure 6.3. Here the raw log wage gap is plotted against age 
groups for the three periods 1974-76, 1986-88 and 1995-98. In each period the wage 
gap grows substantially with age. However, while in 1974/76 women’s relative 
earnings levelled out at a log wage gap of just under -.6 (or a gender earnings ratio of 
just over 55 percent) by the time women hit their early 30s, in 1995-98 the wage gap, 
while higher at all ages, continued to decline between the ages of 20 and 50. The 
diagram also indicates that the biggest improvements in relative earnings have been 
for those women aged under 40. For women over 40, the earnings gap has narrowed 
by less and remains large at around -.4 log points (equivalent to a gender earnings 
ratio of 67 percent). For those under 35, on the other hand, the log wage gap in 
1995/98 is less that -.2 log points, or 82 percent. This is shown more clearly in 
Figure 6.4, which plots the change in the relative wage gap over the period 1974/76 
and 1995/98 by age group. It is clear from this figure that women in their late 20s 
and early 30s, the ages when women have typically taken the most time out of the 
labour market to care for children have seen the greatest improvements in their 
relative wages.
Accounting for Differences in Characteristics
Part of the difference in wages between men and women is, of course, due to 
differences in characteristics. In order to account for this an “adjusted” gender wage 
gap is estimated from a regression of the log of full-time weekly wages on a 
quadratic in age, five education dummy variables, eleven regional dummy variables, 
and a dummy variable for being female.1 . The coefficient on the female dummy 
variable is taken as the measure of the gender pay gap. This is computed for each of 
these 13 age groups and 8 time periods, giving a total of 104 wage gaps. The 
robustness of this measure of the pay gap is explored in Section 6.7, where the
1 The controls are: a quadratic in age, education (Degree, “A” level or equivalent, 5+ “O” levels, 
under 5 “O” levels and no qualifications); region (the North, Yorkshire and Humberside, North West, 
East Midlands, West Midlands, East Anglia, South West, South East, Wales, Scotland) and individual 
year dummy variables.
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traditional Oaxaca (1973) decomposition is used as an alternative means of 
computing the gender pay gap. In order to control for sample selection bias, 
Heckman’s two-step selection procedure is also used.2 The probability of being 
employed is estimated as a function of being married, the log of non-labour family 
income and the number of children in the family unit, these three variables interacted 
with a dummy variable for being female, and all variables in the wage equation.
Table 6.2 reports the adjusted wage gaps and standard errors both with and 
without the Heckman selection correction. The raw log wage gaps, and adjusted log 
wage gaps with and without correction for sample selection are plotted by age group 
for the periods 1974/76, 1986/88 and 1995/98 in Figure 6.5. Looking first at the 
period 1974/76, accounting for differences in characteristics reduces the raw log 
wage gap by around .03 log points for workers over 30, and made no difference to 
the wage gap for younger workers. This reflects the narrowing of the gap in 
educational attainment between men and women that was occurring over this period. 
Controlling for selection reduces the wage gap by approximately another .10 log 
points for workers over 30, suggesting that in the 1970s women were negatively 
selected into full time employment (or that those characteristics which increased the 
probability of women working also tended to reduce their wages). For younger 
workers, in particular those in their early 20s, selection was much less important and 
accounted for a smaller share of the wage gap. By 1986/88 differences in 
characteristics did very little to explain the wage gap among younger workers, 
although for older workers they accounted for around .08 log points of the wage gap 
once selection was accounted for. Again older workers tended to be negatively 
selected into employment, while for those under-35 selection had little impact on 
wages. By 1995/98, differences in characteristics explained none of the wage gap 
for those under 40. Indeed for those under 25 controlling for differences in
2 Heckman’s (1976) correction involves estimating a probit model o f employment participation across 
the working age population and then including a variable to correct for sample selection (the inverse 
Mills ratio) from this probit specification in the wage equation. This correction is adopted to allow for 
the fact that people with positive earnings may be a selected sample o f individuals in that their 
characteristics may be different from those who are out o f work. For an earnings equation log(W) = 
Xd + e the issue arises because the equation is based only upon people who have W>0. As such it is 
possible that the mean o f the error term e (E(e)) may not equal 0 as one would require for estimates of  
0 to be unbiased. To ensure the error term does have a zero mean one needs to include a selection 
correction term (the inverse Mills ratio) in the wage equation. To see this note that the earnings 
equation for those with positive earnings can be written [log(W)|W>0] = X 0  + a(0/f>) + v where E(v) 
= 0  and <f> and $  are the density function and distribution function o f the standard normal distribution. 
The inverse Mills ratio can be calculated from a first stage probit model explaining the probability 
that an individual has positive earnings, Pr[W>0] = $ ( Z £ +  co).
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characteristics actually lead to an increase in the estimated wage gap suggesting that, 
had these women received the same returns to characteristics as men, their average 
earnings would have been higher than the equivalent male average. When controls 
for selection into employment are added in 1995/98, the impact is somewhat less 
clear than in the previous two periods. In 1995/98, selection into full-time 
employment is of little importance to workers under 30. For older workers however, 
the impact of selection into full time employment is mostly positive (leading to 
higher observed average wages) for those over 40, but negative for those in their 30s. 
The impact of selection on the wage gap is however relatively small. In 1995/98, 
therefore, for older workers, differences in characteristics still matter but account for 
a significantly smaller part of the pay gap than in earlier decades. Overall the picture 
to emerge suggests that, while differences in worker characteristics went some way 
to explaining the wage gap in 1974/76, by 1995/98 such differences could do little to 
account for the observed gender wage gap even among older workers. It is notable 
too that the reported standard errors indicate that the log wage gap is highly 
significant in all cases.
Figure 6.6 shows how the adjusted wage gaps have changed over time by age 
group. It shows an increase in the wage gap with age. The adjusted wage gaps are 
however smaller, particularly for older women, than suggested by the raw wage data 
in Figure 6.3, and the rate of decline in relative earnings with age is less dramatic.
It should be noted that the parameter estimates in the Heckman selection 
corrected models are sensitive to the choice of control variables. Pencavel (1998) 
finds that ”by tinkering with the precise form of the selection variables, we could 
generate somewhat different estimates of 0. This does not mean, of course, that 
selection bias is not an issue, but it does imply that we lack the means to address the 
issue in a thoroughly convincing fashion”. Because of the inability to satisfactorily 
control for sample selection bias in our model, the rest of this chapter focuses on 
measures of the wage gap that do not include controls for sample selection bias.
Overall the descriptive data therefore shows that in all years, relative female 
earnings decline with age. Over the last 20 years however, the rate of decline has 
slowed and this is reflected in relatively large increases in the relative earnings of 
women in their late 20s and 30s. Differences in characteristics account for a small 
part of the gender pay gap in all periods. They are most important in explaining
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earnings differences for older women in the 1970s and early 1980s. The same is also 
true of selection into employment, with non-random selection into full time work 
tending to increase the gender pay gap in the 1970s, particularly for older women. 
By the 1990s the impact of selection on relative wages is small and has an 
ambiguous effect on relative earnings.
6.3 Theoretical Framework
In this section a model of the relative earnings of women is developed as a function 
of age, time and year of birth cohort. The theoretical model outlined here uses a 
framework that has commonly been used in the literature on education wage 
differentials to analyse changes in the gender pay gap. It follows closely the work of 
Card and Lemieux (2000), which analyses changes in wage differentials across 
education groups and age cohorts. In this model output at time t depends on two 
constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) sub-aggregates of male and female labour:
(1)
(2)
Where -  oo <tj < 1 is a function of the partial elasticity of substitution crA between 
age-groups j of the same gender and rj = 1 — —. This is assumed to be the same
across gender.3 The terms ctj and Pj are “relative efficiency” parameters of men and 
women of age group j, assumed constant over time. Output in period t is therefore a 
function of male and female labour, and “technological efficiency” parameters
K , and$i, ■
(3) y, = f ( M t,Fl-eml,efl)
Assuming aggregate production is CES:
(4) y,=(0„,M,p +dfiF,py
Again p  = 1 — —; where cr is the partial elasticity of substitution between men and 
women. ) The marginal product of labour for men in age group j is given by:
3 Relaxation o f this assumption is relatively straightforward, but makes little difference to the 
empirical results obtained.
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(5)
dy, dy, dM,
dMj, dM, dMj,
I-i i-,
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Similarly for women:
(6) —  = dy‘ dF‘ = 4', x 0 f,F,p~” x p  F f '
v dFj, dF, dFj, f  ' ‘ "
This assumes that the economy is operating on its labour demand curve, and that 
labour supply is fixed in the short run. In order to overcome the potential problem of 
sample selection bias, wages are estimated both with and without a Heckman two- 
step selection correction. If wages equal marginal product, the relative wages of men 
to women can be written as the ratio of marginal products:
O B  p f
(7) log —77 = log~~- +log — +(p -  V) log-y- + 0? -1) log- j -  + ej,
Wj, 0M cij M, Mj,
= log ~zr~ +log +(p - 1) lo g ^ -  + (1 -  7)[!og-^- -  log"~~ + ejt
0m, Uj M, M, M Jt
, efi ,, Pi 1 , F, 1 r, FJ> , F< , .= log-^- + l o g  lo g -;-------- [log-7—  log 77-] + ej,0M a , M , ^ j ,  M ,
This assumes that aggregate female labour supply relative to male labour supply is 
endogenous. Studies that have looked at the relationship between husbands and 
wives labour supply have found little evidence of joint determination of labour 
supply among couples without pre-school children (Lundberg 1988), and no or little 
evidence of an added-worker-effect (Layard, Barton and Zabazlam, 1980; Lundberg, 
1985; Maloney 1991; Grubber and Cullen 1996). Studies also suggest that female 
labour supply is much more responsive to own rather than partner’s wages (Juhn and
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Murphy, 1997; Coleman and Pencavel, 1994). These findings suggest that the 
assumption of endogeneity of relative labour supply is a reasonable one. Note that in 
this competitive model where wages equal marginal product, differences in wages 
between men and women with the same observed characteristics can only arise as a 
result of differences in productivity. This may result because of a mis-specification 
of the wage equation, for example, resulting from the omission of variables that 
differ systematically across genders. Such variables may include work effort or 
differences in accumulated human capital (such as previous work experience). This 
model can therefore incorporate Becker’s (1985) effort hypothesis. It does not 
however allow for discrimination as workers are in all cases paid their marginal 
product. Note that the wage gap is now a function of time, age, the relative supply of 
women to men, and age group specific relative supplies of labour. Card and Lemieux 
assume that the relative supply of high skill workers consists of a cohort effect that 
varies by year of birth, and an age specific effect that is equal across cohorts. This 
also seems to be a plausible assumption when applied to the relative supplies of 
female to male labour. We can therefore write:
(8) l o g i i L ^  +<*
Mj,
Where Xt.j is a cohort effect and Oj is an age specific effect. Inserting equation (8) 
into (7) we get:
(9)
w{ 0„ B. \ F \ Flog—  = log—^ -+log— ----- log—! [X +0 - lo g —H  + e.,
w" 0m ccj <7a M , a g M,
efi Bj 1 1 F, 1 . 1 ,
= lo g -^ + lo g -^  + f----------- ]log—;--------X , _ J ------ (pj +  e .
Vj ° s <*„ M, a  <r Jt  g
Making a number of simplifying assumptions it is possible to show that relative 
wages are a function of time, age and cohort. First, it seems plausible to write the 
relative technology parameters and log relative supply of female labour as a function 
of time, and are written as a series of time period dummy variables. The 
Pi 1terms log—-  and— </>, (age specific differences in relative production efficiency 
a  ■ <7j  a
and age specific relative supplies of labour) are functions of age and expressed as a
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series of age dummy variables. Finally, — Xt_n where A, .is a cohort effects, is
represented by a series of year of birth cohort dummies. Estimation then becomes: 
(10) rjt =bj + d,+c,_j +eJt
where: rjt is estimated wage gap for age group “j ” at time “t”.
bj is an age effect 
dt is a time effect again 
ct.j is cohort effects
Econometric issues involved in the estimation of equation (10) are discussed in the 
following section, and results are presented in Section 6.4.
6.4. Estimation
In order to estimate equation (10), grouped data from the GHS is used. The 
dependent variable, the estimated wage gap rJt, is defined as the adjusted wage gap 
after controlling and is computed both with and without controls for sample selection 
(using the Heckman (1979) selection correction). An alternative means of 
controlling for the non-random selection into full time employment is to use the 
mean adjusted pay gap without correcting for sample selection as the dependent 
variable and to include as a control variable the average of the inverse mills ratio. 
This is also carried out here. Computation of the dependent variable was described in 
more detail in Section 6.3. Wage gaps are calculated for 13 age groups and 8 time 
periods, giving a total of 104 observations. The control variables include an age 
effects, bj, time effects, dt, and cohort effects, ct.j. All of these are defined over 
approximate three-year age bands. The age and year effects are banded as before, 
while the year of birth cohorts are defined as the periods: 1915/18, 1919/21,1922/24, 
1925/27, 1928/30, 1931/33, 1934/36, 1937/39, 1940/42, 1943/45, 1946/48, 1949/51, 
1952/54, 1955/57, 1958/60, 1961/63, 1964/66, 1967/69, 1970/72 and 1974/78. 
Clearly, given that data is available to us only from 1974-1998/9, the data is 
censored. For the earliest birth cohorts, for example, only older workers are observed 
in the 1970s, while we only observe the wages and employment of women bom in 
the 1970s when they are in their 20s. The years and ages at which workers are 
observed for each birth cohort are reported in Appendix Table A6.2.
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This problem of ‘incomplete data’ is discussed in detail in Cawley, Heckman 
and Vytlacil (1998). They argue that such data structures prohibit the identification 
of all age and time effects, and their interactions. In order to overcome these 
problems, certain restrictions must be imposed on the data. Blackburn and Neumark 
(1993) for example impose a linear constraint on time and age effects. Cawley et.al. 
point out that the imposition of such restrictions on the data can be tested, and in the 
context of estimating returns to education, reject the imposition of linear constraints 
on age and time. The validity of the imposed restrictions is tested using a chi-squared 
test that compares restricted models to the ‘saturated’ model (which allow for a full 
set of interactions between age, time and cohort). The constraints imposed on the 
models estimated are discussed in further detail below, with these constraints being 
tested against the saturated model using the chi-squared test.
A further problem with the analysis of grouped data is that the sample sizes 
used to calculate the wage gap vary across age groups and over time. This may lead 
to problems of heteroscedasticity. In order to correct for this variance weighted least 
squares is used, where each observation is weighted by the inverse of the variance of 
the wage gap. Measurement error is an additional potential problem where data is 
grouped. This is discussed in Verbeek and Nijman (1992) in the context of pseudo 
panel data. They suggest that the problem of measurement error can be ignored 
where the cell size used to compute the grouped mean is greater than 100 
individuals. Here sample sizes range from 740 to 2,182, which should be sufficient 
to resolve any problems of measurement error.
Empirical Results
The results from estimation of equation (10) using variance weighted least squares 
are reported in Table 6.3. The first specification includes only age effects and year 
effects. The estimates suggest that the gender pay gap has narrowed with time, and 
that the pay gap increases with age from 20 to 40, where after it narrows. The chi- 
squared statistic, which tests the validity of the restrictions against the saturated 
model, however suggests that the fit of the model is poor. The second column 
includes age and year controls again, but this time also include the average of the 
inverse mills ratio. The inverse mills ratio measures the probability of non-selection 
into the sample, and the average inverse mills ratio therefore includes the average 
probability of not being selected into full-time employment by age and year groups.
240
This ratio is included separately for men and women. The inclusion of the inverse 
mills ratios does little to improve the fit of the model, as denoted by the chi-squared 
statistics. Moreover both coefficients are statistically insignificant.
The third column includes nine dummy variables for year of birth cohort 
from 1946-50 on wards. Cohort dummies from 1915-45 are omitted as no change in 
the pay gap is observed for these cohorts and addition of earlier cohort dummies 
does not improve the models goodness of fit. The inclusion of cohort dummies 
considerably improves the fit of the model, as can be seen by the chi squared 
statistics. This null hypothesis, which tells us that the model is not mis-specified and 
that the restrictions imposed are valid, can no longer be rejected. Controls for earlier 
birth cohorts (from 1915 to 1945) are excluded because there appears to be little 
variation in the pay gap across these earlier birth cohorts. Inclusion of all 13-cohort 
controls reduced the chi-squared from 80.73 to 72.29 and a likelihood ratio test that 
compares this model against the specification in column (3) suggests that the 
restricted model in column 3 is preferred. Contrasting the results in columns (1) and 
(3) shows that inclusion of cohort controls reduces the size of the dummy variables 
on the time period dummies and also reduces the negative coefficients on the age 
dummy variables. It appears therefore that more recent birth cohorts have been doing 
better from the late 1940s onwards. Moreover the negative impact of ageing on the 
pay gap is considerably reduced once cohort controls are added. The coefficients on 
the time period dummies remain positive and significant, although they are smaller 
in magnitude compared to the earlier specifications.
In column (4), in order to increase the available degrees of freedom, the 
series of time period dummy variables are replaced with a linear time trend. This 
increases the chi-squared statistic from 80.73 to 104.35, and reduces the p-value 
from .305 to .041. The likelihood ratio test provides weak support for the imposition 
of this restriction. The specification of Column (5) is the same as Column (4) but 
also includes average inverse mills ratios for male and female selection into 
employment. The average inverse mills ratios are both insignificant and the results in 
columns (4) and (5) are similar. Looking at column (5), we can see that the gender 
pay gap has been narrowing on average by 1.5 log points every 3 years between 
1974 and 1998. The coefficients on the age variables suggest that the gender pay 
gap began to increase with age when women reach their late 20s. The pay gap is 
largest for women aged 38-41, where after the gender pay gap narrows. The cohort
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dummies show that successive cohorts of women are doing better in the labour 
market. For example, the pay gap is .183 log points smaller for women bom between 
1970 and 1978 compared to those bom between 1918 and 1946.
One reason that more recent birth cohorts have been doing better may be that 
changes in fertility patterns mean women are now having fewer children at a later 
age. The impact of children on pay has been discussed widely in the gender pay gap 
literature. The final specification estimated here therefore also includes controls for 
the average number of children and the proportion of women who are married by age 
and time cell. While the coefficients on these two variables have the expected sign, it 
is perhaps surprising that neither variable is statistically significant.
6.5. Supply and Demand Changes
Economic theory predicts that levels of supply and demand will affect the relative 
price of male and female labour, where male and female employees are imperfect 
substitutes. This has been widely assumed in the literature on wage inequality (eg. 
Katz and Murphy 1992, Juhn Murphy Pierce 1993, Bound and Johnson 1992, 
Machin 1996) and is also been assumed here. Given imperfect substitution, we 
would expect the unexplained gender pay gap to increase with relative female labour 
supply, and to fall when relative demand is higher. Blau and Kahn (1996) find this to 
be the case in their cross-country study of the gender pay gap. They conclude that, 
“controlling for wage structure, the gender differential is lower when women are in 
shorter supply compared to men relative to how favourable the country’s demand 
structure is for women (female ‘net supply’).” In this section supply and demand 
indexes are constructed across age and time cohorts, and the impact of changes in the 
relative supply of and demand for female labour on the wage gap is assessed.
We assumed earlier that, as Card and Lemieux suggest, the relative supply of 
high skill workers consists of a cohort effect that varies by year of birth, and an age 
specific effect that is equal across cohorts. However while cohort effects reflect 
changes in the relative supply of, and demand, for female labour, they may also 
reflect changes in a number of other factors which impact on relative wages (such as 
differences in labour market attachment, work experience and demographic 
differences across cohorts). For this reason, instead of replacing the cohort effects
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with a measure of relative labour supply, as Card and Lemieux do, we incorporate 
them as additional explanatory variables.
Indices of Relative Female Labour Supply
In order to construct supply indices we follow Blau and Kahn (1996) who 
look at international differences in the gender pay gap. This closely follows the 
methodology used in the literature on wage inequality first applied by Katz and 
Murphy 1992. Here, relative supply indices are constructed as:
f  f  A(11) log(ASy,)=log i f .
\ J  75 J
Where fjt is the proportion of full-time workers who were women of age j at time t; 
and fVs is the share of full time employees who were women (of all ages) in the base 
year, chosen here to be 1974-76. The supply index therefore compares the relative 
share of women, aged j, in full-time employment at time t to the total 1974-76 full­
time female employment share.
Figure 6.7 plots the share of full-time employees who are female against 
time. Here we can see that the average share of women increased from 26 percent to 
34 percent over the 24-year period. Most of this change took place between 1985 and 
1998. In Figure 6.8 age specific female shares of full time employment are plotted 
for the three periods 1974-76, 1986-88 and 1995-98. Table 6.4 reports these shares. 
From this graph two things are evident: first, the relative share of female 
employment exhibits a U-shape pattern, declining with age between the ages of 20- 
22 and 32-34, and increasing slowly thereafter. Second, the biggest increases in 
relative employment have occurred for those aged between 25 and 35.
The relative supply indices, as defined in equation (11) above, are reported in 
Table 6.5. These indices compare female employment shares at a point in time, and 
at a specific age, with the aggregate share of female employment in 1974-76. This 
essentially shows that in 1974-76 relative employment was low for those aged 26 to 
41. By 1989-91, for all age groups relative employment was higher than the 1975 
average and this trend increase in the relative supply index continued across age 
groups until 1995-98.
Figure 6.9 plots the log female employment shares against adjusted wage 
gaps for 1974-76, 1986-88 and 1995-98. Ceterus paribus, we would expect that
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higher supply would lead to a larger wage gaps. In contrast to what economic theory 
would predict, the observed relationship suggest that pay gaps are larger among 
those with lower levels of relative labour supply. Figure 6.10 plots changes in the 
adjusted wage gap and in log relative supply between 1974-76 and 1995-98. Again 
the observed relationship is not in line with what economic theory would predict. 
The plotted relationship suggest that those age groups who have increased their 
relative supply by most have also had some of the largest improvements in their 
relative wages. Two things may be driving these observed relationships. First, there 
may be omitted variable bias. For example, years of work experience have not been 
controlled for when computing the adjusted wage gaps and this may be correlated 
with current employment. Second, higher labour supply and lower wage gaps may 
result from differences in labour demand across age groups. These differences in 
labour demand are dealt with next.
Indices of Relative Female Labour Demand
In order to find out how changes in the occupational structure of the economy have 
affected demand for female labour, demand indices are constructed. While changes 
in the occupational structure of the economy may matter too, insufficient sample 
sizes mean that only changes in occupational structure are controlled for here. Again 
the methodology used here follows that used by Katz and Murphy (1992) and Blau 
and Kahn (1998).
Net demand indices are written as:
(12) ln[l + AD,] = ln[l + (*» J ^ -)]
i i l5
Where Cij is the proportion of female employees of age j working in industry i over 
the entire period 1974-98; Ejt is the share of total employment in industry i at time t, 
and Ei75 is the share of total employment in industry i over the period, 1974-76. The 
demand index therefore measures the extent to which changes in industrial structure 
have favoured women of different ages relative to the industrial structure in 1974/76, 
with weights being defined over the entire period 1974-1998.
Table 6.6 reports in the upper panel data on the occupational structure of all 
full-time employees for 8 time periods, and in the lower panel data on the on the 
share of employees in each occupational group by gender and age group (across all 
years). Looking first at the upper panel, we observe that the occupational structure
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of full time employment has shifted considerably over the period, with large 
increases in the numbers of workers employed in professional occupations, and a 
substantial decline in the share of workers employed in manual occupations. Looking 
at the second panel, we observe considerable differences in occupational structure by 
age and gender. Older workers, and male workers, are more likely to work in 
professional occupations, while the probability of working in other non-manual 
occupations declines with age and is considerably higher for women. Men are much 
more likely to work in manual occupations, and the probability of men working in 
skilled manual jobs increases with age. Table 6.7 reports the change in log relative 
demand index, defined in equation (12), by age and year. Changes in relative 
demand are defined relative to the base year 1974-76. Changes in the log demand 
index are charted in Figure 6.11 against age for 1986-88 and 1995-98. Looking at 
Figure 6.11, we can see that relative demand for female workers has increased by 
most for those in their 30s, while for younger workers their has been little change in 
relative demand for female employees. In Figure 6.12, changes in relative demand 
are plotted against changes in the adjusted wage gap (changes defined over the 
period 1974-76 to 1995-98). Here we observe that, in line with economic theory 
those age groups which have had the largest increases in relative demand have also 
had the biggest improvements in their relative earnings.
Controlling for Shifts in Supply and Demand
Table 6.8 reports results from the variance weighted least squares regressions of the 
adjusted wage gap on age and cohort dummy variables, plus controls for shifts in 
supply and demand. Time effect dummy variables are omitted here because of 
problems of collinearity between these variables. The estimated parameters suggest 
that shifts in labour demand have had a significant impact on closing the wage gap. 
However, the coefficient on labour supply suggests that while increased labour 
supply has tended to reduce relative pay, the effect is statistically insignificant. This 
specification also increases the significance of the impact of children on the wage 
gap, with the wage gap increasing by .141 log points with a unit increase in the 
average number of children. It should be noted too that under this specification it still 
appears to be the case that successive cohorts have been improving their labour 
market position. Age however is a much less important factor in determining the size 
of the pay gap.
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6.6. Controlling for Changes in Inequality
Blau and Kahn (1996) argue that the level of wage inequality affects the size of the 
gender pay gap. In particular, as the level of wage inequality increases, we would 
expect that those with fewer observed or unobserved labour market skills would see 
a reduction in their relative average wage. In the final specification an indicator of 
the level of wage inequality is also included as a control variable. The indicator of 
wage inequality used here is the standard deviation of the log of the male wage and 
the results are reported in Table 6.9. Results are reported for two specifications. 
First, a time trend is included alongside a set of age dummies, year of birth cohort 
dummies, the average number of children and a variable controlling for the 
proportion married. The second specification replaces the time trend with the 
demand and supply indices. The chi squared statistic from the first specification 
suggests that the model is a good fit. The measure of wage inequality is found in this 
model to be strongly related to the wage gap, with a .10 increase in the standard 
deviation of the log male wage leading to an increase in the wage gap by -.04 log 
points. This specification also suggests large effects across cohorts, while age is a 
much less significant factor in determining the size of the adjusted wage gap. The 
second specification includes controls for labour supply and demand. In this case the 
measure of wage inequality does not appear to bear a statistically significant impact 
on the size of the wage gap. It should be noted however that the chi-squared statistic 
suggests a relatively poor fit of this model to the data.
6.7 The Pay Gap by Education
It was noted earlier that the employment experience of women varies considerably 
by education level. In this section differences in the employment and earnings of 
women relative to men are explored for five different education groups (those with 
degrees, higher qualifications, A levels, O levels and no qualifications).
Looking first at relative earnings, figure 13 plots the gender earnings gap, by 
education and year between 1974-76 and 1995-98. In 1974/76, the pay gap was 
around -.5 log points for those with no qualifications, compared to -.24 log points for 
those with a degree. For each of the educational groups the pay gap has narrowed 
over the last 20 years, although for those with higher qualifications and degrees any
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improvement has been small. For those with no qualifications and O levels have 
closed the pay gap by the most, although the pay gap remains greatest for low 
educated women.
Those with low levels of education tend to be older. To account for 
differences in the age composition of workers the pay gap is plotted by age for 
1974/78, 1986/88 and 1995/98 in Figure 6.14. Comparing the evolution of the 
relative earnings profiles of those with and without degrees, it is apparent that while 
the pay gap is similar for older workers, those with degrees fare substantially better 
than unqualified workers up until their mid-30s. It is also notable that, while low 
qualified workers earn less relative to men than the more qualified, the largest 
improvements in relative earnings have been among the low skilled.
There are also substantial differences in employment rates across education 
groups. Figure 6.15 plots employment rates by education group for men and women, 
while in Figure 6.16 the differences in FT employment rate are plotted. Male full­
time employment rates show a gradual decline for all education groups, except for 
those with no qualifications who have seen a much sharper reduction in employment. 
For women, employment rates have increased only among the more educated. For 
those with no qualifications, employment rates actually fell between 1974/76 and 
1995/98. It is also notable that those with degrees were almost 3 times more likely 
than those with no qualifications to be employed full-time in 1995/98. The gap in 
full-time employment rates between men and women in the same education group 
are plotted over time in Figure 6.16. For those with degrees, the difference in male 
and female employment was around 30 percentage points in 1995/98, compared to a 
gap of 47 percentage points for those with no qualifications. However, it is notable 
that the employment gap has closed by most for those with no qualifications because 
employment rates have fallen most dramatically for unqualified men (in 1974/76 the 
employment gap was 64 percentage points for those with no qualifications and 38 
percentage points for those with degrees). Figure 6.17 accounts for age differences 
by education, plotting the gender pay gap by age and education for 1974/76, 1986/88 
and 1995/98. Here it is apparent that the gap in employment rates between men and 
women has changed most for less educated workers under 40.
Table 6.12 reports the results from variance weighted least squares 
regressions of the adjusted wage gap on age and year of birth cohort dummy 
variables, plus a linear time period variable and controls for the average number of
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dependent children and the proportion married. The chi-squared test statistic 
suggests that the fit of the model is good, particularly for those educated to A level 
or above. Looking first at the age dummy variables, for those with A levels or higher 
qualification relative earnings decline after the age of 30. However, the dummy 
variables are not significant for those with “A” level as their highest level of 
qualification. For women with degrees, O levels and no qualifications, however, age 
does not appear to be an important factor in determining relative earnings. Looking 
at the year of birth cohorts, again we find that recent birth cohorts have made 
substantial gains in their relative earnings for those with higher qualifications or O 
levels. For those with no qualifications and for those with degrees, however, while 
the magnitude of the coefficients on the cohort dummy variables suggest some 
improvement in relative earnings, for more recent birth cohorts, these improvements 
are not statistically significant. The coefficient on the time period variable suggests 
that the relative earnings of women have improved with time only for those with A 
level or no qualifications. Finally, the magnitude of the coefficient on the variable 
controlling for the average number of children suggests that an increase in the 
average number of children reduces relative earnings, but that this is only significant 
for those with “higher” qualifications.
To summarise, therefore, the results here suggest that the employment and 
earnings experience of women has varied considerably across education groups. 
While the less qualified still earn much less, and are much less likely to work full 
time, compared to comparably qualified men than women with degrees, those with 
lower skills have seen the largest improvements in their position relative to men. 
However this is likely to be in large part due to the declining fortunes of low skilled 
men. The model estimated suggests that while relative earnings decline with age for 
the more educated, this is less true of the low skilled. Cohort effects, on the other 
hand, appear to be most important for those with intermediate levels of 
qualifications. In particular, those with no qualifications and those with degrees have 
seen little change in relative earnings as a result of cohort effects. This may in part 
be due to compositional changes in those who achieve these levels of qualifications. 
Finally, the time period dummy suggests that relative earnings have improved over 
time only for those qualified to A level or with no qualifications. For the later group, 
this time trend may reflect the declining fortunes of low skilled men.
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6.8 Robustness Checks
Using Oaxaca’s Decomposition to Measure the Pay Gap
So far the analysis has computed the adjusted wage gap through the inclusion 
of a dummy variable for gender in a regression of wages on characteristics for the 
104 age / year groups. In this section the validity of this assumption is tested by 
comparing the results obtained by using this measure of the wage gap for the whole 
sample with those obtained through the use of the wage gap calculated using the 
Oaxaca decomposition. This allows returns to characteristics to vary for men and 
women and is defined as follows:
(13) logWm - lo g Wf  = ( Xm - X f )bm ~(bm - b f ) X f
Where (bm -  bf  ) X f  is the unexplained portion of the wage gap, and defined here as
the Oaxaca adjusted wage gap. Table 6.10 reports the adjusted pay gap as defined 
before and the Oaxaca pay gap. In the majority of cases the measured pay gaps are 
very close.
Table 6.11 presents the results from regressing the previously defined 
adjusted wage gap and Oaxaca’s adjusted wage gap on a set of age and birth cohort 
dummies, average number of children, the proportion that are married, and either a 
time trend variable or the demand and supply indices. For the Oaxaca defined wage 
gap the observation are weighted by the inverse of the sample size. The parameter 
estimates obtained are very similar, suggesting the results are not sensitive to the 
choice of measure of the gender pay gap.
6.9 Conclusion
This chapter examined the impact of age, time and year of birth cohort on the gender 
pay gap between 1974 and 1998. At all ages, differences in characteristics account 
for only a small part of the gender pay gap, although they are most important in 
explaining earnings differences for older women in the 1970s and early 1980s.
Age earnings profiles show that the gender pay gap widens considerably 
between the ages of 20 and 30. Over the last 20 years however, the gender pay gap 
has grown more gradually with age, and this is reflected in comparatively large 
improvements in the relative earnings of women in their late 20s and 30s. Thus the 
greatest improvements in relative earnings over this period have been for those in
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their late 20s and early 30s, the ages when women have typically taken the most time 
out of the labour market to care for children.
There are important cohort effects, with successive birth cohort earning 
relatively more from the late 1940s onwards. The adjusted wage gap for those bom 
in 1967-71, for example, is around 15 percentage points smaller than for women 
bom before 1945. Once controls for birth cohorts are introduced, the negative impact 
of ageing on the pay gap is considerably reduced. However, the pay gap still 
increases, with the pay gap increasing by around 7 percentage points between the age 
of 20-22 and 32-34, and by 10 percentage points by the age of 42-44. The inclusion 
of controls for year of birth cohort reduces the importance of time in closing the pay 
gap considerably. Our estimates suggest the pay gap closed by just over 1 percentage 
point every 3 years between 1974 and 1998. Inclusion of controls for shifts in the 
occupational structure of demand has also had an important impact on reducing the 
pay gap. However, surprisingly, controlling for the average number of children has 
no statistically significant effect.
Finally, the employment and earnings experience of women has varied 
considerably across education groups. While the less qualified still earn much less, 
and are much less likely to work full time, compared to comparably qualified men, 
than women with degrees, those with lower skills have seen the largest 
improvements in their relative position. This may be in large part due to the 
declining fortunes of low skilled men. The model estimated suggests that while 
relative earnings decline with age for the more educated, this is less true of the low 
skilled. Cohort effects, on the other hand, appear to be most important for those with 
intermediate levels of qualifications. In particular, those with no qualifications and 
those with degrees have seen little change in relative earnings across cohorts. This 
could be due to compositional changes in those who achieve these levels of 
qualifications. Finally, the time period dummy suggests that relative earnings have 
improved over time only for those qualified to “A” level or with no qualifications. 
For the latter group, this time trend may reflect the declining fortunes of low skilled 
men.
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Figure 6.1: Log Weekly Wage Gap by Year, Full time Workers
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Figure 6.2: Log Weekly Wage Gap by Age and Year, Full Timers
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Figure 6.3: Log Wage Gap by Year and Age
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Figure 6.4: Change in the Log Wage Gap by Age
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Figure 6.5: Raw and Adjusted Wage Gaps by Age
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Figure 6.6: Adjusted Wage Gap by Age and Year
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Figure 6.7: Female Share of FT Employment
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Figure 6.8: Share of Full time Employees who are Female by Age and Year
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Figure 6.9: Employment shares and wage gaps
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Figure 6.10: Changes in Relative Supplies and the Wage Gap
Changes in Adjusted Wage Gap & Relative Supply, 1974/76 to 1995/98
.3 -
.25 -
.2 -
.15 -
.1 -
38-41
42-44
35-37
32-34
29-31
26-28
23-25
20-22 45-47
54-5&-S3 
57-59
48-50
i -------------------------------- 1-------------------------------- 1---------------------------------r~
0 .2 .4 .6
Change in log FT employment shar
261
re
lat
ive
 
de
m
an
d 
in
de
x
Figure 6.11: Changes in Relative Demand (base year 1974/76)
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Figure 6.12: Change in Relative Demand and Change in Adjusted Wage Gap,
1995/98
No Selection Correction
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Figure 6.13: Pay Gap by Education
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Figure 6.14: Pay Gap by Age and Education
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Figure 6.15: FT Employment Rates, Men and Women by Education, 1974/6-
95/8
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Figure 6.16: Gap in FT Employment Rates for Men and Women by Education,
1974/76-95/98
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Figure 6.17: Gender Gap in FT Employment by Age; 1974/76,1986/8 and
1995/98
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Table 6.1: Raw Wage Gaps
74-76 77-79 80-82 83-85 86-88 89-91 92-94 95-98
Age
20-22 -.293 -.291 -.272 -.215 -.240 -.182 -.128 -.127
23-25 -.326 -.300 -.271 -.236 -.258 -.218 -.162 -.127
26-28 -.378 -.298 -.270 -.246 -.211 -.198 -.153 -.173
29-31 -.488 -.390 -.361 -.268 -.255 -.251 -.193 -.200
32-34 -.550 -.489 -.416 -.352 -.328 -.300 -.250 -.248
35-37 -.574 -.536 -.496 -.452 -.457 -.356 -.317 -.335
38-41 -.574 -.533 -.534 -.512 -.486 -.417 -.391 -.345
42-44 -.577 -.511 -.474 -.497 -.538 -.444 -.366 -.396
45-47 -.559 -.512 -.515 -.507 -.475 -.449 -.435 -.413
48-50 -.511 -.489 -.457 -.529 -.490 -.463 -.461 -.453
51-53 -.516 -.448 -.469 -.461 -.448 -.439 -.387 -.364
54-56 -.495 -.440 -.414 -.446 -.443 -.453 -.360 -.337
57-59 -.504 -.406 -.404 -.408 -.420 -.362 -.352 -.383
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Table 6.2: Adjusted Wage Gap (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
a) No Selection Correction
YEAR/AGE 74-76 77-79 80-82 83-85 86-88 89-91 92-94 95-98
20-22 -.287 -.289 -.281 -.205 -.238 -.187 -.145 -.103
(.013) (012) (.013) (.015) (016) (0 1 7 ) (.021) (.030)
23-25 -.330 -.300 -.276 -.233 -.246 -.222 -.176 -.151
(.013) (012) (-013) (016) (015) (.015) (.018) (024)
26-28 -.377 -.309 -.293 -.258 -.228 -.235 -.184 -.210
(.014) (015) (-016) (017) (017) (.018) (018) (.024)
29-31 -.485 -.387 -.367 -.290 -.258 -.272 -.199 -.230
(.018) (015) (.018) (.022) (.020) (.021) (.019) (.026)
32-34 -.515 -.474 -.401 -.365 -.321 -.307 -.253 -.245
(.019) (-017) (.018) (.023) (.022) (.022) (.023) (.030)
35-37 -.543 -.526 -.481 -.417 -.415 -.318 -.284 -.300
(.020) (.018) (.020) (.023) (024) (0 2 4 ) (.025) (.031)
38-41 -.556 -.512 -.493 -.474 -.465 -.389 -.362 -.330
(.019) (.018) (.020) (.022) (.020) (.023) (024) (031)
42-44 -.552 -.491 -.449 -.473 -.489 -.405 -.336 -.321
(.019) (.018) (.020) (-025) (024) (0 2 1 ) (0 2 4 ) (.029)
45-47 -.515 -.491 -.487 -.490 -.447 -.418 -.404 -.356
(.019) (017) (.019) (025) (.024) (.023) (.023) (.033)
48-50 -.486 -.407 -.444 -.415 -.416 -.428 -.386 -.367
(0 1 7 ) (016 ) (.020) (.026) (-024) (0 2 7 ) (.028) (0 3 4 )
51-53 -.486 -.407 -.444 -.415 -.416 -.428 -.386 -.367
(.017) (016) (.020) (.026) (.026) (0 2 7 ) (.028) (034)
54-56 -.477 -.415 -.422 -.418 -.435 -.408 -.370 -.280
(.018) (018) (.021) (027) ( 027) (.029) (.031) (.038)
57-59 -.480 -.399 -.399 -.381 -.397 -.343 -.340 -.316
(.019) (.016) (.018) (.025) (.026) (.028) (034) (.041)
b) With Heckman Selection Correction
YEAR/AGE 74-76 77-79 80-82 83-85 86-88 89-91 92-94 95-98
20-22 -.277 -.280 -.280 -.204 -.258 -.182 -.153 -.121
(.014) (013) (.013) (.021) (.019) (.019) (.022) (.029)
23-25 -.315 -.286 -.263 -.238 -.245 -.240 -.182 -.142
(.014) (013) (013) (.022) (017) (0 1 8 ) (0 1 8 ) (.022)
26-28 -.333 -.272 -.265 -.199 -.214 -.243 -.173 -.156
(.017) (017) (017) (024) (021) (.020) (.018) (.023)
29-31 -.394 -.303 -.303 -.207 -.216 -.246 -.154 -.190
(.024) (.019) (.020) (.035) (.023) (0 2 4 ) (.021) (.026)
32-34 -.406 -.433 -.320 -.252 -.310 -.264 -.223 -.118
(.029) (.022) (.026) ( 042) (.030) (.029) (.028) (034)
35-37 -.409 -.362 -.418 -.355 -.340 -.232 -.295 -.264
(.033) (.030) (031) (.044) (.039) (-037) (.031) (.036)
38-41 -.435 -.396 -.438 -.384 -.407 -.341 -.345 -.271
(.032) (.030) (-031) (042) (.032) (.036) (.033) (-037)
42-44 -.445 -.399 -.367 -.331 -.440 -.396 -.336 -.387
(.031) (.033) (034) (.050) (042) (.030) (.035) (.038)
45-47 -.439 -.411 -.411 -.441 -.421 -.412 -.377 -.329
(.034) (.032) (.032) (.064) (.041) (0 4 1 ) (.030) (.045)
48-50 -.324 -.296 -.368 -.470 -.389 -.447 -.514 -.373
(.038) (.038) (.032) (061) (.044) (0 3 7 ) (0 4 2 ) (041)
51-53 -.404 -.346 -.368 -.323 -.364 -.443 -.308 -.307
(.037) (.033) (.037) (067) (.046) (.048) (0 4 2 ) (.040)
54-56 -.328 -.343 -.401 -.357 -.385 -.429 -.376 -.381
(.042) (.037) (042) (061) (.053) (0 5 7 ) (.045) (0 4 7 )
57-59 -.388 -.259 -.326 -.320 -.404 -.430 -.409 -.395
(.047) (.036) (.036) (.067) (.049) (.048) (.050) (.054)
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Table 6.3: Adjusted Pay Gap as a Function of Time, Age and Birth Cohort
No selection correction Heckman corrected
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Number Kids -.069 -.011
(037) (.053)
Married .157 .148
(.103) (.123)
Time trend .014 .015 .014 -.006 -.006
(.002)** (.002)** (.002)** (.003)* (.003)
77-79 .049 .050 .037 .029 .005
(.006)** (.006)** (.006)** (.009)** (.009)
80-82 .061 .065 .040 .036 -.012
(.007)** (.007)** (.007)** (.009)** (.011)
83-85 .098 .104 .065 .085 .014
(.008)** (.008)** (.008)** (.012)** (.015)
86-88 .101 .107 .057 .061 -.033
(.007)** (.009)** (.009)** (.010)** (.015)*
89-91 .132 .139 .076 .074 -.044
(.008)** (.010)** (.010)** (.010)** (.017)**
92-94 .177 .192 .104 .119 -.031
(.008)** (.013)** (.012)** (.010)** (.019)
95-98 .191 .259 .103 .154 -.024
(.010)** (.033)** (.014)** (.013)** (.023)
23-25 -.021 -.023 -.007 -.008 -.013 -.036 -.015 .010 .011 -.020
(.008)** (.010)* (.008) (.008) (.012) (.027) (.008) (.009) (.009) (.029)
26-28 -.040 -.039 -.007 -.008 -.015 -.029 -.012 .047 .049 .006
(.008)** (.013)** (.009) (.009) (.016) (.045) (.009) (.011)** (.011)** (.049)
29-31 -.095 -.091 -.041 -.041 -.050 -.044 -.029 .064 .066 .022
(.009)** (.015)** (.011)** (.011)** (.019)** (.055) (.010)** (.014)** (.014)** (.064)
32-34 -.148 -.142 -.072 -.074 -.082 -.061 -.082 .048 .048 .007
(.009)** (.015)** (.012)** (.012)** (.019)** (.061) (.012)** (.018)** (.018)** (.074)
35-37 -.199 -.193 -.106 -.108 -.114 -.091 -.109 .044 .045 .005
(.010)** (.014)** (.014)** (.014)** (.018)** (.060) (.014)** (.021)* (.021)* (.075)
38-41 -.231 -.229 -.124 -.126 -.131 -.126 -.152 .021 .022 -.019
(.009)** (.012)** (.015)** (.015)** (.017)** (.051)* (.013)** (.023) (.023) (.064)
42-44 -.219 -.217 -.100 -.103 -.106 -.127 -.156 .036 .035 -.010
(.009)** (.012)** (.016)** (.015)** (.017)** (.043)** (.014)** (.025) (.025) (.053)
45-47 -.227 -.226 -.097 -.099 -.102 -.150 -.167 .043 .043 -.006
(.009)** (.011)** (.016)** (.016)** (.017)** (.039)** (.015)** (.027) (.026) (.049)
48-50 -.182 -.184 -.049 -.051 -.054 -.123 -.159 .066 .066 .014
(.009)** (.011)** (.017)** (.016)** (.017)** (.040)** (.016)** (.029)* (.028)* (.053)
51-53 -.182 -.180 -.046 -.049 -.052 -.131 -.122 .099 .099 .049
(.009)** (.011)** (.017)** (.017)** (.018)** (.040)** (.016)** (.029)** (.029)** (.055)
54-56 -.173 -.168 -.038 -.040 -.043 -.129 -.121 .104 .106 .056
(.010)** (.012)** (.017)* (.017)* (.018)* (.041)** (.018)** (.030)** (.030)** (.058)
57-59 -.151 -.140 -.016 -.018 -.022 -.106 -.112 .109 .109 .065
(.010)** (.012)** (017) (.017) (.018) (.040)** (.018)** (.030)** (.030)** (057)
1946-50 .046 .044 .044 .044 .065 .063 .065
(.009)** (.009)** (.010)** (.010)** (.014)** (.014)** (.014)**
1949-53 .086 .084 .084 .083 .117 .116 .117
(.011)** (.011)** (.011)** (.011)** (.016)** (.016)** (.017)**
1952-56 .115 .114 .114 .115 .151 .151 .155
(.012)** (.012)** (.012)** (.013)** (.018)** (.018)** (.019)**
1955-59 .120 .122 .123 .123 .175 .178 .187
(.013)** (.013)** (.013)** (.017)** (.020)** (.020)** (.024)**
1958-62 .129 .127 .128 .136 .189 .188 .204
(.015)** (.015)** (.015)** (.021)** (.023)** (.023)** (.029)**
1961-65 .146 .143 .145 .155 .231 .230 .251
(.016)** (.016)** (.017)** (.025)** (.026)** (.026)** (.034)**
1964-68 .139 .133 .135 .147 .235 .229 .252
(.018)** (.018)** (.019)** (.028)** (.029)** (.029)** (.038)**
1967-71 .154 .150 .152 .168 .281 .279 .305
(.021)** (.021)** (.021)** (.030)** (.032)** (.032)** (.041)**
1970-78 .190 .186 .183 .204 .332 .343 .372
(.025)** (.024)** (.026)** (.035)** (.037)** (.036)** (.046)**
Male inverse -.056 -.015 -.013
mills ratio (.033) (.022) (.023)
Female inverse -.013 .011 .011
Mills Ratio (015) (.020) (.021)
Constant -.322 -.286 -.429 -.430 -.436 -.463 -.294 -.446 -.436 -.504
(.007)** (.017)** (.013)** (.011)** (.018)** (.064)** (.008)** (.019)** (.016)** (.076)**
d.o.f. 84 82 75 81 79 77 84 75 81 79
Adj R2 .920 .920 .963 .956 .955 .956 .731 .843 .829 .827
R2 .934 .936 .973 .965 .965 .967 .780 .886 .866 .867
Chi squared 197.19 191.44 80.73 104.35 103.91 98.19 203.77 105.89 124.50 123.04
(p value) (.000) (.000) (.305) (.041) (.032) (.052) (.000) (.011) (.001) (.001)
Log likelihood 228.06 229.59 274.50 261.15 261.37 264.31 194.07 228.11 219.69 220.30
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 6.4: Share of Full-time Employees who are Female
20-
22
23-
25
26-
28
29-
31
32-
34
35-
37
38-
41
42-
44
45-
47
48-
50
51-
53
54-
56
57-
59
74-76 .400 .339 .245 .194 .187 .213 .223 .262 .286 .255 .284 .266 .242
77-79 .423 .351 .257 .209 .193 .228 .232 .259 .268 .280 .267 .271 .245
80-82 .444 .372 .287 .249 .200 .218 .239 .264 .277 .270 .281 .272 .242
83-85 .456 .386 .311 .225 .220 .214 .251 .251 .260 .280 .266 .260 .263
86-88 .488 .404 .341 .279 .273 .237 .270 .262 .291 .292 .305 .263 .229
89-91 .453 .421 .353 .306 .283 .268 .294 .304 .305 .326 .288 .281 .259
92-94 .445 .461 .380 .340 .300 .293 .313 .317 .317 .338 .319 .276 .268
95-98 .449 .447 .404 .356 .313 .294 .304 .321 .342 .337 .331 .302 .281
change .049 .108 .159 .162 .126 .081 .081 .059 .056 .082 .047 .036 .039
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Table 6.5: Log Relative Supply Indices
74-76
77-79
80-82
83-85
86-88
89-91
92-94
95-98
20-22 23-25 26-28 29-31 32-34 35-37 38-41 42-44 45-47 48-50 51-53 54-56 57-59
42.04
47.62
52.49
55.17
61.84
54.48
52.71
53.57
25.37
28.99
34.68
38.51
42.93
47.21
56.34
53.20
-6.99
-2.23
8.80
17.00
26.06
29.45
36.94
42.95
-30.28 -33.89 -20.96 -16.20 -0.39
-22.91 -30.99 -13.97 -12.63 -1.39
-5.35 -27.30 -18.50 -9.57
-15.50 -17.68 -20.37 -4.40
5.90 3.85
15.11
25.73
30.42
7.58
13.31
17.37
-10.16 2.57
2.03 11.16
11.03
11.16
17.56
14.53
0.59
-4.43
-0.38
14.68
18.72
19.90
8.62
2.14
5.43
-0.98
10.13
15.04
18.66
26.40
-3.07
6.27
2.62
6.50
10.69
21.74
25.29
24.94
7.78
1.66
6.90
1.44
15.01 
9.21 
19.38
23.01
1.36
3.00
3.46
-1.16
0.26
6.92
4.81
13.95
- 8.01
-6.90
- 8.12
0.20
-13.52
-1.33
1.95
6.78
Note: The log relative supply index is defined as log(Fjt/F75)
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Table 6.6: Occupational Distribution of Men and Women, 194-98
Changes in Employment
74-76 77-79 80-82 83-85 86-88 89-91 92-94 95-98
Professional 18.51 19.12 19.51 23.44 26.75 27.82 29.35 30.32
Other non- manual 27.52 28.46 29.7 29.07 29.67 29.93 30.99 30.83
Personal Services 2.26 2.29 2.2 2.46 2.33 2.13 2.05 2.28
Skilled manual 33.3 32.69 32.2 30.13 28.5 27.47 25.48 23.71
Semi-skilled manual 14.57 13.49 12.66 11.41 9.83 9.59 9.12 9.91
Unskilled manual 3.84 3.95 3.73 3.49 2.91 3.06 3 2.94
Weights: Distribution of FT Employment by Age and Sex (percentage)
______________ Age group______________________________________________
Men
Professional
20-22 23-25 26-28 29-31 32-34 35-37 38-41 42-44 45-47 48-50 51-53 54-56 57-59
9.40 17.29 22.29 26.98 29.29 31.63 31.84 32.36 32.77 31.77 28.32 28.05 25.11
Other non- manual 23.24 23.64 20.89 19.23 18.63 16.32 15.57 15.68 14.53 14.51 14.89 15.64 15.42
Personal Services 1.91 1.13 0.97 0.80 0.66 0.65 0.51 0.60 0.45 0.50 0.60 0.63 0.49
Skilled manual 42.49 39.85 39.93 39.22 38.66 39.07 38.84 38.01 38.41 38.22 38.86 38.10 39.35
Semi-skilled manual 16.06 13.37 12.02 10.72 9.63 9.38 10.21 9.78 10.44 11.43 12.82 12.69 14.35
Unskilled manual 6.90 4.72 3.90 3.05 3.14 2.95 3.03 3.58 3.40 3.56 4.51 4.89 5.28
Women
Professional 5.07 10.77 15.80 18.02 20.16 18.57 18.61 17.00 16.34 17.01 15.39 14.26 13.97
Other non- manual 69.94 69.14 64.43 59.51 55.26 52.87 50.93 52.72 51.23 50.53 48.26 47.92 45.64
Personal Services 7.23 4.63 3.97 3.87 4.02 4.86 5.1 5.96 6.01 6.46 8 8.07 8.07
Skilled manual 5.46 5.33 6.33 7.15 8.8 9.4 9.79 9.26 9.78 8.98 10.07 10.33 11.62
Semi-skilled manual 11.11 9.19 8.54 10.22 10.08 12.48 12.74 12.7 14.03 13.76 14.77 15.6 15.88
Unskilled manual 1.18 0.94 0.93 1.24 1.68 1.83 2.83 2.37 2.61 3.26 3.51 3.82 4.83
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Table 6.7: Change in Log Relative Demand (*100)
Period 20-22 23-25 26-28 29-31 32-34 35-37 38-41 42-44 45-47 48-50 51-53 54-56 57-
74-76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.(
77-79 1.66 1.79 1.77 1.37 1.54 0.98 0.80 0.83 0.87 0.73 0.91 0.71 0.'
80-82 4.22 4.75 4.87 4.22 3.44 2.35 1.60 2.69 1.58 2.04 1.49 1.45 u
83-85 3.64 4.49 5.66 5.74 6.15 4.73 3.88 2.88 3.44 3.32 2.73 3.17 3.<
86-88 4.72 7.50 9.54 9.15 10.85 9.14 8.65 8.20 6.89 6.05 6.54 2.94 3.'
89-91 3.25 9.20 12.97 11.78 12.86 11.10 9.99 11.00 9.58 9.59 8.77 6.24 3.:
92-94 7.17 10.85 15.41 17.44 18.65 14.61 16.53 15.15 13.50 14.69 11.29 12.77 10.
95-98 6.77 14.06 16.79 18.33 17.72 21.11 20.38 17.14 17.66 12.86 16.78 14.77 12.
Note: The log relative demand index is given by lo g (l+ ADk); where
ADk = Z  , a jk(— - ) .  a jk is the average share for group k o f employment in sector j
E k
over the entire period (weighted by the number of full time employees observed in 
each year), Ej if  the share of aggregate employment in sector j, and Ek is the average 
share o f total employment of group k for 1974 to 1998.
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Table 6.8; Variance Weighted Least Squares Regression controlling for Supply
and Demand
Adjusted wage Gap, no selection correciton
Log demand .426
(.130)**
Log supply -.074
(.055)
Kids -.141
(.036)**
Married .040
(100)
23-25 .016
(.026)
26-28 .077
(.044)
29-31 .103
(.055)
32-34 .101
(.060)
35-37 .066
(.057)
38-41 .013
(.050)
42-44 -.026
(.042)
45-47 -.079
(.038)*
48-50 -.067
(.041)
51-53 -.100
(.041)*
54-56 -.108
(.042)**
57-59 -.092
(.040)*
1946-50 .048
(.010)**
1949-53 .087
(.013)**
1952-56 .116
(.016)**
1955-59 .119
(.020)**
1958-62 .129
(.024)**
1961-65 .147
(.028)**
1964-68 .142
(.032)**
1967-71 .175
(.034)**
1970-78 .222
(.038)**
Mills Ratio .029
Male (.024)
Mills Ratio -.018
Female (.021)
Constant -.328
(.058)**
d.o.f 76
Adj R2 .945
R2 .960
Chi squared 121.69
(p value) (.001)
Log likelihood 253.16
S tandard  errors in p a re n th e se s ; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 6.9: Controlling for Levels of Wage Inequality
_________Adjusted Wage Gap_______ Adjusted Wage Gap________
SD o f  Log Male Wage -0.395 -0.057
(0.119)** (0.120)
Time Trend 0.022
(0.003)**
Demand index 0.480
(0.172)**
Log Supply Index -0.073
(0.055)
Average num ber kids -0.056 -0.142
(0.037) (0.036)**
Married 0.163 0.033
(0.103) (0.101)
1946-50 0.041 0.047
(0.010)** (0.010)**
1949-53 0.082 0.085
(0.011)** (0.013)**
1952-56 0.115 0.114
(0.013)** (0.016)**
1955-59 0.121 0.116
(0.017)** (0.021)**
1958-62 0.137 0.125
(0.021)** (0.025)**
1961-65 0.154 0.143
(0.025)** (0.029)**
1964-68 0.143 0.138
(0.028)** (0.033)**
1967-71 0.163 0.173
(0.031)** (0.034)**
1970-78 0.193 0.219
(0.035)** (0.039)**
23-25 -0.045 0.016
(0.028) (0.026)
26-28 -0.037 0.078
(0.045) (0.044)
29-31 -0.050 0.105
(0.055) (0.055)
32-34 -0.066 0.104
(0.061) (0.060)
35-37 -0.088 0.070
(0.060) (0.058)
38-41 -0.118 0.016
(0.051)* (0.051)
42-44 -0.109 -0.022
(0.043)* (0.043)
45-47 -0.124 -0.075
(0.040)** (0.040)
48-50 -0.093 -0.063
(0.041)* (0.042)
51-53 -0.102 -0.096
(0.041)* (0.041)*
54-56 -0.094 -0.104
(0.043)* (0.043)*
57-59 -0.070 -0.088
(0.041) (0.041)*
Male IM R mean -0.009 0.029
(0.023) (0.024)
Female IMR mean 0.009 -0.018
(0.021) (0.021)
Constant -0.368 -0.305
(0.070)** (0.076)**
d.o.f 76 75
Adj R2 . 9 6 1 1 2 1 . 5
R2 . 9 7 1 9 4 . 9
Chi squared 8 7 . 1 9 9 6 . 0
(p value) ( . 1 7 9 ) ( . 0 0 1 )
Log likelihood 2 7 0 . 5 2 5 3 . 2
S tandard  erro rs in p a re n th e se s ; * significant a t 5%; ** significant a t 1%
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Table 6.10: Comparing Measures of the Pay Gap by Age and Year
74-76 77-79 80-82 83-85 86-88 89-91 92-94 95-98
20-22 -.286
-.287
-.292
-.289
-.278
-.281
-.202
-.205
-.241
-.238
-.189
-.187
-.144
-.145
-.097
-.103
23-25 -.324
-.330
-.303
-.300
-.308
-.276
-.233
-.233
-.247
-.246
-.222
-.222
-.173
-.176
-.149
-.151
26-28 -.375
-.377
-.308
-.309
-.287
-.293
-.257
-.258
-.224
-.228
-.232
-.235
-.183
-.184
-.206
-.210
29-31 -.484
-.485
-.388
-.387
-.363
-.367
-.286
-.290
-.255
-.258
-.267
-.272
-.195
-.199
-.232
-.230
32-34 -.517
-.515
-.475
-.474
-.404
-.401
-.370
-.365
-.326
-.321
-.303
-.307
-.252
-.253
-.255
-.245
35-37 -.543
-.543
-.526
-.526
-.481
-.481
-.419
-.417
-.419
-.415
-.324
-.318
-.285
-.284
-.304
-.300
38-41 -.556
-.556
-.512
-.512
-.492
-.493
-.475
-.474
-.467
-.465
-.395
-.389
-.359
-.362
-.323
-.330
42-44 -.549
-.552
-.486
-.491
-.448
-.449
-.475
-.473
-.492
-.489
-.407
-.405
-.338
-.336
-.328
-.321
45-47 -.517
-.515
-.488
-.491
-.487
-.487
-.489
-.490
-.445
-.447
-.426
-.418
-.407
-.404
-.359
-.356
48-50 -.482
-.486
-.461
-.407
-.447
-.444
-.488
-.415
-.468
-.416
-.432
-.428
-.435
-.386
-.402
-.367
51-53 -.486
-.486
-.409
-.407
-.444
-.444
-.412
-.415
-.409
-.416
-.427
-.428
-.387
-.386
-.364
-.367
54-56 -.479
-.477
-.416
-.415
-.419
-.422
-.416
-.418
-.433
-.435
-.406
-.408
-.368
-.370
-.287
-.280
57-59 -.479
-.480
-.397
-.399
-.397
-.399
-.380
-.381
-.395
-.397
-.344
-.343
-.339
-.340
-.305
-.316
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Table 6.11: Variance Weighted Least Squares using the Oaxaca Gender Pay
Gap
Gender Gap measured 
as Coefficient on 
female
Oaxaca decomposition wage gap Gender Gap Measured 
as Coefficient on 
female
Oaxaca decomposition wage gap
period .014 .015
(.002)** (.002)**
Demand index .522 .608
(.129)** (.110)**
Supply Index -.069 -.040
(.067) (.065)
Kids -.072 -.061 -.133 -.114
(.039) (.038) (.044)** (.043)*
Married .147 .212 .057 .133
(.111) (.128) (.124) (142)
23-25 -.028 -.056 .001 -.042
(.026) (.031) (.029) (.035)
26-28 -.017 -.055 .050 -.013
(.042) (.047) (.047) (.055)
29-31 -.028 -.072 .070 -.003
(.052) (.057) (.059) (.068)
32-34 -.045 -.099 .067 -.020
(.059) (.062) (.066) (.074)
35-37 -.077 -.131 .036 -.051
(.059) (.062)* (.065) (.072)
38-41 -.114 -.163 -.014 -.094
(.051)* (.056)** (.057) (.065)
42-44 -.119 -.165 -.047 -.118
(.044)** (.049)** (.048) (.056)*
45-47 -.143 -.189 -.096 -.163
(.041)** (.047)** (.046)* (.054)**
48-50 -.118 -.199 -.081 -.181
(.043)** (.049)** (.049) (.056)**
51-53 -.126 -.168 -.111 -.167
(.044)** (.050)** (.050)* (.056)**
54-56 -.125 -.154 -.117 -.156
(.045)** (.050)** (.051)* (.057)**
57-59 -.102 -.127 -.099 -.129
(.043)* (.048)** (.049)* (.054)*
1946-50 .044 .034 .046 .036
(.011)** (.011)** (.013)** (.013)**
1949-53 .083 .073 .086 .071
(.012)** (.012)** (.016)** (.015)**
1952-56 .113 .108 .114 .101
(.014)** (.015)** (.019)** (.018)**
1955-59 .121 .120 .119 .109
(.018)** (.018)** (.025)** (.023)**
1958-62 .132 .134 .129 .117
(.023)** (.023)** (.031)** (.029)**
1961-65 .150 .148 .149 .135
(.027)** (.027)** (.036)** (.034)**
1964-68 .142 .136 .146 .125**omp
(.031)** (.040)** (.039)**
1967-71 .163 .153 .182 .156
(.032)** (.034)** (.042)** (.042)**
1970-78 .205 .208 .222 .218
(.037)** (.037)** (.045)** (.043)**
Constant -.448 -.474 -.344 -.362
(.065)** (.070)** (.071)** (.077)**
d.o.f 79 79 78 78
Adj R2 .957 .946 .939
R2 .967 .959 .954
S tandard  erro rs in p a re n th e se s ; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 6.12: VWLS Regression of Gender Pay Gap by Education Group
Degree Higher As Os No quals
Period
Kids
Married
23-25
26-28
29-31
32-34
35-37
38-41
42-44
45-47
48-50
51-53
54-56
57-59
1946-50
1949-53
1952-56
1955-59
1958-62
1961-65
1964-68
1967-71
1970-78
Constant
Chi Squared 
(p value) 
Adj R2 
R2
-0.009
(0 .010)
-0.073
(0.106)
-0.006
(0.175)
-0.004
(0.051)
0.017
(0.089)
-0.005
(0.130)
0.017
(0.166)
0.062
(0.192)
-0.091
(0.205)
-0.008
(0.203)
-0.008
(0.188)
-0.067
(0.168)
-0.090
(0.161)
-0.091
(0.156)
-0.030
(0.155)
0.055
(0.035)
0.104
(0.042)*
0.143
(0.051)**
0.097
(0.061)
0.101
(0.071)
0.150
(0.078)
0.151
(0.086)
0.093
(0.096)
0.189
(0 .111)
-0.180
(0.076)*
80.1
(.423)
.648
.730
0.005
(0.006)
-0.233
(0.081)**
0.795
(0.219)**
-0.264
(0.073)**
-0.391
(0 .120)**
-0.350
(0.146)*
-0.321
(0.166)
-0.303
(0.176)
-0.288
(0.173)
-0.344
(0.168)*
-0.447
(0.154)**
-0.462
(0.142)**
-0.519
(0.143)**
-0.528
(0.141)**
-0.529
(0.135)**
0.076
(0.025)**
0.095
(0.029)**
0.110
(0.033)**
0.147
(0.041)**
0.192
(0.048)**
0.146
(0.053)**
0.168
(0.057)**
0.222
(0.064)**
0.200
(0.069)**
-0.389
(0.072)**
78.6
(.493)
.723
.787
0.028
(0.008)**
0.145
(0.117)
-0.253
(0.270)
0.025
(0.077)
0.030
(0.123)
-0.061
(0.150)
-0.135
(0.168)
-0.268
(0.177)
-0.279
(0.171)
-0.306
(0.160)
-0.251
(0.153)
-0.209
(0.157)
-0.085
(0.157)
- 0.111
(0.169)
0.026
(0.165)
0.013
(0.035)
0.021
(0.037)
0.032
(0.043)
0.026
(0.049)
-0.004
(0.057)
-0.014
(0.066)
-0.046
(0.072)
0.008
(0.078)
-0.057
(0.087)
-0.324
(0.109)**
64.5
(.880)
.816
.859
- 0.000
(0.004)
-0.048
(0.085)
0.013
(0.217)
-0.013
(0.058)
0.032
(0.096)
0.049
(0 .122)
0.001
(0.139)
0.012
(0.143)
0.003
(0.133)
0.024
(0.116)
0.029
(0 .102)
0.005
(0.099)
0.053
(0 .100)
0.090
(0 .101)
0.094
0.058 7 
(0 .020)** 
0.096 
(0 .022)** 
0.143 
(0.026)** 
0.178 
(0.032)** 
0.207 
(0.037)** 
0.235 
(0.042)** 
0.227 
(0.049)** 
0.279 
(0.049)** 
0.344 
(0.055)** 
-0.478 
(0.116)** 
100.7 
(.051) 
.840 
.877
0.012
(0.003)**
-0.084
(0.065)
0.102
(0.247)
-0.036
(0.052)
-0.041
(0.073)
-0.082
(0.086)
-0.071
(0.091)
-0.103
(0.092)
-0.143
(0.081)
-0.132
(0.076)
-0.156
(0.081)
-0.171
(0.086)*
-0.146
(0.088)
-0.154
(0.092)
-0.133
(0.090)
0.003
(0.017)
0.034
(0 .020)
0.056
(0.024)*
0.069
(0.029)*
0.036
(0.042)
0.146
(0.058)*
0.097
(0.069)
0.096
(0.085)
0.060
(0.105)
-0.396
(0.137)**
104.3
(.030)
.753
.811
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Appendix
Table A6.1: Sample Sizes
Period 74-76 77-79 80-82 83-85 86-88 89-91 92-94 95-98
Age
20-22 2,057 2,175 2,065 1,610 1,691 1,405 1,012 688
23-25 2,050 2,131 1,999 1,640 1,885 1,771 1,400 1,155
26-28 2,182 1,895 1,748 1,486 1,617 1,674 1,490 1,396
29-31 1,900 2,098 1,592 1,373 1,493 1,480 1,405 1,378
32-34 1,675 1,814 1,739 1,281 1,350 1,343 1,281 1,315
35-37 1,588 1,520 1,580 1,472 1,334 1,291 1,207 1,299
38-41 1,682 1,588 1,484 1,313 1,568 1,268 1,197 1,199
42-44 1,626 1,584 1,454 1,128 1,370 1,550 1,166 1,176
45-47 1,755 1,557 1,400 1,056 1,231 1,341 1,287 1,147
48-50 1,737 1,544 1,354 1,012 1,133 1,176 1,219 1,201
51-53 1,821 1,678 1,420 965 1,032 958 879 1,055
54-56 1,828 1,571 1,289 942 946 948 740 803
57-59 1,791 2,025 1,690 1,150 1,047 930 780 741
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Table A6.2: Observations by Year / Cohort and Period / Age
Period 74.76 77-79 80-82 83-85 86-88 89-91 92-94 95-98 Number obs.
Year o f  Birt 
15-20 
19-23 
22-26
ti Cohort 
1
1 1 
1 1 1
1
2
3
25-29 1 1 1 1 4
28-32 1 1 1 1 1 5
31-35 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
34-38 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
37-41 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
40-45 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
43-48 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
46-51 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
49-54 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
52-57 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
55-60 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
58-63 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
61-66 1 1 1 1 1 5
64-69 1 1 1 1 4
67-72 1 1 1 3
70-75 1 1 2
73-78 1 1
Age 20- 23- 26- 29- 32- 35- 38- 42- 45- 48- 51- 54- 57- No.
22 25 28 31 34 37 41 44 47 50 53 56 59 obs.
Year o f  Birth Cohort
15-20 1 1
19-23 1 1 2
22-26 1 1 1 3
25-29 1 1 1 1 4
28-32 1 1 1 1 1 5
31-35 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
34-38 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
37-41 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
40-45 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
43-48 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
46-51 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
49-54 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
52-57 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
55-60 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
58-63 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
61-66 1 1 1 1 1 5
64-69 1 1 1 1 4
67-72 1 1 1 3
70-75 1 1 2
73-78 1 1
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION
This thesis provides an account of some the major changes in patterns of female 
employment in the UK over the last thirty years. It also provides some evidence on 
how the labour market experience of British women differed from that of women in 
other industrialised countries in the 1990s. Major trends in employment and earnings 
have been reviewed, and particular attention has been paid to the employment 
experience of women at different points of the wage distribution, across 
qualification groups and for full and part-time workers.
In the second chapter, the evolution of the full-time female/male wage gap in 
Britain was analysed using microeconomic data. A significant closing of the average 
gender wage gap was observed between the early 1970s and late 1990s, with most of 
the improvement occurring in the late 1980s and 1990s. Among the full-timers 
studied the weekly wage gap rose from around 64 percent in 1978 up to 74 percent 
by 1998. After estimating a range of regression models controlling for detailed 
characteristics we find a weekly wage ratio as high as 86 percent in 1998. However, 
as this time period also saw large rises in wage inequality, and to properly consider 
women's relative wage position it is also necessary to look at the impact of rising 
wage inequality on the gender wage gap. Decompositions based on the full wage 
distribution show that rising wage inequality limited the closing of the gender wage 
gap: had the structure of wages been the same in the 1990s as in the mid-1970s the 
gender wage differential would have closed by twice as much. The estimates also 
suggest that, even with the observed closing of the gender wage gap, by 1998 
women were still paid substantially less than men in otherwise comparable jobs (the 
"corrected" weekly wage gap was about 86 percent in 1998).
Chapter 6.2 looked only at full-time employees. Chapter 6.3 goes on to 
consider the position of those working part-time. Since the 1980s a substantial gap 
has emerged between the pay of full and part time female employees. In 1994-5 
part-time women earned only 69 percent of the full-time female wage. This gap 
appears to have emerged largely because part-time employees are now considerably 
less well qualified than those working full time. Indeed this research indicates that 
there is little or no part-time pay penalty per se. Part time jobs appear to be
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increasingly dichotomously distributed - with the top one fifth of part timers in 
highly paid professional jobs while the majority of workers are stuck in low paid, 
low skill jobs. However, we have also reported evidence that suggests that many 
women working full time would prefer to work part time, but may be unable to do 
so because part-time employment is not available in more highly skilled jobs. This 
constraint on part-time work may exacerbate the observed gap between full- and 
part-time pay. The most immediate policy implication to be drawn from this 
research is that policies should be put in place to improve opportunities for those 
women who want to work part time. Policies, such as the right to return to work part 
time after maternity leave, would go some way towards improving the quality of 
part time jobs on offer.
Children are assumed to be an important factor in determining the size of the 
gender pay gap. Using data from seven countries, we examine whether the pay 
penalty to motherhood found in Anglo-American countries is reproduced in other 
countries. The results for the seven countries examined indicate that, controlling for 
differences in eamings-related characteristics, the effect of children on women’s pay 
is largest in the United Kingdom, followed by the other Anglo-American countries 
and Germany, and smallest in the Nordic countries. The fact that the “family gap” in 
pay is not observed in other countries suggests that policy measures can be effective 
in mitigating the negative impact of children on pay, and moreover that such policy 
responses are essential if the gender pay gap is to close.
In Chapter Five, changes in returns to education are examined by gender. 
The 1970s and 1980s saw rapid increases in the supply of more educated workers. 
However, throughout the 1980s and 1990s simultaneously rising relative wages and 
employment were observed for the more educated. This suggests that relative 
demand rose faster than relative supply, as employers both demanded more educated 
workers and, at the same time, were prepared to pay them relatively higher wages. 
Indeed, changes in relative wages by education show very clearly that changes in 
demand have dominated changes in supply, particularly when one considers 
differences by gender. It is well known that the male/female wage differential has 
fallen in recent years, despite increases in female labour force participation 
(Harkness, 1996). In this chapter show that, while relative demand shifts in favour 
of the more highly educated have occurred for both sexes, they are more marked for
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women than for men (with the exception of recent labour market entrants where 
gender differences are less marked). In particular, there seem to have been very big 
demand shifts in favour of female graduates with degrees in science and engineering 
(and, to a lesser extent, in social studies and business). Finally, when we investigate 
whether one can identify a gender bias associated with skill biased technological 
change we find little evidence of such an effect. Faster skill upgrading appears to 
have occurred in much the same industries for men and women and correlations of 
industrial skill upgrading with computer usage seem to be similar across the sexes. 
This probably suggests that the gender earnings gap has been closing as a result of 
reduced discrimination, which has enabled women to improve their labour market 
position in terms of both wages and employment, and has lead to faster relative 
demand shifts for women than for men. We have only scratched the surface on this 
important question and clearly the extent to which faster relative demand shifts do 
reflect reduced discrimination rather than a gender bias in SBTC is worthy of more 
investigation in future. So is the possible substitution of men and women across the 
skills hierarchy. The comparisons we draw here look at men and women separately. 
A potentially important aspect of recent changes in labour market structure may be 
the extent to which more skilled women are substituting for less skilled men (given 
that according to estimates of wage equations women are still, ceteris paribus, 
cheaper to employ than men within a given skill group. In the final chapter,
The final chapter examined the impact of age, time and year of birth cohort 
on the gender pay gap between 1974 and 1998. At all ages, differences in 
characteristics account for only a small part of the gender pay gap, although they are 
most important in explaining earnings differences for older women in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. Age earnings profiles show that the gender pay gap widens 
considerably between the ages of 20 and 30. Over the last 20 years however, the 
gender pay gap has grown more gradually with age, and this is reflected in 
comparatively large improvements in the relative earnings of women in their late 
20s and 30s. Thus the greatest improvements in relative earnings over this period 
have been for those in their late 20s and early 30s, the ages when women have 
typically taken the most time out of the labour market to care for children.
There are important cohort effects, with successive birth cohort earning 
relatively more from the late 1940s onwards. Once controls for birth cohorts are
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introduced, the negative impact of ageing on the pay gap is considerably reduced. 
Inclusion of controls for year of birth cohort also considerably reduces the 
importance of time in reducing the pay gap. Shifts in the occupational structure of 
demand have also had an important impact on reducing the pay gap. However, 
surprisingly, controlling for the average number of children has no statistically 
significant effect. Finally, the employment and earnings experience of women has 
varied considerably across education groups. While the less qualified still earn much 
less, and are much less likely to work full time, compared to comparably qualified 
men, than women with degrees, those with lower skills have seen the largest 
improvements in their relative position. This may be in large part due to the 
declining fortunes of low skilled men. The model estimated suggests that while 
relative earnings decline with age for the more educated, this is less true of the low 
skilled. Cohort effects, on the other hand, appear to be most important for those with 
intermediate levels of qualifications. In particular, those with no qualifications and 
those with degrees have seen little change in relative earnings across cohorts. This 
could be due to compositional changes in those who achieve these levels of 
qualifications. Finally, the time period dummy suggests that relative earnings have 
improved over time only for those qualified to A level or with no qualifications. For 
the latter group, this time trend may reflect the declining fortunes of low skilled 
men.
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